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Abstract
Privacy is defined as the right to control, edit, manage, and delete information about
oneself and decide when, how, and to what extent this information is communicated to
others. Therefore, every person should ideally be empowered to manage and protect his
own data, individually and independently of others. This assumption, however, barely
holds in practice, because people are by nature biologically and socially interconnected.
An individual’s identity is essentially determined at the biological and social levels. First,
a person is biologically determined by his DNA, his genes, that fully encode his physical
characteristics. Second, human beings are social animals, with a strong need to create
ties and interact with their peers. Interdependence is present at both levels. At the
biological level, interdependence stems from genetic inheritance. At the social level,
interdependence emerges from social ties. In this thesis, we investigate whether, in
today’s highly connected world, individual privacy is in fact achievable, or if it is almost
impossible due to the inherent interdependence between people.
First, we study interdependent privacy risks at the social level, focusing on online
social networks (OSNs), the digital counterpart of our social lives. We show that, even if
an OSN user carefully tunes his privacy settings in order to not be present in any search
directory, it is possible for an adversary to find him by using publicly visible attributes of
other OSN users. We demonstrate that, in OSNs where privacy settings are not aligned
between users and where some users reveal a (even limited) set of attributes, it is almost
impossible for a specific user to hide in the crowd. Our navigation attack complements
existing work on inference attacks in OSNs by showing how we can efficiently find targeted
profiles in OSNs, which is a necessary precondition for any targeted attack. Our attack
also demonstrates the threat on OSN-membership privacy.
Second, we investigate upcoming interdependent privacy risks at the biological level.
More precisely, due to the recent drop in costs of genome sequencing, an increasing num-
ber of people are having their genomes sequenced and share them online and/or with
third parties for various purposes. However, familial genetic dependencies induce indi-
rect genomic privacy risks for the relatives of the individuals who share their genomes.
We propose a probabilistic framework that relies upon graphical models and Bayesian
inference in order to formally quantify genomic privacy risks. Then, we study the inter-
play between rational family members with potentially conflicting interests regarding the
storage security and disclosure of their genomic data. We consider both purely selfish and
altruistic behaviors, and we make use of multi-agent influence diagrams to efficiently de-
rive equilibria in the general case where more than two relatives interact with each other.
We also propose an obfuscation mechanism in order to reconcile utility with privacy in
v
genomics, in the context where all family members are cooperative and care about each
other’s privacy.
Third, we study privacy-enhancing systems, such as anonymity networks, where users
do not damage other users’ privacy but are actually needed in order to protect privacy.
In this context, we show how incentives based on virtual currency can be used and their
amount optimized in order to foster cooperation between users and eventually improve
everyone’s privacy. We derive our analytical findings by relying upon Markov chains,
game theory, and Markov decision processes. This last part demonstrates that other
people can also play a beneficial role in privacy.
We conclude that the quest for online privacy is chimerical because of the lack of in-
dividual control over data. As a consequence, unless cooperation between people quickly
expands, we should consider that online privacy is steadily vanishing, and start designing
novel mechanisms for the upcoming post-privacy era. We should finally redefine privacy,
which is, beyond an individual right, now part of the commons.
Keywords : interdependent privacy, genomic privacy, online social networks (OSNs),
incentives, cooperation, Bayesian inference, graphical models, obfuscation mechanism,
game theory, Markov chains, Markov decision processes, multi-agent influence diagrams
Re´sume´
La protection de la vie prive´e est de´finie comme le droit de controˆler, d’e´diter, de ge´rer,
et d’effacer l’information nous concernant, ainsi que de de´cider quand, comment, et dans
quelle mesure cette information peut eˆtre communique´e a` des tiers. Par conse´quent,
chaque individu devrait ide´alement avoir les moyens de ge´rer et de prote´ger ses propres
donne´es, individuellement et inde´pendamment des autres. Cependant, cette hypothe`se
n’est que peu valable en pratique, car nous sommes par nature interconnecte´s biologique-
ment et socialement. Or, notre identite´ est essentiellement de´termine´e par nos sphe`res
biologique et social. Premie`rement, un individu est de´termine´ par son ADN, ses ge`nes,
qui codent entie`rement ses caracte´ristiques physiques. Deuxie`mement, l’homme est un
animal social, avec un besoin profond de cre´er des liens et d’interagir avec ses sem-
blables. Nous sommes interde´pendants a` ces deux niveaux de notre identite´. Au niveau
biologique, l’interde´pendance est le re´sultat de notre he´ritage ge´ne´tique. Au niveau so-
cial, l’interde´pendance est lie´e a` nos liens sociaux. Dans cette the`se, nous e´tudions si,
dans notre monde hyperconnecte´, la protection de la vie prive´e est possible individu-
ellement, ou si ceci est rendu quasi impossible par l’interde´pendance inhe´rente a` notre
humanite´.
Tout d’abord, nous e´tudions les risques de confidentialite´ lie´s a` notre interde´pendance
au niveau social, en se focalisant sur les re´seaux sociaux en ligne (comme Facebook), qui
sont la projection nume´rique de notre vie sociale. Nous montrons que, meˆme si un
utilisateur de´finit avec soin ses parame`tres de confidentialite´ afin de ne pas eˆtre pre´sent
dans l’annuaire de recherche, il est possible pour un attaquant de le retrouver en utilisant
les attributs des autres utilisateurs accessibles publiquement. Nous de´montrons que,
dans les re´seaux sociaux ou` les re´glages de confidentialite´s ne sont pas similaires entre les
utilisateurs et ou` certains utilisateurs re´ve`lent un ensemble d’attributs (meˆme restreint),
il est pratiquement impossible pour un utilisateur spe´cifique de se cacher dans la masse
des utilisateurs. Notre attaque de navigation comple´mente les travaux existants sur les
attaques d’infe´rence dans les re´seaux sociaux, en montrant comment l’on peut trouver
efficacement des profils cibles dans les re´seaux sociaux, ce qui est une condition ne´cessaire
a` n’importe quelle attaque cible´e. Notre attaque de´montre e´galement la menace qui pe`se
sur la confidentialite´ de l’adhe´sion a` un re´seau social.
Deuxie`mement, nous examinons les risques de confidentialite´ lie´s a` notre in-
terde´pendance au niveau biologique. En particulier, graˆce a` la baisse rapide des couˆts de
se´quenc¸age du ge´nome, un nombre croissant d’individus font se´quencer leur ge´nome et
le partagent en ligne et/ou avec des tiers. Cependant, les de´pendances ge´ne´tiques famil-
iales entraˆınent des risques indirects pour la confidentialite´ des donne´es ge´nomiques des
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membres d’une famille dont certains individus partagent leurs propres ge´nomes. Nous
proposons un mode`le probabiliste qui s’appuie sur les mode`les graphiques et l’infe´rence
baye´sienne pour quantifier formellement les risques lie´s aux donne´es ge´nomiques. Ensuite,
nous e´tudions l’interaction entre des agents rationnels appartenant a` une meˆme famille,
avec des inte´reˆts potentiellement contradictoires concernant la se´curite´ et le partage des
donne´es ge´nomiques. Nous conside´rons a` la fois des comportements e´go¨ıste et altruiste,
et utilisons des diagrammes d’influence multi-agents afin de calculer efficacement des
e´quilibres dans le cas ge´ne´ral ou` plus de deux membres d’une meˆme famille inte´ragissent
entre eux. Nous proposons e´galement un me´canisme de brouillage afin de re´concilier
l’utilite´ avec la protection des donne´es ge´nomiques, dans un contexte ou` tous les membres
de la famille sont coope´ratifs et se soucient de la confidentialite´ des donne´es ge´nomiques
des autres membres.
Troisie`mement, nous e´tudions des syste`mes de protection de la vie prive´e, comme
les re´seaux anonymes, ou` les autres utilisateurs ne nuisent pas notre vie prive´e mais
sont au contraire ne´cessaires a` la protection de cette vie prive´e. Dans ce contexte, nous
montrons comment des incitations base´es sur une monnaie virtuelle peuvent eˆtre utilise´es
et leur quantite´ optimise´e afin d’encourager la coope´ration entre les utilisateurs et en fin
de compte ame´liorer l’anonymat de tous les utilisateurs. Nous obtenons nos re´sultats
analytiques en nous appuyant sur des chaˆınes de Markov, de la the´orie des jeux, ainsi
que sur des processus de de´cision markoviens. Cette dernie`re partie de´montre que les
autres individus peuvent aussi jouer un roˆle positif dans la protection de la vie prive´e.
En conclusion, nous estimons que la queˆte de la confidentialite´ en ligne est une chime`re
a` cause du manque de controˆle individuel sur les donne´es personnelles. Par conse´quent,
a` moins que la coope´ration entre les individus ne se de´veloppe rapidement, nous de-
vrions conside´rer que la confidentialite´ en ligne est en train de disparaˆıtre, et devrions
commencer a` concevoir de nouveaux me´canismes pour l’e`re post-confidentialite´ a` venir.
Nous devrions finalement rede´finir (le droit a`) la vie prive´e, qui est de´sormais, au-dela`
d’un droit individuel, partie inte´grante de nos biens communs.
Mots-Cle´s : interde´pendance dans la protection des donne´es, protection des donne´es
ge´nomiques, re´seaux sociaux en ligne, incitations, coope´ration, infe´rence baye´sienne,
mode`les graphiques, me´canisme de brouillage, the´orie des jeux, chaˆınes de Markov, pro-
cessus de de´cision markoviens, diagrammes d’influence multi-agents
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since its popularization in the 1990s, the Internet has dramatically changed the world
we live in. Among various benefits, the Web has enabled decentralized information and
communication on a large scale, thus diminishing censorship and control over public
opinion by political or economic powers. The Arab Spring of 2011 is certainly the best
example of the positive impact of the Internet on free speech, civic rights, political
freedom and democracy. Social media, such as Facebook or Twitter, were instrumental in
the organization of the protests, and in the dissemination of information. The other side
of this digital revolution is in the new forms of surveillance and control it enables. Billions
of dollars are invested by surveillance agencies in both democratic and authoritarian
regimes to intercept and analyze communication data, and in some countries, to censor
political or religious content. Increasing computing and storage capabilities enable global
data mining and lead to perpetual electronic surveillance.
Surveillance, however, is at odds with privacy, a fundamental human right recog-
nized by the Swiss Federal Constitution (article 13), by the European Convention on
Human Rights (article 8), and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (article
12). In many aspects, privacy (including anonymity) is a condition for democracy, as
it is essential to the preservation of freedom of speech. The protection of sources in
journalism also ultimately relies upon privacy and anonymity. Recent revelations about
mass surveillance by Western government agencies have shed light on the right to pri-
vacy, generating intense debate about the limits of this right and the balance between
privacy and (national) security. These revelations also highlight the privacy risks caused
by trading our data off in return for free services, such as Web search, e-mails, or social
media. We should keep in mind that by doing so, we, as Internet users, are also, and
perhaps primarily, fuelling the current immense privacy erosion.
By the number of their users and the scale of deliberate data disclosure, online social
networks (OSNs) are probably the most relevant example illustrating this phenomenon.
By providing their billion users with platforms for sharing their pictures, videos, inter-
ests, political views, emotions, and other intimate data, online social networks fulfill the
human need for social recognition, gratification and publicity. Social media especially
encourage data over-sharing, as their business model essentially relies on targeted adver-
tising, thus users’ data. But this trend seriously threatens users’ privacy. First, according
to revelations about the PRISM program, companies such as Facebook and Google per-
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mit U.S. and British intelligence to directly tap into their central servers to track foreign
targets [1]. Second, government agencies of authoritarian regimes, even though they do
not have direct access to the OSNs’ servers, also exploit OSNs to infiltrate protesters’ so-
cial networks. Indeed, several Syrian activists reported having been arrested and forced
to reveal their Facebook passwords [141]. Third, recruiters are known to look up OSN
profiles of job applicants, potentially leading to hiring discriminations. Some employers
and colleges even request the Facebook passwords of job applicants and students in order
to get full access to their profiles [156].
Following the over-sharing behavior driven by OSNs, some people have started pub-
licly disclosing their most intimate biological data, i.e. their genetic data. With the help
of rapidly developing technology, the cost of DNA sequencing has dramatically decreased.
This has allowed the availability and use of genomic data in research, healthcare, law
enforcement, and recreational applications. Moreover, individuals can now obtain the
sequencing of a significant part of their DNA (genotype) for less than $100 via direct-
to-consumer genetic testing. These individuals can then use this genomic data to learn
about their ancestries, their predispositions to diseases, and even their (genetic) compati-
bilities with potential partners. Following the trend exemplified by online social networks,
some individuals bring the disclosure of personal data to new heights, by revealing their
genomic data on genome-sharing websites (such as OpenSNP [2] or Personal Genome
Project [3]). Today, there are already thousands of genotypes available online, and this
number continues to increase. The sharing of genomic data might be seen as more benev-
olent than the egocentric storytelling of OSNs,1 but this does not at all diminish the huge
privacy risks inherent to this very sensitive information.
First of all, as genomic data carries information about our predisposition to diseases
and physical traits, it can be used to infer future physical conditions. As a consequence,
access to this data can potentially lead to serious discriminations in health insurance, life
insurance, or mortgages. Furthermore, genomic data could also be used to discriminate
people in their work, sports, and eventually in their whole life ambitions, as very well
portrayed by the 1997 movie Gattaca. Moreover, as it also carries information about
kinship, genomic data can lead to familial nightmares, for instance, divorce caused by
the discovery of illegitimate offspring [5]. Last but not least, as DNA bears detailed
information about our ethnicity and ancestries, it could be leveraged by racist move-
ments to discriminate people based on their genetic origins. We should definitely not
underestimate this risk, which is of low likelihood, but whose effect would be of extreme
magnitude. The European tragedy of the Holocaust should remind us that ethnic dif-
ferences can be exploited for evil ends. We can also imagine how the systematic racial
segregation could have been even worsened if detailed genetic profiles had fallen into
the hands of Nazi authorities [6]. Such tragedies could occur again, against any ethnic
minority, especially with the rise of far-right parties and hate ideas in today’s Europe.
Our duty is to limit the risk of such systematic segregation by preventing the leakage
and dissemination of genomic data.
Following Alan Westin’s definition [171], privacy is the right to control, edit, man-
age, and delete information about oneself and decide when, how, and to what extent
information is communicated to others. Therefore, each person should be empowered to
manage and preserve his own privacy, individually and independently of others. How-
1A recent survey showed that the first motivation of individuals who publicly share their genotypes
was to help research [4].
3ever, there are many online activities where the privacy attitudes of others matter as
much as our own. The best example is probably e-mail service providers that have most
of our e-mails, even if we do not use these e-mail providers ourselves [7]. Unfortunately,
at both social and biological levels of our lives, which together determine our identity,
there exist mutual privacy risks. At the social level, interdependence emerges from our
social ties, our friends, acquaintances or colleagues. Consequently, by their behavior in
OSNs, they can reveal information about us that we cannot control. At the biological
level, interdependence is inherent to genetic inheritance that relates our genome to those
of our family members. Interdependence is an integral part of mankind, and privacy is
no exception.
In this thesis, we investigate how these interdependent risks affect our privacy at
both of the aforementioned levels of lives; we also propose countermeasures and solutions
to mitigate indirect threats caused by others. We conclude this thesis with the study
of privacy-enhancing systems where others, instead of damaging our own privacy, are
actually needed to preserve it, thus demonstrating that interdependence can also be
beneficial to privacy.
Contributions
In this thesis, we explore the problem of interdependent privacy risks and protec-
tion in today’s highly connected world. We primarily study mutual privacy risks
incurred by individuals who are, by nature, biologically and socially interconnected. We
also propose solutions that eventually all require some degree of cooperation among in-
dividuals. Finally, we demonstrate how others can play a positive role for individuals’
privacy when appropriate incentives are put in place.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We study interdependent privacy risks in online social networks. We propose a
navigation privacy attack, where an external adversary exploits the public social
links and public attributes of users to find a target user. We describe a search
algorithm that, in order to efficiently navigate towards target users, relies upon
geographical attributes as well as occupation attributes. Our results show that the
majority of users of two prominent OSNs can be found with our algorithm. This
study complements the existing work on inference attacks in OSNs by showing that
an OSN user cannot hide simply by excluding himself from a central directory or
search function, even in a network with more than one billion users. Our findings
also demonstrate that with the current privacy policies of most OSNs there is
no OSN-membership privacy; for instance, the Syrian activists or job applicants
mentioned above would have no chance of denying the existence of their OSN
accounts. We suggest countermeasures that could easily be implemented by OSN
operators in order to prevent this uncontrollable loss of privacy.
2. Considering the emergence of direct-to-consumer genetic testing and the resulting
increasing use of genomic data for various purposes, we tackle the novel problem of
genomic privacy. The first step in this endeavor is to formally measure the threats.
To this end, we propose a probabilistic framework that relies upon Bayesian in-
ference to quantify the genomic privacy and health privacy risks, including those
induced by a person’s relatives. We show that interdependence within a family
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can have a serious impact on the family members’ privacy levels. We illustrate the
significance of the threat by carrying out a cross-website attack, using OSNs as a
side channel to gather kinship information. Moreover, in the context of personal
genomics, we study the interactions between relatives with different interests and
behaviors regarding the storage security and sharing of their genomic data. We
consider only purely selfish relatives who are willing to maximize only their own
utility. We extend the game-theoretic framework to also take into account the al-
truistic behavior that can stem from familial ties. We also propose to rely upon
multi-agent influence diagrams in order to efficiently predict equilibrium behav-
iors in the general scenario where more than two family members interact with
each other. Finally, we develop a genomic-privacy preserving mechanism based on
obfuscation that allows individuals to share (part of) their genomic data, while
preserving some of the genomic privacy of their relatives. We emphasize that this
is possible only if the family members care about each other, thus would cooperate
with each other.
3. To end on a positive note, we study cooperative privacy-enhancing technologies
where others do not compromise our privacy but actually help improve it. There
are plenty of such systems where we need to rely upon our peers to protect our
privacy. Indeed, one of the current most popular privacy-enhancing tools (Tor [56])
is based on the cooperation of others. The cost of cooperation causes a lack of such
benevolent agents, which remains one of the main issues in Tor. We suggest that
monetary incentives could be put in place in order to foster cooperation of more
users in anonymity networks and in other privacy-enhancing systems. Under this
assumption, we study the optimal amount of virtual money needed to maximize
the efficiency of the system. To achieve this goal, we propose a scrip system model,
which notably enables us to demonstrate that threshold strategies lead to a stable
equilibrium. We evaluate the effect of various parameters on the optimal amount
of money. Finally, we apply our analytical findings to real-world applications, such
as anonymity networks. This part of the thesis demonstrates that our novel scrip
system can help improve fairness and efficiency of cooperative privacy-enhancing
systems via well-designed monetary incentives.
Thesis Outline
Following the three main areas of contributions described above, this thesis contains
three parts. Part I discusses the interdependent privacy risks in online social networks.
In particular, we show in Chapter 2 how any external adversary can find target users by
exploiting publicly revealed information and misaligned privacy settings of OSN users.
In Part II, we study interdependent privacy in the genomic context. In Chapter 3, we
focus on the quantification of genomic privacy risks inherent to kinship. In Chapter 4,
we analyze the interplay between family members with non-cooperative behaviors in the
genomic-privacy context. In Chapter 5, we describe a genomic-privacy preserving mech-
anism that relies upon some degree of cooperation between relatives. In Part III, we
study systems where interdependence can be beneficial for privacy. In Chapter 6, in par-
ticular, we investigate how incentives can be optimized in order to encourage cooperative
5behavior in mutual privacy protection, thus eventually maximizing fairness and efficiency
of the privacy-enhancing systems.
Publications
Chapter 2 is an extended version of [94]. Chapter 3 is an extension of [89], whereas
Chapter 4 is based on the results of [91]. Chapter 5 contains the findings of [90]. Finally,
Chapter 6 rests on the results of [93].

Part I
Interdependent Privacy in Online
Social Networks
7

Chapter 2
Navigating around Privacy in Online
Social Networks
2.1 Introduction
Over the last few years, online social networks (OSNs) have revolutionized the way people
behave and interact with each other over the Internet. OSNs enable the majority of users
to not just be passive consumers of the Web, but to become active producers of content,
and to be storytellers of their own lives for the first time online. The other side of the coin
is that privacy breaches are intrinsically bound to OSNs, and new forms of surveillance
and control have emerged with OSNs. Recruiters are now known to look up Facebook
profiles of job applicants, and hiring discrimination based on OSNs has become a serious
threat [19, 66]. Some employers and colleges even request the Facebook passwords of job
applicants and student athletes in order to get full access to their profiles [156]. OSNs
have also been exploited by government agencies of authoritarian regimes to infiltrate
protesters’ social networks. Several Syrian activists have notably reported having been
arrested and forced to reveal their Facebook passwords [141]. These practices are only
the tip of the iceberg of privacy erosion caused by OSNs.
The first, straightforward method for finding an individual in an online social network
is to rely on a central directory, if available. Obviously, a user u trying to keep his profile
private would opt not to be listed in such a directory or, if this privacy option is not
available,1 make use of a pseudonym. The second method to reach u is to rely on the
social links between users and to navigate via these links towards u. This approach works
if some of u’s friends show their friend lists publicly (thereby exposing u), which is the
default setting in most OSNs.
In order to find a hidden user, an attacker could search the whole public social graph.
However, such an exhaustive search, despite guaranteeing to find any user in the giant
component,2 would certainly be too expensive for OSNs that contain hundreds of millions
users, notably because of the anti-crawling features deployed by virtually all OSNs. To
1Since the end of 2012, Facebook does not allow its members to remove themselves from the search
directory, even though this is considered to be an important privacy setting [75].
2This holds if the search starts from the giant component and the target is in this component too.
This is a fair assumption for current OSNs; for example, in 2011, researchers found that 99.91% of users
belonged to the giant component in Facebook [164].
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reduce the search cost, the attacker can decide to crawl only a targeted subset of OSN
users. In this chapter, we evaluate the feasibility of such an attack for large networks
and ultimately answer the following question: Is it possible to find a target profile by
navigating a small fraction of the whole network, by relying on public attributes of
queried profiles? Answering this question is crucial for privacy, because reaching the
target profile or its neighborhood is the necessary precondition for any targeted attack
such as the inference of hidden attributes (e.g., political or religious views) through other
personal attributes [45, 130], or through friends’ public attributes [115, 135, 54].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work proposing to make use of social
links between users to find a target profile in an OSN. Our navigation attack is generic in
order to apply to any attribute-enhanced OSN (such as Facebook, Google+, or Twitter).
We propose a search algorithm that relies on a space of attributes and distance heuristics
based on A∗ search [83]. The categories of attributes and their priorities can be adapted
to any kind of OSN. We show how the attack can be efficiently carried out, given the
OSN visibility and privacy policies, and the users’ privacy choices, by implementing it
in the two largest OSNs, Facebook and Google+. For this OSN, building upon results
on navigation and routing in social networks, the attack first relies on geographical
attributes only, making use of additional types of attributes (such as education or work)
as soon as it reaches the target’s city. Our results demonstrate that 66.5% of Facebook
users are findable by crawling a median number of users smaller than 400, and 59% of
Google+ users are findable by crawling a median number of users small than 300. This
shows that it is very difficult to hide in an OSN, however large it is, and thus to prevent
targeted attacks and/or to deny the existence of a profile. Moreover, targets’ cities are
reached in 92% and 93.5% of the cases by crawling a median number of 13 and 8 users, in
Facebook and Google+, respectively. This shows the efficiency of geographic navigation
in Facebook and Google+. We propose two main explanations for the failed cases. First,
the targets least likely to be discovered are those who have a small number of friends,
or have privacy-cautious friends (not revealing too much information), or friends whose
revealed information is not similar to their own information. Second, users living in
larger cities tend to be harder to discover than others, especially in Facebook. Whereas
the latter reason is inherent to the structure of the OSN and to the limit we impose
on the number of crawled users, the former is essentially due to the privacy settings of
the targets’ friends and the OSN dynamics. Our results demonstrate that homophily
in social networks [131, 25] does not only allow to infer hidden attributes of OSN users
locally, but also allows to efficiently navigate toward the target. Note that we do not
assume any prior knowledge on the network structure and the users’ distribution in the
network. Moreover, by starting the navigation from a random user in the network, we
consider the worst-case scenario for the attacker, and provide a lower-bound on the attack
efficiency. It is clear that the use of advanced search filters or source users closer to the
target can only further benefit the attacker. We briefly show how this can dramatically
reduce the search cost. Finally, we show that simple countermeasures exist and could be
implemented directly by the OSN operators.
2.2 Model
OSN Model Online social networks can be described as social links between online users
who own a personal profile. Formally, an OSN can be defined as a graph G = (V,E),
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User with public social links 
User with private social links 
Target (with private social links) 
Public social link 
Private social link 
Figure 2.1: OSN model. The target keeps his social links private, but two of his neighbors
make these links public.
where the vertex set, V , represents the set of users3 and E, the edge set, their social
links. Each user u ∈ V is endowed with a set of attributes Au that is a subset of the set A
of the available attributes (gender, birthdate, education, city, ...). OSNs with symmetric
social links requiring mutual consent, such as Facebook or LinkedIn, can be modeled
as undirected graphs, whereas OSNs with asymmetric social links, such as Twitter or
Google+, can be represented as directed graphs.4
In most OSNs, users can decide to what extent and with whom they share information
by appropriately tuning their privacy settings. For instance, in Facebook users can reveal
personal attributes to friends only, to friends of friends, or to everyone in the OSN. The
same settings are generally available for their list of social links. Embedding users’ privacy
settings on their social links into the original social graph G induces a directed public
subgraph D, where directed edges are those whose tail vertices have publicly available
social links. Formally, D = (V,Ed), with Ed = {(u, v)|(u, v) ∈ E,Γ(u) 6= ∅}, where Γ(u)
represents the out-neighbors of u ∈ D. Note that we make the conservative assumption
that all privacy settings except the public one (e.g., everyone in Facebook) are private
(e.g., friends, friends of friends), as we cannot access the information if we are not part
of a user’s close neighborhood. Figure 2.1 shows a simple example of an OSN with 22
users, among which 7 have private social links.
Adversary Model The attacker can be any external curious entity that wants to collect
data or infer information about a target t. We assume that the attacker controls at least
one node and can thus have access to information publicly visible in the OSN. In order
to reach his target, the attacker will search the public subgraph D, relying on all public
3In the rest of the chapter, we will alternatively write user, node or vertex to refer to a member of
the OSN.
4Note that Facebook now also allows asymmetric social links, by enabling users to become subscribers
of other users.
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social links and other public personal attributes (such as place of residence and work,
educational affiliations, hobbies, etc.). We assume this attacker to have prior knowledge
on the values of a subset A′t of t’s personal attributes, that he will use to navigate towards
the target. As the attacker will reach the target through the target’s social links (friends,
friends of friends, ...), he will also discover at least one friend of the target, which can be
useful for friend-based inference attacks [135, 54, 173]. Finally, note that the attacker we
consider in this work is passive, in that he does not subvert any user account or interact
with other OSN users, e.g., to create social ties with them.
2.3 Approach
We present here our navigation attack and algorithm. This attack is generic in order
to apply to any attribute-enhanced OSN. We suppose that the attacker cannot rely on
any search directory to find the target or to jump towards any user close to the target
and that the navigation’s starting point is randomly selected. This helps us evaluate the
feasibility of a navigation attack in the worst-case scenario, and provide an upper-bound
on the number of nodes that need to be crawled before reaching a target in general. In
Subsec. 2.5.2, we nevertheless show how the attacker can take advantage of search filters
to quicken the navigation.
In the generic scenario, the attacker navigates from user to user through public so-
cial links, until he reaches the target. He makes an informed decision about the next
user to visit by relying on information publicly revealed by users at each hop towards
the target and on his prior knowledge about the target. Whereas in Milgram’s experi-
ment [133] every participant in the chain could rely on his own local information about
his acquaintances to make a decision about the next user to select, the attacker here
relies on global information bounded by the attributes publicly revealed by users on the
path. Our navigation attack is represented by Algorithm 1, called TargetedCrawler. This
generic algorithm relies on a heuristic model inspired by A∗ search [83].
The TargetedCrawler’s inputs are (i) the source user s, from which the attacker will
start crawling, (ii) the target user t that he has to reach, (iii) a subset of the target’s
attributes A′t ⊆ At known a priori by the attacker, (iv) the distance functions for each
attribute, and (v) the priority of the attributes. The priorities depend essentially on
the OSN and on the prior knowledge about the target’s attributes. For instance, we
will give higher priority to profession or workplace attributes in job-oriented OSNs (such
as LinkedIn), to interests in microblogging OSNs (like Twitter), or to geographical at-
tributes for mobile OSNs. The highest- and lowest-priority attributes will be represented
as A1 and AN , respectively. The algorithm outputs t’s profile and the shortest discovered
path from s to t.
The total estimated cost cu (line 13) from the source to the target at some node u on
the path is divided into (i) the cost from the source to u, dhop(s, u) (hop distance), and
the estimated remaining cost from u to the target, drem(u, t), that is expressed as
drem(u, t) =
{
khdh(A
h
u, A
h
t ) if dj(A
j
u, A
j
t ) = 0 ∀j < h
k1d1(A
1
u, A
1
t ) otherwise
(2.1)
where dh(A
h
u, A
h
t ) is the distance function between users u and t in the attribute h
(attribute with hth priority). The distance functions can be represented by (i) binary
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Algorithm 1: TargetedCrawler
1: F ← s % Initializing the frontier with the source user
2: E ← ∅ % The explored set is initially empty
3: repeat
4: if F = ∅ then
5: Failure
6: else
7: Select the user u∗ ∈ F with the lowest estimated cost to the target t and
remove it from F
8: E ← u∗
9: if t ∈ Γ(u∗) then
10: Return t’s profile and the path from s to t
11: else
12: for all u ∈ Γ(u∗) do
13: cu = dhop(s, u) + drem(u, t)
14: if u /∈ F AND u /∈ E then
15: F ← (u, cu)
16: else if u ∈ F AND cu < coldu then
17: coldu = cu
18: Replace the former parent of u by u∗
19: until t reached
values (e.g., 0 or 1 for last names), (ii) real values (e.g., difference for ages, or geographical
distance for locations), or (iii) integers based on hierarchical decompositions (e.g., half the
tree distance for tree-based hierarchies). kh is a normalization parameter translating the
attribute distance into a hop distance. kh should decrease with h, as the more attributes
we share, the closer to each other we should be. With drem, the targeted crawler will
reach a user sharing the same first-priority attribute as the target before considering the
second-priority attribute, then reach a user sharing a second-priority attribute before
considering the third-priority attribute, and so on. We conjecture that OSN users share
certain categories of attributes more than others (depending on the OSN) and that these
attributes affect the way users cluster on different OSNs. Thus, in order to increase the
search efficiency, we prioritize different categories of attributes depending on the type of
OSN.
2.4 Experiments
As the current largest OSN (1.1 billion users as of March 2013), Facebook is the most
representative candidate for evaluating our attack. Moreover, its privacy policies are no-
toriously designed to encourage public disclosure: the default policy for many important
user attributes is everybody, i.e., full public visibility.5 We also implemented our attack
in Google+ in order to validate our findings in Facebook. This OSN is now the second
largest OSN after Facebook [169] and shares many privacy features with Facebook. It
also reveals the users’ social links by default but, contrary to Facebook, allows users to
be not searchable by name.
5As of this writing, this is the case for the following attributes: current city, hometown, sexual
orientation, friend list, relationship status, family, education, work, activities, as well as music, books,
movies, and the sports users like.
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2.4.1 Implementation in Facebook and Google+
Gathering Source-Target Pairs Before beginning the navigation attack, we had to collect
source users from which to start and target users to be reached. We chose to select
pairs of users that would act both as source and as target to further evaluate the paths’
symmetry. In order to have representative and meaningful results, we wanted to avoid
sampling biases as much as possible. Unfortunately, as Facebook and Google+ IDs are
encoded over 64 bits, there is a very small probability that a randomly generated ID
corresponds to an existing profile.
For this reason, we decided to sample on the Facebook directory to gather source
and target profiles, as in [45]. The Facebook directory6 has a tree structure, and profiles
are sorted in first-name alphabetical order. The first layer of the tree is divided into
Latin characters and non-Latin characters. Then, all subsequent layers are divided by
alphabetical order into at most 120 subcategories until the fifth layer where we can
actually select users’ profiles. At each layer of the directory tree, we randomly selected
one branch, until we reached the last layer, where we randomly selected one profile.
Unfortunately, Google+ does not provide such a public directory. Thus, we decided
to sample source and target users by relying on a random walk method. Our method
starts by walking through 50 different profiles in order to reach a random profile in the
network. Once we have reached this profile, we select a node with probability inversely
proportional to its (bidirectional) degree to be added to the source-target set. This
probability compensates the random walk bias towards high degree nodes [73]. Finally,
we retain only profiles with at least two publicly accessible attributes, assuming these
to be part of the attacker’s prior knowledge.7 Note that we repeat the random walk
through 50 profiles for each new node that we add into the source-target set. We discuss
selection bias and the representativeness of our target set in Subsection 2.4.2.
Navigating in Facebook and Google+ Because of the very limited Facebook API, we had
to implement our own crawler of users’ friend lists. With the standard HTTP request
to access the friend list, Facebook provides only the first 60 friends of a user. Then,
it dynamically provides the rest of the friends if the Web user scrolls down the friend
list’s page. While the user is scrolling down, his Web browser actually sends an Ajax
request to get the subsequent 60 friends in the friend list. The server replies in about
2 seconds with a JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) object that contains the next 60
friends in the list. We parsed the list of user IDs of each JSON object, as well as the
additional piece of information (if any) provided right below each friend’s name that
would be used for the navigation. We also implemented our own crawler for Google+.
We could get both all outgoing and incoming social links with only two HTTP requests.
Both requests returned a JSON object with the social links’ profiles (names), and some
attributes (including location, employer, education, profile picture) also useful for the
navigation.
Several lessons can be learned from previous work on navigation in social networks:
(i) Geography and occupation are the two most crucial dimensions in choosing the next
hop in a chain [110]; (ii) geography tends to dominate in early stages of routing [58]; (iii)
adding non-geographic dimensions once the chain has reached a point geographically
6http://www.facebook.com/directory
7This does not mean that a target without any publicly available attributes could not be found. We
need this information here to replace the prior knowledge the attacker is assumed to have.
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close to the target can make the routing more efficient [162, 170]; and (iv) seeking hubs
(highly connected users) seems to be effective in some experiments [162, 23] and to have
limited effect in others [58]. As Facebook and Google+ share many properties with
real social networks, we incorporate these findings into our navigation attack in order
to maximize its efficiency. We select location (current city or hometown) as the first-
priority attribute in Algorithm 1, and education, employer/workplace, and last name as
second-priority attributes. We make this choice also because of the OSN structure and
design. All aforementioned attributes are those most publicly shared by the Facebook and
Google+ users. Location (current city or hometown), education and work are publicly
revealed by around 35%, 30%, and 25% of the Facebook users, respectively [45, 78]. In
Google+, location, education, and employer are publicly shared by 26%, 27%, and 21%
of the users, respectively [129]. Moreover, these attributes are directly available from the
social links’ JSON objects, allowing us to not crawl all friends’ profiles individually, and
thus dramatically decreasing the number of HTTP requests and crawling time.
We propose to rely on two different types of distance function to evaluate the similarity
between two locations. The first metric is computed as half the tree distance where the
tree is defined by a discrete geographical hierarchy: d1(A
1
u, A
1
t ) is equal to 3, 2, 1, or 0,
if user u shares a continent, a country, a region/state or a city, respectively, with the
target t. d1(A
1
u, A
1
t ) = 4 if u and t are from different continents. The second distance
metric relies on the real geographical distances between two locations and d1(A
1
u, A
1
t ) is
then defined as
d1(A
1
u, A
1
t ) = max(0, log(dgeo(u, t)/α)) (2.2)
where the logarithm is base-10, dgeo is the great-circle distance (in km), and α is a
normalization constant set to 1 km. We notice that this distance is very close to the
discrete-hierarchy distance (first metric). In order to infer detailed geographical informa-
tion from any location attribute, we relied on GeoNames8, a Web service with a database
containing over 10 million geographical names. More precisely, we used GeoNames (i) to
find the region, country and continent associated with a city in the first distance metric
and (ii) to compute the distance between two locations in the second metric. k1 is set to
2 to get a maximal (theoretical) hop distance of around 8.
We give all non-geographical attributes (education, workplace and last name) second,
thus same, priority. We make these design choices mainly because we can only access
a single attribute in the Facebook users’ friend lists (below each friend’s name). These
structural constraints, imposed by the OSN architecture, lead us to trade off some of
Algorithm 1’s steps against efficiency. Moreover, we make use of a binary distance
function for these second-priority attributes (0 if two attributes match, 1 otherwise)
because (i) we believe it is more efficient to directly select users based on whether they
share the same attribute with the target once we have reached the same city, and (ii)
it is particularly complex to build more elaborate distance functions for last names,
employers, high schools or universities. k2 can be set to any number strictly smaller than
2; we chose k2 = 1.
For simplicity, we verify whether we have reached the target profile by checking his
ID or alias, which both uniquely identify users. An attacker who is not supposed to
know such identifiers will have to check the target’s first and last names that, in addition
to the location, should uniquely identify most of the people. In case there are multiple
8http://www.geonames.org/
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Figure 2.2: Empirical complementary cumulative distributions of (a) the targets’ city
sizes, and (b) the targets’ degrees.
matching targets, the attacker could, for instance, just check the profile pictures of these
few potential targets in order to select the correct target. Facial recognition could be
further used to automatize the targets’ check for targets making use of pseudonyms.9
2.4.2 Dataset Description
We ran our experiments on Facebook from April to November 2012, discontinuously and
not too intensively. In this way, we avoided overloading the system and our crawler
had a behavior similar to an energetic human user. Despite this, we attempted to reach
200 targets, collecting approximately 393k different friend lists, 197 million social links,
and 138 million public user attributes. We also targeted 200 different users in Google+,
during Spring 2013, collecting 398k friend lists and 139 million social links. For the
Google+ crawler, we took similar precautions as for Facebook.
In both Facebook and Google+, we gathered targets in 42 different countries, spread
over all continents. North America encompasses 33.5% of the targets in Facebook and
44% in Google+, Asia 26% in Facebook and 31% in Google+, Europe 18% and 15%,
South America 13.5% and 8%, Africa 7.5% and 1%, and Oceania 1.5% and 1%. The
continent distribution is quite close to the actual distribution of users’ continents, ex-
cept for North America that is a bit over-represented with respect to Europe and Asia.
Regarding the countries, USA represents 26% of the targets in Facebook, followed by
Indonesia, Brazil, and India, with 9.5%, 8.5%, and 8%, respectively. Almost the same
sequence appears in Google+, with USA representing 38% of the targets, India 13%,
Brazil 4%, and Indonesia 4%.
Regarding the targets’ cities, we can notice in Figure 2.2(a) that the populations’
distributions of Facebook and Google+ follow a similar shape, Google+’s targets living in
cities with a bit more inhabitants in general. The average and the median city populations
are equal to 870k and 233k, respectively, in Facebook, and to 2.6M and 440k, respectively,
in Google+.
Regarding the targets’ degrees (friends’ or social links’ numbers), we clearly notice
a phase transition in the degree distribution (Figure 2.2(b)) in Facebook, which is very
9Face recognition has been shown to be very accurate and efficient for subject re-identification in
OSNs [22].
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Table 2.1: Success rates and numbers of crawled nodes for all continents.
Facebook Google+
Continent % success # nodes: mean median % succ. mean med.
North Am. 71.6 1,065 467 67.1 668 272
Asia 51.9 1,061 658 49.2 565 179
Europe 86.1 513 144 53.3 348 72
South Am. 59.3 1,275 445 56.3 667 628
Africa 60 1,500 1,608 67 805 100
Oceania 66.7 2,270 553 100 92 14
similar to the one shown in [164]. Moreover, the average target has 291 friends, which is
fairly close to the global average which was around 278 in April 2012 according to [82].
The targets’ degree distribution is more scattered in Google+, with more targets having
degrees smaller than 100 and greater than 1000. The median number of social links is
equal to 71, smaller than Facebook, but its average is 424, greater than Facebook. It
is hard to link these numbers with other studies, as Google+ is a recent OSN known
to be evolving rapidly [129]. The geographical distance between sources and targets is
quite uniformly distributed between 450 km (shortest distance) and 18,962 km (longest
distance) in Facebook, and between 285 km and 15,814 km in Google+.
2.5 Results
In this section, we will first exhibit the results of our generic navigation attack, showing
its success rate and efficiency. We will also provide some explanations for the failed cases.
We will then mention how, by using some search filters, we can drastically reduce the
crawling effort.
2.5.1 General Results
Our objective is not to launch a brute-force attack by crawling millions of nodes, which
would demand a lot of resources. We rather aim to develop an algorithm that can reach
a specific target in the network in a limited amount of time. For this reason, we decide
to stop the attack after a certain number of crawled nodes, even if the frontier F is not
empty. We choose a limit of 4,000 users, which already takes about 14 hours in Facebook
(much slower than in Google+). We assume this is the maximum bearable time for an
attacker attempting to reach someone in Facebook, and we keep the same limit with
Google+, for consistency. Despite this limit, our attack successfully reaches its target in
66.5% of the cases in Facebook, and 59% of the cases in Google+. Using the Clopper-
Pearson interval in order to evaluate the confidence interval for this success rate, we
find that 95% of the users are reachable with a success rate in the intervals [59.5%, 73%]
and [52%, 66%] for Facebook and Google+, respectively. The Clopper-Pearson interval
is an exact method for calculating binomial confidence intervals. However, it is quite
conservative, thus the intervals above might be wider than what it needs to be in order to
achieve 95% confidence. Table 2.1 shows the success rates, average and median numbers
of crawled nodes, for each continent.
We notice that the North American targets are reached quite successfully in both
OSNs, whereas reaching Asian users are more challenging to reach. We also note that
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Figure 2.3: Success rates with respect to (a) the target’s city size, and (b) his number
of friends. We made use of the Clopper-Pearson method to compute the 95% confidence
intervals.
European targets are reached very successfully in Facebook but not in Google+. Figure
2.3 helps us understand these discrepancies. In particular, Figure 2.3(a) shows that the
success rate drops with the size of the target’s city in Facebook but not with Google+.
We note in Figure 2.3(b) that the success rate increases with the target’s number of
friends, especially in Google+. Lower success rates in Facebook can be explained by
comparing the average numbers of inhabitants for the different continents. We find that
European and North American city populations have averages way below 1M (217k and
449k, respectively), whereas Asia, South America and Africa have average city sizes
close to or above 1M (925k, 1.83M, and 2.46M, respectively). This lower success rate
is certainly due to the fact that, in large cities, our algorithm has to crawl more nodes
in order to cover all the users living in these cities. Our 4,000-node limit is certainly
too low for such cities. However, this does not seem to explain the difference in success
rates in Google+. This is probably due to the fact that Google+ being more recent
and smaller than Facebook, there are less people publicizing the same city, thus less
people to potentially crawl. What seems to have the highest impact on the success rate
in Google+ is the number of friends of the targets. For instance, the median number
of friends in Europe is equal to 33, where it is equal to 81 in North America. This
is certainly due to the fact that the young age of Google+, and smaller adoption by
European users. Note that there is no significant effect of the distance between sources
and targets on the success rate. This shows that it is possible to efficiently navigate
through large geographical distances in Facebook. We must also mention that source
users have no effect on the success rate: all crawls successfully navigate out of the source
neighborhood, and the large majority of them (92% in Facebook and 93.5% in Google+)
reach the target’s city.
We evaluate the nodes’ efficiency by looking at the number of nodes crawled during
our searches. Crawling a node in our experiment means crawling his friend list, not
his personal profile. On average, 983 and 591 nodes needed to be crawled before a
target could be reached, in Facebook and Google+, respectively. Half of the targets were
attained in 380 and 291 or few nodes in Facebook and Google+, respectively. European
targets were especially rapidly reached, after 513 and 348 nodes on average, half of the
targets being found after less than 144 and 72 crawled nodes in Facebook and Google+,
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Figure 2.4: (a) Empirical CCDF of the number of crawled nodes in successful cases, (b)
number of crawled nodes with respect to the target’s city size (number of inhabitants).
respectively. We see in Figure 2.4(b) that the number of crawled nodes is (positively)
correlated to the target’s city size. This is again due to the fact that more nodes will be
seen in larger cities, thus reaching the target after a higher expected number of crawled
nodes. It also tells us that the failures to reach European targets is not due to the city
size but rather to the low number of neighbors. Moreover, for all failed and successful
cases, on average 44 and 28 nodes had to be crawled before reaching a user in the target’s
city, and half of the searches found a user living in the target’s city in less than 13 and
8 crawled nodes, in Facebook and Google+, respectively. This shows that our search
algorithm makes use of long-range social links to efficiently reach the target’s city, and
that the most challenging part of the search is the navigation within the target’s city,
when we have to narrow down the search using second-priority attributes.
The target’s neighborhood also has a huge impact on how easy this target can be
reached. Some targets have only a few friends revealing their friend lists and who display
information similar to the target’s information. These targets have less chance of being
reached. For instance, around 6.5% of the targets have no friends who publicly reveal
their friend list and display information similar to the target’s. Due to their privacy-
cautious friends, these targets are obviously impossible to reach with our attack. Table
2.2 demonstrates the importance, for the success of the attack, of similar attributes being
publicly shared by the target’s friends. The difference between the median number of
attributes (city, or other information) of successful and unsuccessful cases is very signifi-
cant, especially in Google+. Furthermore, the median amount of attributes revealed by
friends of non-reached targets is quite low. This leads us to conclude that, in addition to
the size of the city, the amount of attributes revealed by the target’s friends is crucial to
the attack success. Whereas the influence of the city size is inherent to the OSN structure
and to the 4,000-node limit that we impose, the influence of the target’s friends is due
to the OSN users and their privacy behaviors. Some users might also just have arrived
in their current city, thus not have many friends yet in this city. They might also have
education and work attributes that are not geographically correlated to their location,
thus not be of great help for our attack. In order to improve the attack performance, we
could target more than one cities when needed, e.g., the target’s current city, hometown,
and the city where he studied.
From each subgraph crawled during a successful attack, we reconstructed the shortest
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Table 2.2: Number of similar attributes publicly revealed by the target’s friends with
public friend lists.
Facebook Google+
Success Failure Success Failure
Average Median Ave. Med. Ave. Med. Ave. Med.
City 17 12 8 3 282 45 22 6
Other infos 14.4 7 9.1 3 4 0 0.7 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Number of hops of the shortest crawled paths
N
um
be
r o
f o
cc
ur
en
ce
s
 
 
Facebook
Google+
(a)
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of hops away from the target
%
 o
f i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ty
pe
s
 
 
City (FB)
Non−geo. infos (FB)
Other geo. infos (FB)
City (G+)
Non−geo. infos (G+)
Other geo. infos (G+)
(b)
Figure 2.5: (a) Histograms of the shortest discovered path lengths within the crawled
subgraphs, and (b) evolutions of the information types used to navigate towards the
target (information types shared by users on the shortest paths).
discovered path from the source to the target. Figure 2.5(a) illustrates the distribution
of the shortest discovered path lengths. We notice that it goes from 4 to 18 hops in
Facebook, most of shortest paths being between 9 and 11-hops long. This is approxi-
mately twice the distance found in [35] with the knowledge of the complete social graph.
The shortest paths are between 3 and 11 hops in Google+, most of them being 6 hops
long. This result is similar to the diameter obtained in [74], where 90% of the pairs were
separated by a distance of 5, 6 or 7 hops.
We show in Figure 2.5(b) how the information the nodes on the shortest path (SP)
display evolves. It shows that the city is especially useful 3, 2, and 1 hop(s) before the
target, for both OSNs. At 4 (and more) hops from the target, other (non-local) geo-
graphical attributes are used to navigate towards the target. We also note that other
types of attributes (education, work, or last name) begin to be more used 4 hops before
the target (certainly once we have reached the target’s city) and increase their influence
while getting closer to the target. At the latest hop before the target, the city is repre-
sented in 70% of cases in Facebook and 56% in Google+, non-geographical information
representing around 30% of cases in both OSNs. This shows that geographical informa-
tion remains crucial, but also that other types of information can still be useful when we
get close to the target, as it was already mentioned in [162]. Finally, we note that 25%
of the targets in Google+ were found from a profile sharing no similar attribute with
the target. These targets were reached from a user geographically close (at a median
distance of 32 km) but not sharing the same location.
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2.5.2 Jumping towards the Target
Facebook provides an additional feature in order to help people find their acquaintances
in the network: It allows users to apply search filters on location, education or workplace.
This means that, in addition to the first and last names, we can, for instance, specify the
city of the searched person. We did not want to rely extensively on this feature for our
navigation attack because we wanted to keep it generic and applicable to other OSNs.
However, we show here that the attacker can take advantage of Facebook’s search filters
to facilitate his attack.
We search for the last names and the cities of the targets using the Facebook search
filters, and then crawl the friend lists of the users found by the search directory. We search
for last names because users sharing same last names are more likely to be relatives, thus
to be friends. If more than ten users are found, we select the first ten displayed users
as sources. Of course, our targets can appear in the users found by the search filters, as
we chose targets that are in the Facebook directory for our experiments. Searching for
the last names and the cities of our targets, we directly find the targets in 49.5% of the
search results. As targets are assumed to not be in the directory, we remove them from
the list of users to be crawled. At least 10 users satisfying the search criteria are found
in 30% of the filtered searches, and the search requests output no user in 15% of the
cases. By crawling only the friend lists of users found by our filtered search, we reach the
targets with a success rate of 16.5%. This means that an attacker can find a target in
only one hop (and a maximum of 10 crawled nodes) in 16.5% of the cases by relying on
the Facebook search filters. It is interesting to note that 18.2% of the targets discovered
in one hop are targets that were not found by our generic attack. Most of these are living
in large African or South American cities. The size of these cities is probably the reason
our targeted crawler did not find them in less than 4,000 crawled nodes.
2.6 Countermeasures
Countermeasures should logically be developed and implemented by the OSN operators
themselves. An obvious solution, already advanced in [161], is to set the visibility policy
as the intersection of visibility policies selected by all users involved in the published
information. Although it is difficult to force a friend to change his privacy settings on
his personal attributes, it is possible to enforce his social links’ privacy policy. Choosing
the intersection of both users’ policies on social links would mean that a user electing
to reveal his social links to his friends, or friends of friends only, would automatically
enforce non-public social links for his own friends. It would prevent any curious stranger
from accessing his profile by using his friends’ friend lists. Another change in the privacy
policies could be to automatically remove users who are not in the search directory from
their peers’ friend lists. OSN operators could finally also prevent anyone from publicly
showing his social links, as it is the case in LinkedIn. They could at least design non-
public default privacy settings on social links. Detailed formal requirements to protect
multilateral privacy are presented in [80].
If the OSN operators themselves do not re-design their privacy policies, the users
could also take action. The first option is to change the default privacy settings on
social links to more restrictive settings. For this option though, users must collectively
deviate from the default policy in order for it to be efficient. Another strategy is to
22 CHAPTER 2. NAVIGATING AROUND PRIVACY IN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
unfriend “dangerous” friends who publicly reveal their social links and other personal
attributes. However, this strategy, already envisaged in a more general setting in [78],
can dramatically spoil users’ experiences and social lives. Finally, if more users decided
to hide their personal attributes (such as city, education, ...), the attacker’s ability to
navigate efficiently in the social graph would decrease, thus reducing the threat presented
in this chapter.
The last and most extreme countermeasure is certainly to change the full OSN archi-
tecture, and rely on a decentralized architecture with encrypted personal data and social
links (e.g., [49, 96]), even though it seems too involved to be accepted by most of the
OSN users.
2.7 Related Work
We present here the most closely related work on privacy threats in OSNs, showing how
our work complements existing attacks. We also discuss the background on navigation
in social networks.
2.7.1 Privacy Issues in Online Social Networks
Acquisti and Gross were among the first to mention the potential risks induced by in-
formation sharing in OSNs in their seminal papers [76, 21]. They study in detail the
Facebook privacy settings and data visibility, and they emphasize the potential threats
caused by weak privacy settings (used by most users). In [117] and [118], Krishnamurthy
and Wills study what types of information are shared with whom, by default or not, and
what kind of privacy settings are available for various pieces of personally identifiable
information. They show that, among 12 OSNs, 10 publicly reveal social links by default
and 1 reveals them always (i.e., without any possibility of changing the settings). 7 reveal
by default the user’s location and 5 always reveal it. 8 reveal the attended schools by
default and 6 the employers. These statistics are relevant for our work as they show what
kind of attributes are publicly revealed, and thus can be used for the navigation.
He et al. [84] were among the first to propose inference attacks based on the users’
neighborhood. They make use of Bayesian inference and multi-hop inference to predict
private attributes based on the friends, and friends of friends of the targeted users. The
authors apply their analytical findings to a LiveJournal dataset with hypothetical at-
tributes. In the same vein, Lindamood et al. propose to infer political affiliation (binary
attribute: liberal or conservative) based on a modified Naive Bayes classifier [127]. Their
results show that simply sanitizing user attributes or links is not enough to prevent
inference attacks. Johnson [104] also emphasizes that social links can leak very sensi-
tive information about a specific Facebook user, for instance whether a certain user is
homosexual or not.
Zheleva and Getoor [174] propose novel inference attacks based on social links and
group memberships, which they apply in four different social networks. Another work on
inference of undisclosed attributes proposes to rely on any of the user’s public attributes,
and on any of the aggregates of his friends’ attributes [115]. Finally, Chaabane et al. [45]
show how music interests can be used to infer private sensitive attributes of Facebook
users. Their approach does not rely on users’ social links or group memberships, but
only on users’ attributes.
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Thomas et al. [161] examine how the lack of joint privacy controls can put a user’s
privacy at risk. Notably, they highlight the inherent interdependent privacy risks due
to friends in Facebook, and the fact that a user had no control over his friends’ friend
lists. They present inference techniques that, based on wall posts and friends, present
improvements compared to previous work by relying only on friends to infer private
attributes. Yamada et al. [173] also emphasize the impact of conflicting privacy policies
on users’ privacy. They propose 3 different attacks: friend-list, profile and wall-post
recovery attacks. Dey et al. [54] estimate the leakage of age information in Facebook,
either by relying on the target’s profile directly, or by using information released by the
targets’ friends.
While these previous papers exploit the notion of homophily to infer hidden attributes
of a user from the visible attributes of his neighbors, our work exploits the global struc-
ture of visible attributes to navigate efficiently towards a target. While the former is a
purely local operation, ours exploits a macroscopic property of the social network. It
complements existing work by showing how to efficiently find anyone in an OSN, neces-
sary condition for any targeted inference attack.
Finally, Jain and Kumaraguru propose an integrated system which uses major dimen-
sions of a user identity (profile, content and network) to search and link a user across
multiple social networks [97]. Our work notably differs in the method used to search for
a user. Our navigation attack does not require the targeted user to be present in multiple
OSNs, and does not assume the target profile to be known in one OSN in order to find
him in another.
2.7.2 Navigation in Social Networks
The seminal experiment by Milgram [133] shows that any arbitrarily selected individuals
can reach any other person through a short chain of acquaintances. There generally
exists a short path from any individual to another, thanks to a few long-range social
links. However, knowing that short chains exist does not tell us how arbitrary pairs
of strangers are able to find them. Since Milgram’s experiment, there have been many
theoretical and experimental papers that explain how people can find short paths, and
thus navigate, in social networks [126].
Travers and Milgram ask 296 arbitrarily selected individuals in the United States to
generate acquaintance chains (using postal mail) to a single target person. Out of the
296 starting chains, 64 reach the target (22% of completion rate) with a mean number
of intermediaries between the sources and the target of 5.2 [162]. They also show that
chains converge essentially by using geographic information; but once in the target’s city,
they often circulate before entering the target’s circle of acquaintances. Dodds et al.
propose a similar social-search experimental approach except that they rely on e-mails
instead of classic postal service to reach a target [58]. This allows them to increase the
number of targeted individuals (18 in 13 countries, instead of 1 target) and the number of
distinct chains (24,163 instead of 296). In total, 384 out of the 24,163 chains reach their
targets, showing an extremely low chain completion rate of 1.6% with an average chain
length of 4.05. They show that geography clearly dominates the routing strategies of
senders at early stages of the chains and is less frequently used than other characteristics
(such as occupation) after the third step.
On a more theoretical side, Kleinberg develops a graphical model, d-dimensional
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lattices encompassing the small-world properties, and derives several analytical results,
notably showing the conditions under which a decentralized algorithm that uses only
local information could efficiently (i.e., in polylogarithmic time) route messages from a
source to a target [112, 113]. Considering another model, rank-based friendship, Kumar
et al. prove that greedy routing can find a short path (of expected polylogarithmic
length) from an arbitrary source to a target as long as the doubling dimension of the
metric space of locations is low [120].
Watts et al. present a hierarchical model for categorical organization in social net-
works for message routing. They define the social distance between two people as the
minimum ultrametric distance over all group hierarchies [170]. Eppstein et al. study the
existence of mathematical frameworks that demonstrate the feasibility of local category-
based routing in social networks [61]. They notably introduce the notion of membership
dimension that characterizes the cognitive load of performing routing tasks in a given
system of categories. Their results show how participants in a social network, while re-
membering an amount of information that is polylogarithmic in the size of the network,
can efficiently route messages by using a local, greedy, category-based routing strategy.
Liben-Nowell et al. study the role of geography in order to route messages in social
networks and provide a theoretical model to explain path discovery [126]. To the best
of our knowledge, they are the first to analyze routing in an “online” social network,
namely the LiveJournal social network. However, they limit themselves to the problem
of reaching the target’s city. Among other results, they show that geography remains a
crucial factor in online friendship and is thus very helpful when trying to reach a target.
Lattanzi et al. extend this one-dimensional approach based on geographical proximity
to a multidimensional space of interests relying on a model of social networks called
“affiliation networks” [123].
Knowing that acquaintances’ and social networks show small-world properties, we
now question whether current OSNs do so as well. Mislove et al. already provided a piece
of the answer to that question in 2007 [134]. The four considered OSNs exhibit power-law
degree distributions, a densely connected core of high-degree nodes linking small groups of
strongly clustered nodes and, as a result, short path lengths. Wilson et al. make another
step in that direction, by crawling a significant portion of Facebook and showing its
small-world properties [172]. A crucial step in providing evidence about the small-world
characteristics of OSNs has recently been achieved with the publication of two reports
by Facebook researchers on the Facebook full social graph [164, 35]. Their dataset of 721
million users follows the main small-world properties: 99.91% users belong to the largest
component, the distribution of nodes degree follows a power-law distribution, and the
average distance between users equals 4.7, showing that online social networks are even
smaller than real-world social networks. We can thus predict that, by relying on users’
attributes, most OSNs should also be navigable. However, how to efficiently navigate
on them was until now an open question. Furthermore, Facebook reports considered the
full social graph, with all social links, whereas the attacker assumed in this work would
not have access to all those links. In this chapter, we study whether the public subgraph
induced by the users’ privacy settings on their social links is navigable by relying on
publicly revealed attributes.
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2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced a navigation privacy attack, where an external adver-
sary attempts to find a target user by exploiting publicly visible attributes of intermediate
users. We describe a search algorithm that relies on public attributes of users and dis-
tance heuristics. As most attributes (such as place of residence, age, or alma mater) tend
to correlate with social proximity, they can be exploited as navigational cues while crawl-
ing the network. The problem is exacerbated by privacy policies where an OSN user who
keeps his profile private remains nevertheless visible in his friends’ “friend lists”, leading
to interdependent privacy risks.
Our search algorithm discovers more than 66% of the targeted Facebook users and
59% of the targeted Google+ users, in a median number of crawled nodes smaller than 400
in Facebook, and smaller than 300 in Google+. Moreover, the targets’ cities are reached
in 92%, respectively 93.5%, of the cases, in a median number of 13, respectively 8, crawled
nodes, showing the efficiency of geographic navigation in Facebook and Google+. The
navigation within the targets’ cities, that rely on more attributes, is less efficient and
successful. One important reason for the failed cases is the privacy behaviors of the
target’s friends: the more friends have public attributes and public social links, the more
likely the target is to be found. This demonstrates the crucial role of social ties in OSNs,
who can have a non-negligible impact on our own privacy. Finally, we highlight the
increased risk induced by advanced search filters in OSNs.
Our results suggest that an OSN user cannot hide simply by excluding himself from
a central directory or search function. This leads us to conclude that it is urgent that
OSN operators implement countermeasures to thwart navigation attacks, thus to reduce
interdependent privacy risks. The most obvious one is to set by default the social links
(friend lists) to be non-public.
Consequences of our Work In addition to being a required prerequisite for most of the
targeted attacks already proposed in the literature, our navigation attack also demon-
strates that it is in most cases impossible for a user to claim that he does not have any
account in a given OSN, thus jeopardizing OSN-membership privacy. This is of partic-
ular relevance when considering the Arab Spring. It is well-known that the successful
protest against the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes was channeled by social media, and in
particular Facebook. The security officials of those countries were apparently unprepared
for such a threat and the rulers were toppled. But, meanwhile, the Syrian government
seems to have learned the lesson. Several Syrian activists have indeed reported having
been arrested and forced to reveal their Facebook passwords [141]. Of course, one of first
reaction of an arrested activist was to claim that he did not have any Facebook account,
but the police had already found his profile and were monitoring him. Considering our
results, most political activists could never hide in Facebook. Our results also apply to
the job applicants who were required by recruiters to allow for access to their entire pro-
files [156]. These individuals would also be affected by the attack shown in this chapter.
Most of them could not claim that they do not have any Facebook account. This leads
us to conclude that OSN-membership privacy is in jeopardy.
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Chapter 3
Quantifying Kin Genomic Privacy
3.1 Introduction
With the help of rapidly developing technology, DNA sequencing is becoming less ex-
pensive. As a consequence, large collections of human genomes are now available to
geneticists, which dramatically increases the speed of genomic research and paves the
way to personalized medicine. Furthermore, individuals can obtain the sequencing of the
most significant part of their DNA (genotype) for less than $100 via direct-to-consumer
genetic testing. Individuals are then using their genotypes to learn about their (genetic)
predispositions to diseases, their ancestries (e.g., on 23andMe [8]), and even their (ge-
netic) compatibilities with potential partners (e.g., on GenePartner [9]). This trend has
also caused the launch of genome-sharing websites and online social networks (OSNs),
in which individuals share their genomic data (e.g., OpenSNP [2] or 23andMe [8]).1
Thus, already today, thousands of genomes are available online and this number keeps
increasing.
Even though most of the genomic sequences on the Internet are anonymized, many
individuals publish their genomes under their real identities (e.g., on OpenSNP). Fur-
thermore, it has been shown that anonymization is not sufficient for protecting the real
identities of the genome donors [81, 158]. The genome containing very sensitive informa-
tion about ethnicity, kinship, and predisposition to diseases, its leakage/usage can lead
to genetic discrimination (e.g., by employers or insurance companies) [29, 62], and even
divorce [5]. Some believe that they have nothing to hide about their genetic structure,
hence they might decide to give full consent for the publication of their genomes on the
Internet to help genomic research. However, our DNA sequences are highly correlated
to our relatives’ sequences. The DNA sequences between two random human beings are
99.9% similar, and this value is even higher for closely related people due to familial in-
heritance. Consequently, somebody revealing his genome does not only damage his own
genomic privacy, but also puts his relatives’ privacy at risk [154]. Moreover, currently, a
person does not need consent from his relatives to share his genome online, thus making
the protection of genomic privacy even more complicated.
A recent New York Times’ article [10] reports the controversy about sequencing and
1A survey about users’ motivation for and fear about genome sharing can be found in [4].
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publishing, without the permission of her family, the genome of Henrietta Lacks (died
1951). On the one hand, the family members think that her genome is private family
information and it should not be published without the consent of the family. On the
other hand, some scientists argue that the genomes of current family members have
changed so much over time (due to gene mixing during reproduction), that nothing
accurate can be told about the genomes of current family members by using Henrietta
Lacks’ genome. We will show in this chapter that they are, at least partially, wrong.
Unfortunately, the Lacks family is only the tip of iceberg. As mentioned before, thousands
of genomes are already available online, thus there are currently thousands of families
facing the same threat. Once the identity of a genome donor is known, an attacker can
learn about his relatives (or family tree) by using an auxiliary side channel, such as an
OSN, and infer significant information about the DNA sequences of the donor’s relatives.
We show the feasibility of such an attack in Section 3.5.
Although the researchers took Henrietta Lacks’ genome oﬄine from SNPedia, other
databases continued to publish portions of her genomic data. Unfortunately, publishing
only portions of a genome does not, however, completely hide the unpublished portions;
even if a person reveals only a part of his genome, other parts can be inferred using
the statistical relationships between the nucleotides in his DNA. For example, James
Watson, co-discoverer of DNA, made his whole DNA sequence publicly available, with the
exception of one gene known as Apolipoprotein E (ApoE), one of the strongest predictors
for the development of Alzheimer’s disease. However, it was shown that the correlation
(called linkage disequilibrium by geneticists) between one or multiple polymorphisms and
ApoE can be used to predict the ApoE status [137]. Thus, an attacker can also use these
statistical relationships (which are publicly available) to infer the DNA sequences of a
donor’s family members, even if the donor shares only part of his genome. It is important
to note that these privacy threats not only jeopardize kin genomic privacy, but, if not
properly addressed, these issues could also hamper genomic research due to untimely fear
of potential misuse of genomic information.
In this chapter, we evaluate the genomic privacy of an individual threatened by his
relatives revealing their genomes. Focusing on the most common genetic variant in
human population, single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), and considering the statistical
relationships between the SNPs on the DNA sequence, we quantify the loss in genomic
privacy of individuals when one or more of their family members’ genomes are (either
partially or fully) revealed. To achieve this goal, first, we design a reconstruction attack
based on a well-known statistical inference technique. The computational complexity of
the traditional ways of realizing such inference grows exponentially with the number of
SNPs (which is on the order of tens of millions) and relatives. In order to reduce the
complexity and infer the values of the unknown SNPs in linear complexity, we represent
the SNPs, family relationships and the statistical relationships between SNPs on a factor
graph and use the belief propagation algorithm [139, 119] for inference. Then, using
various metrics, we quantify the genomic privacy of individuals and show the decrease in
their level of genomic privacy caused by the genomes of their family members. We also
quantify the health privacy of the individuals by considering their (genetic) predisposition
to certain serious diseases. We evaluate the proposed inference attack and show its
efficiency and accuracy by using real genomic data of a pedigree. More importantly, by
using genomic data and familial information we collected from a public genome-sharing
website and OSNs, we show that the proposed inference attack threatens not only the
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Lacks family, but also many other families. We define in this chapter the quantification
concepts and formalism that we will rely upon in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2 Background
In this section, we briefly introduce the relevant genetic principles, as well as the concept
of belief propagation.
3.2.1 Genomics
DNA is a double-helix structure that consists of two complementary polymer chains.
Genetic information is encoded on the DNA as a sequence of nucleotides (A,T,G,C) and
a human DNA includes around 3 billion nucleotide pairs. With the decreasing cost of
DNA sequencing, genomic data is currently being used mainly in the following two areas:
(i) clinical diagnostics, for personalized genomic medicine and genetic research (e.g.,
genome-wide association studies2), and (ii) direct-to-consumer genomics, for genetic risk
estimation of various diseases or for recreational activities such as ancestry search. In
the following, we briefly introduce some concepts, which we use throughout this thesis,
about the human genome and reproduction.
Single Nucleotide Polymorphism
As already mentioned, human beings have 99.9% of their DNA in common. Thus, there
is no need to focus on the whole DNA but rather on the most important variants. Single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) is the most common DNA variation in human popula-
tion. A SNP occurs when a nucleotide (at a specific position on the DNA) varies between
individuals of a given population (as illustrated in Figure 3.1). There are approximately
50 million SNP positions currently known in the human population [11]. Recent discover-
ies show that the susceptibility of an individual to several diseases can be computed from
his SNPs [103, 12]. For example, it has been reported that two particular SNPs (rs7412
and rs429358) on the Apolipoprotein E (ApoE) gene indicate an (increased) risk for
Alzheimer’s disease. SNPs carry privacy-sensitive information about individuals’ health,
hence we will quantify health privacy focusing on individuals’ published (or inferred)
SNPs and the diseases they reveal.
Two different nucleotides (called alleles) can usually be observed at a given SNP
position: (i) the major allele is the most frequently observed nucleotide, and (ii) the
minor allele is the rare nucleotide. From here on, we represent the major allele as B for
a SNP position, and the minor allele as b (where both B and b are in {A, T,G,C}).
Furthermore, each SNP position contains two nucleotides (one inherited from the
mother and one from the father, as we will discuss next). Thus, the content of a SNP
position can be in one of the following states: (i) BB (homozygous-major genotype),
if an individual receives the same major allele from both parents; (ii) Bb (heterozygous
genotype), if he receives a different allele from each parent (one minor and one major);
or (iii) bb (homozygous-minor genotype), if he inherits the same minor allele from both
parents. For simplicity of presentation, in the rest of the thesis, we encode BB with 0,
2Examination of many genetic variants in different individuals to determine if any variant is associ-
ated with a trait.
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Figure 3.1: Reproduction and single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). Each parent pro-
duces gametes that are derived from his or her genome. The offspring’s genome is the
combination of these two gamets. As an example, the SNP circled on the offspring’s
genome is homozygous-minor for the offspring but heterozygous for the parents.
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Table 3.1: Mendelian inheritance probabilities FR(XiM,XiF,XiC) for a SNP gi, given
different genotypes for the parents. The probabilities of the child’s genotype is repre-
sented in parentheses. Each table entry represents
(
P (XiC = BB|XiM,XiF), P (XiC =
Bb|XiM,XiF), P (XiC = bb|XiM,XiF)
)
.
Bb with 1, and bb with 2. Finally, each SNP gi has a minor allele frequency (MAF),
pimaf, which represents the frequency at which the minor allele b of the corresponding
SNP occurs in a given population (typically, 0 < pimaf < 0.5).
Reproduction
Mendel’s First Law states that alleles are passed independently from parents to children
for different meioses (the process of cell division necessary for reproduction). For each
SNP position, a child inherits one allele from his mother and one from his father (as
shown in Figure 3.1). Each allele of a parent is passed on to a child with equal prob-
ability of 0.5. Let FR(XiM,XiF,XiC) = P (XiC|XiM,XiF) be the function modeling the
Mendelian inheritance of a SNP gi, where M , F , and C represent mother, father, and
child, respectively. We illustrate the Mendelian inheritance probabilities in Table 3.1.
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Linkage Disequilibrium
Linkage disequilibrium (LD) [63] is a correlation that appears between any pair of SNP
positions in the whole genome due to the population’s genetic history. Because of LD, the
content of a SNP position can be inferred from the contents of other SNP positions. The
strength of the LD between two SNP positions is usually represented by the correlation
coefficient r2, where r2 = 1 represents the strongest LD relationship.
3.2.2 Belief Propagation
Belief propagation [139, 119] is a message-passing algorithm for performing inference on
graphical models (Bayesian networks, Markov random fields). It is typically used to
compute marginal distributions of unobserved variables conditioned on observed ones.
Computing marginal distributions is hard in general as it might require summing over an
exponentially large number of terms. The belief propagation algorithm can be described
in terms of operations on a factor graph, a graphical model that is represented as a
bipartite graph. One of the two disjoint sets of the factor graph’s vertices represents the
(random) variables of interest, and the second set represents the functions that factor
the joint probability distribution (or global function) based on the dependences between
variables. An edge connects a variable node to a factor node if and only if the variable is
an argument of the function corresponding to the factor node. The marginal distribution
of an unobserved variable can be exactly computed by using the belief propagation algo-
rithm if the factor graph has no cycles. However, the algorithm is still well-defined and
often gives good approximate results for factor graphs with cycles. Belief propagation
is commonly used in artificial intelligence and information theory. It has demonstrated
empirical success in numerous applications including LDPC codes [140], reputation man-
agement [31], and recommender systems [30].
3.3 The Proposed Framework
In this section, we formalize our approach and present the different components that will
allow us to quantify kin genomic privacy. Figure 3.2 gives an overview of the framework.
The SNPs of all relatives are represented by the random variable X that takes value
in the set X = {0, 1, 2}n×m, where n is the number of relatives in the targeted family
and m is the number of SNPs in a single DNA sequence. Moreover, the hidden SNPs
are represented by the random variable XH (that takes value in the set XH), and the
SNPs observed by the adversary by the random variable XO (that takes value in the
set XO). We define R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn} to be the set of relatives in the targeted family
(whose family tree, showing the familial connections between the relatives, is denoted as
T ) and G = {g1, g2, . . . , gm} to be the set of SNPs (i.e., positions on the DNA sequence).
Let Xij , respectively x
i
j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, represent the random variable representing SNP gi of
individual rj , respectively its value. Furthermore, we let xi =
[
x1i x
2
i · · · xmi
]
represent
the values of the SNPs of individual ri, and x ∈ X be the n×m matrix representing the
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the proposed framework to quantify kin genomic privacy. Each
vector xj (j ∈ {1, . . . , n}) includes the set of SNPs for an individual in the targeted
family. Furthermore, SNP gi of relative rj is represented by x
i
j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Once the
health privacy is quantified, the family should ideally decide whether to reveal less or
more of their genomic information through the genomic-privacy preserving mechanism
(GPPM). The optimization of the GPPM is presented in more details in Chapter 5.
values of the SNPs of all relatives:
x =

x11 x
2
1 · · · xm1
x12 x
2
2 · · · xm2
...
...
. . .
...
x1n x
2
n · · · xmn
 (3.1)
FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC) is the function representing the Mendelian inheritance probabilities
(in Table 3.1), where M , F , C represent mother, father, and child, respectively. The
m×m matrix L represents the pairwise linkage disequilibrium (LD) values between the
SNPs in G, that can be expressed by r2; lij refers to the matrix entry at row i and column
j. lij > 0 if i and j are in LD, and lij = 0 if these two SNPs are independent (i.e., there
is no LD between them). The m-size vector pmaf =
[
p1maf p
2
maf · · · pmmaf
]
represents the
minor allele probabilities (or MAF) of the SNPs in G. Finally, note that, for any rk ∈ R,
gi ∈ G, and gj ∈ G, the joint probability P (Xik,Xjk) can be derived from lij , pimaf, and
pjmaf.
The adversary carries out a reconstruction attack to infer the value xH ∈ XH by
relying on his background knowledge, FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC), L, pmaf, and on his observation
xO ∈ XO.3 After carrying out this reconstruction attack, we evaluate genomic and health
privacy of the family members based on the adversary’s success and his certainty about
the targeted SNPs and the predispositions to diseases they reveal.
3xo is constructed by replacing hidden SNPs in x by ⊥.
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3.3.1 Adversary Model
An adversary is defined by his objective(s), attack(s), and knowledge. The objective of
the adversary is to compute the values of the targeted SNPs for one or more members of
a targeted family by using (i) the available genomic data of one or more family members,
(ii) the familial relationships between the family members, (iii) the rules of reproduction
(in Section 3.2.1), (iv) the minor allele frequencies (MAFs) of the nucleotides, and (v)
the population LD values between the SNPs. We note that (i) and (ii) can be gathered
online from genome-sharing websites and OSNs, and (iii), (iv), and (v) are publicly known
information. Note that, in the future, the increasing possibility to accurately sequence,
and to impute the actual haplotypes carried by an individual in each of the copies of the
diploid genome will allow a more accurate inference of relatives’ genotype than relying
on population LD patterns only.
Various attacks can be launched, depending on the adversary’s interest. The ad-
versary might want to infer one particular SNP of a specific individual (targeted-SNP-
targeted-relative attack) or one particular SNP of multiple relatives in the targeted family
(targeted-SNP-multiple-relatives attack) by observing one or more other relatives’ SNP
at the same position. Furthermore, the adversary might also want to infer multiple
SNPs of the same individual (multiple-SNP-targeted-relative attack) or multiple SNPs
of multiple family members (multiple-SNP-multiple-relatives attack) by observing SNPs
at various positions of different relatives. In this chapter, we propose an algorithm that
implements the latter attack, from which any other attacks can be carried out. We
formulate this attack as a statistical inference problem.
3.3.2 Inference Attack
We formulate the reconstruction attack (on determining the values of the targeted SNPs)
as finding the marginal probability distributions of the random variable XH representing
the hidden SNPs, given the observed values xO, familial relationships T , and the publicly
available statistical information. We represent the marginal distribution of a SNP gi for
an individual rj as P (X
i
j = x
i
j |XO = xO).
These marginal probability distributions could traditionally be extracted from
P (XH = xH|XO = xO,FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC), L, T ,pmaf), which is the joint probability
distribution function of of the hidden SNPs, given the available side information and the
observed SNPs. Then, clearly, each marginal probability distribution could be obtained
as follows:
P (Xij = x
i
j |XO = xO) = (3.2)∑
xH′∈XH\X ij
P (XH′ = xH′ ,X
i
j = x
i
j |XO = xO,FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC), L, T ,pmaf),
(3.3)
where XH′ is the random variable representing all SNPs except SNP gi of relative rj .
However, the number of terms in (3.3) grows exponentially with the number of vari-
ables, making the computation infeasible considering the scale of the human genome
(which includes tens of million of SNPs). In the worst case, the computation of the
marginal probabilities has a complexity of O
(
3nm
)
. Thus, we propose to factorize the
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joint probability distribution function into products of simpler local functions, each of
which depends on a subset of variables. These local functions represent the conditional
dependences (due to LD and reproduction) between the different SNPs represented by
X. Then, by running the belief propagation algorithm on a factor graph, we can compute
the marginal probability distributions in linear complexity (with respect to nm).
A factor graph is a bipartite graph containing two sets of nodes (corresponding to
variables and factors) and edges connecting these two sets. Following [119], we form a
factor graph by setting a variable node xij for each random variable X
i
j (gi ∈ G and
rj ∈ R). We use two types of factor nodes: (i) familial factor node, representing the
familial relationships and reproduction, and (ii) LD factor node, representing the LD
relationships between the SNPs. We summarize the connections between the variable
and factor nodes below (Figure 3.3):
• Each variable node xij has its familial factor node f ij and they are connected.
Furthermore, xik (k 6= j) is also connected to f ij if k is the mother or father of j (in
T ). Thus, the maximum degree of a familial factor node is 3.
• Variable nodes xji and xmi are connected to a LD factor node gj,mi if SNP gj is in
LD with SNP gm. Since the LD relationships are pairwise between the SNPs, the
degree of a LD factor node is always 2.
Given the conditional dependences given by reproduction and LD, the global dis-
tribution P (XH = xH|XO = xO,FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC), L, T ,pmaf) can be factorized into
products of several local functions, each having a subset of variables from x as arguments:
P (XH = xH|XO = xO,FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC), L, T ,pmaf) =
1
Z
[ ∏
gi∈G
∏
rj∈R
f ij(x
i
j ,x
i
m(j), x
i
f(j),FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC),pmaf)
]
×
[ ∏
ri∈R
∏
(j,m) s.t.
ljm 6=0
gj,mi (x
j
i , x
m
i , ljm)
]
,
(3.4)
where Z is the normalization constant, and xim(j), respectively x
i
f(j), are the SNPs gi of
the mother, respectively father, of ri (if they exist in T ).
Next, we introduce the messages between the factor and the variable nodes to compute
the marginal probability distributions using belief propagation. We denote the messages
from the variable nodes to the factor nodes as µ. We also denote the messages from
familial factor nodes to variable nodes as λ, and from LD factor nodes to variable nodes
as β. Let X(ν) = {xij(ν) : rj ∈ R, gi ∈ G} be the collection of variables representing the
values of the variable nodes at the iteration ν of the algorithm. The message µ
(ν)
i→k(x
i
j
(ν)
)
denotes the probability of xij
(ν)
= ` (` ∈ {0, 1, 2}), at the νth iteration. Furthermore,
λ
(ν)
k→i(x
i
j
(ν)
) denotes the probability that xij
(ν)
= `, for ` ∈ {0, 1, 2}, at the νth iteration
given xim(j), x
i
f(j), FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC), and pmaf. Finally, β(ν)k→i(xij
(ν)
) denotes the prob-
ability that xij
(ν)
= `, for ` ∈ {0, 1, 2}, at the νth iteration given the LD relationships
between the SNPs.
For the clarity of presentation, we choose a simple family tree consisting of a trio
(i.e., mother, father, and child) and 3 SNPs (i.e., |R| = 3 and |G| = 3). In Figure 3.3, we
show how the trio and the SNPs are represented on a factor graph, where r1 represents
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Figure 3.3: The factor graph representation of a trio (mother, father, child) and 3 SNPs
per family member. The message passing described in the main text is between the nodes
x11, f
1
3 , and g
1,2
1 highlighted in the graph.
the mother, r2 represents the father, and r3 represents the child. Furthermore, the 3
SNPs are g1, g2, and g3. We describe the message exchange between the variable node
representing the first SNP of the mother (x11), the familial factor node of the child (f
1
3 ),
and the LD factor node g1,21 . The belief propagation algorithm iteratively exchanges
messages between the factor and the variable nodes in Figure 3.3, updating the beliefs on
the values (in xH) of the targeted SNPs at each iteration, until convergence. We denote
the variable and factor nodes x11, f
1
3 , and g
1,2
1 with the letters i, k, and z, respectively.
The variable nodes generate their messages (µ) and send them to their neighbors.
Variable node i forms µ
(ν)
i→k(x
1
1
(ν)
) by multiplying all information it receives from its
neighbors excluding the familial factor node k.4 Hence, the message from variable node
i to the familial factor node k at the νth iteration is given by
µ
(ν)
i→k(x
1
1
(ν)
) =
1
Z
×
∏
w∈(∼k)
λ
(ν−1)
w→i (x
1
1
(ν−1)
)×
∏
y∈{z,g11,3}
β
(ν−1)
y→i (x
1
1
(ν−1)
), (3.5)
where Z is a normalization constant, and the notation (∼ k) means all familial factor
node neighbors of the variable node i, except k. This computation is repeated for every
neighbor of each variable node. It is important to note that the message in (3.5) is valid
if the value of x11 is unobserved to the adversary. However, the value of x
1
1 can also be
observed by the adversary. In this case, if x11 = ρ (ρ ∈ {0, 1, 2}), then µ(ν)i→k(x11
(ν)
= ρ) = 1
and µ
(ν)
i→k(x
1
1
(ν)
) = 0 for other potential values of x11 (regardless of the values of the
messages received by the variable node i from its neighbors).
Next, the factor nodes generate their messages. The message from the familial factor
node k to the variable node i at the νth iteration is formed using the principles of belief
propagation as
λ
(ν)
k→i(x
1
1
(ν)
) =
∑
{x12,x13}
f13 (x
1
1, x
1
m(1)), x
1
f(1))FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC),pmaf)
∏
y∈{x21,x31}
µ
(ν)
y→k(x
1
1
(ν)
).
(3.6)
4The message µ
(ν)
i→z(x
1
1
(ν)
) from the variable node i to the LD factor node z is constructed similarly.
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Note that f13 (x
1
1, x
1
m(1)), x
1
f(1))FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC),pmaf) ∝
P (x11|x1m(1)), x1f(1))FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC),pmaf), and this probability is computed us-
ing Table 3.1. Furthermore, if the degree of the familial factor node is 1 for a particular
SNP, then the local function corresponding to the familial factor node only depends on
the MAF of the corresponding SNP. For example, the degree of f11 (in Figure 3.3(c))
is 1, hence f11 (x
1
1, x
1
m(1)), x
1
f(1))FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC),pmaf) ∝ P (x11|p1maf). The above
computation must be performed for every neighbor of each familial factor node.
Similarly, the message from the LD factor node z to the variable node i at the νth
iteration is formed as
β
(ν)
z→i(x
1
1
(ν)
) =
∑
x21
g1,21 (x
1
1, x
2
1, l12)
∏
y∈{x21}
µ
(ν)
y→k(x
1
1
(ν)
). (3.7)
As before, this computation is performed for every neighbor of each LD factor node. We
further note that g1,21 (x
1
1, x
2
1, l1,2) ∝ P (x11, x21), which is derived from l1,2, p1maf, and p2maf.
The algorithm proceeds to the next iteration in the same way as the νth iteration.
The algorithm starts at the variable nodes. Thus, at the first iteration of the algorithm
(i.e., ν = 1), the variable node i sends messages to its neighboring factor nodes based on
the following rules: (i) If the value of x11 is hidden from the adversary, µ
(1)
i→k(x
1
1
(1)
) = 1
for all potential values of x11 and, (ii) if the value of x
1
1 is observed by the adversary and
x11 = ρ (ρ ∈ {0, 1, 2}), µ(1)i→k(x11
(1)
= ρ) = 1 and µ
(1)
i→k(x
1
1
(1)
) = 0 for other potential values
of x11. The iterations stop when all variable nodes have converged to stable distributions.
The marginal probability of each variable in XH is given by multiplying all the incoming
messages at each variable node representing an unobserved SNP.
3.3.3 Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of the proposed inference attack is proportional to the
number of factor nodes. In our setting, there are nm familial factor nodes and a maximum
of nm(m − 1)/2 LD factor nodes. Hence, the worst-case computational complexity per
iteration is O
(
nm2
)
. However, as each SNP is in LD with a limited number of other
SNPs, the matrix L is sparse and the number of LD factor nodes grows with m rather
than with m(m − 1)/2, especially if we focus on SNPs in strong LD only. Thus, the
average computational complexity per iteration is O
(
nm
)
. Based on our experiments, we
can state that the number of iterations before convergence is a small constant, between
10 and 15. Note finally that this complexity can be further reduced by using similar
techniques developed for message-passing decoding of LDPC codes (e.g., working in log-
domain [46]).
3.3.4 Genomic-Privacy Metrics
A crucial step towards protecting genomic privacy is to quantify the privacy loss induced
by the release of genomic information. Through the inference attack, the adversary
infers the targeted SNPs belonging to the members of a targeted family by using his
background knowledge and observed genomic data (of the family members). The in-
ferred information can be expressed as the posterior distribution P (XH = xH|XO =
xO,FR(XiM ,XiF ,XiC), L, T ,pmaf). Moreover, each posterior marginal probability distri-
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bution is represented as P (Xij = xˆ
i
j |XO = xO),5 for all rj ∈ R, gi ∈ G. We propose
to quantify kin genomic privacy using the following metrics: expected estimation error
(incorrectness) and uncertainty.6
Correctness was already proposed in the context of location privacy [152]. In our
scenario, correctness quantifies the adversary’s success in inferring the targeted SNPs.
That is, it quantifies the expected distance between the adversary’s estimate on the
value of a SNP, xˆij and the true value of the corresponding SNP, x
i
j . This distance can
be expressed as the expected estimation error as follows:
Eij =
∑
xˆij∈{0,1,2}
P (Xij = xˆ
i
j |XO = xO)
∥∥xij − xˆij∥∥. (3.8)
Privacy can also be represented as the adversary’s uncertainty [55, 147], that is the
ambiguity of P (Xij = xˆ
i
j |XO = xO). This uncertainty is generally considered to be
maximum if the posterior distribution is uniform. This definition of uncertainty can be
quantified as the (normalized) entropy of P (Xij = xˆ
i
j |XO = xO) as follows:
Hij =
−∑xˆij∈{0,1,2} P (Xij = xˆij |XO = xO) logP (Xij = xˆij |XO = xO)
log(3)
:=
H(Xij |XO)
log(3)
.
(3.9)
The higher the entropy is, the higher is the uncertainty.
Finally, we propose another entropy-based metrics that quantifies the mutual de-
pendence between the hidden genomic data that the adversary is trying to recon-
struct, and the observed data. This is quantified by mutual information I(Xij ; XO) =
H(Xij)−H(Xij |XO) [24]. As privacy decreases with mutual information, we propose the
following (normalized) privacy metrics:
Iij = 1−
H(Xij)−H(Xij |XO)
H(Xij)
=
H(Xij |XO)
H(Xij)
. (3.10)
The aforementioned metrics are useful for quantifying the genomic privacy of individ-
uals. In order to quantify a more tangible privacy, we must convert these genomic-privacy
metrics into health-privacy metrics. To quantify an individual’s health privacy, we focus
on his predisposition to different diseases. Let Sd be the set of SNPs that are associated
with a disease d. Then, a metric quantifying the health privacy for an individual ri
regarding the disease d can be defined as follows:
Ddi =
1∑
k:gk∈Sd ck
∑
k∈Sd
ckG
k
i , (3.11)
where Gki is the genomic privacy of SNP gk of individual ri, computed using (3.8), (3.9),
or (3.10), and ck is the contribution of SNP k to disease d.
7 Other health-privacy metrics
based on non-linear combinations of genotypes or combinations of alleles will be defined
in future work. Note that health-privacy metrics are valid at a given time, and cannot
be used to evaluate future privacy provision, as genome research can change knowledge
on the contribution of SNPs to diseases.
5We use here xˆij to refer to the estimate of x
i
j .
6These metrics are not specific to the proposed inference attack; they can be used to quantify genomic
privacy in general.
7These contributions are determined as a result of medical studies. Some SNPs might increase (or
decrease) the risk for a disease more than others.
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3.3.5 Genomic-Privacy Preserving Mechanism
Individuals willing to share genomic data for research or recreational purposes might
be unwilling to share all their DNA sequence, and thus need to properly obfuscate the
sensitive part(s) before releasing their genomic data. To do so, their DNA will go through
an obfuscation process, that we call genomic-privacy preserving mechanism (GPPM).
GPPM can be implemented using one of the following techniques: (i) hiding the SNPs,
or (ii) reducing the precision or the quantity of the revealed SNPs.
Hiding all or specific SNPs can be achieved either by not releasing them or by en-
crypting them. Obviously, not releasing any of the SNPs would hinder genetic research,
thus it is not a preferred way to protect the genomic privacy of individuals. Instead of
not releasing the SNPs, the use of cryptographic algorithms to encrypt the genome is
proposed. For example, Kantarcioglu et al. propose using homomorphic encryption on
the SNPs of the individuals to perform genetic research on the encrypted SNPs [106].
However, the security of an individual’s genome should be guaranteed for at least 70-100
years (i.e., during the typical lifetime of a human). As we show in this chapter, even life-
long protection is not enough, considering kin privacy implications (e.g., for offsprings).
It is known that even the best of the cryptographic algorithms we use today could be bro-
ken in around 30 years. Therefore, the appropriateness of cryptographic techniques for
storing and processing the genomic data has been questioned due to long-term security
requirements of the genomic data.
As an alternative to the cryptographic techniques, utility can be traded off for privacy.
The precision of the revealed SNPs can be reduced, for example, by revealing only one
of the two alleles of a SNP. Similarly, family members’ SNPs can be selectively revealed
by also considering the previously revealed SNPs from the corresponding family (to keep
the genomic privacy of other family members above a desired threshold): we evaluate
the privacy provided by this technique in Section 3.4 by assessing the inference power of
the adversary for different fractions of observed data from a targeted family. Eventually,
using one of the above techniques, the GPPM will take x as input and output the matrix
xO of observed SNPs. We detail the GPPM and its optimization in Chapter 5.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of the proposed inference attack, then
compare the performance of the inference with and without considering the linkage dis-
equilibrium (LD) between SNPs, and finally evaluate the entropy-based metrics with
respect to the expected estimation error in quantifying the genomic privacy.
For this evaluation, we use the CEPH/Utah Pedigree 1463 that contains the partial
DNA sequences of 17 family members (4 grandparents, 2 parents, and 11 children) [59].
We note in Figure 3.4 that we only use 5 (out of 11) children for our evaluation because (i)
11 is much above the average number of children per family, and (ii) we observe that the
strength of adversary’s inference does not increase further (due to the children’s revealed
genomes) when more that 5 children’s genomes are revealed. As the SNPs related to
important diseases, like Alzheimer’s, are not included in this dataset, we quantify health
privacy in Section 3.5 by using the data collected from a genome-sharing website.
To quantify the genomic privacy of the individuals in the CEPH family, we focus on
their SNPs on chromosome 1 (which is the largest chromosome). We rely on the three
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Figure 3.4: Family tree of CEPH/Utah Pedigree 1463 consisting of the 11 family mem-
bers that were considered. The symbols ♂ and ♀ represent the male and female family
members, respectively.
metrics introduced in Section 3.3.4. That is, we compute the genomic privacy of each
family member using the expected estimation error in (3.8), the (normalized) entropy in
(3.9), and the (normalized) mutual information in (3.10) on the targeted SNPs, and we
average the result based on the number of targeted SNPs for each individual. We rely
on the L1 norm to measure the distance between two SNP values in (3.8).
First, we assume that the adversary targets one family member and tries to infer
his/her SNPs by using the published SNPs of other family members without considering
the LD between the SNPs. We select an individual from the CEPH family and denote him
as the target individual. We construct G, the set of SNPs that we consider for evaluation,
from 80k SNPs on chromosome 1. Thus, the targeted SNPs are the 80k SNPs of the
target individual. Furthermore, we gradually fill the matrix of xO of observed SNPs
with the values of the 80k SNPs of other family members. That is, we sequentially
reveal 80k SNPs (in G) of all family members (excluding the target individual) beginning
with the most distant family members from the target individual (in terms of number of
hops in Figure 3.4) and we keep revealing relatives until we reach his/her closest family
members.8
In Figure 3.5 we show the evolution of the genomic privacy of three target individuals
from the CEPH family (in Figure 3.4): (i) grandparent (GP1), (ii) parent (P5), and
(iii) child (C7). We note that all entropy-based metrics for each target individual start
from the same values. We also observe that the parent’s and the child’s genomic privacy
decreases considerably more than the grandparent’s (the adversary’s error for the grand-
parent’s genome does not go below 0.3). Moreover, the observation of GP3, GP4 and
P6’s genomes has no effect on GP1 and P5’s privacy as their genomes are independent (if
no other relatives’ genomes are observed). We observe in Figure 3.5(a) that the grand-
parent’s genomic privacy is mostly affected by the SNPs of the first revealed children
(C7, C8), and also by those of his spouse and his child (P5). We also observe (in Fig-
ure 3.5(b)) that, by revealing all family members’ SNPs (expect P5), the adversary can
almost reach an estimation error of 0. The target parent’s genomic privacy significantly
8The exact sequence of the family members (whose SNPs are revealed) is indicated for each evalua-
tion.
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of the genomic privacy of the (a) grandparent (GP1), (b) parent
(P5), and (c) child (C7). We reveal all the 80k SNPs on chromosome 1 of other family
members starting from the most distant family members of the target individual (in
terms of number of hops to the target individual in Figure 3.4); the x-axis represents
the disclosure sequence. We note that x = 0 represents the prior distribution, when no
genomic data is observed by the adversary.
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Figure 3.6: Evolution of the genomic privacy of the (a) grandparent (GP1), (b) parent
(P5), and (c) child (C7), with and without considering LD. For each family member, we
reveal 50 randomly picked SNPs (among 100 SNPs in S), starting from the most distant
family members, and the x-axis represents the exact sequence of this disclosure. Note
that x = 0 represents the prior distribution, when no genomic data is revealed.
decreases only with the observation of his children’s and spouse’s SNPs. Finally, we ob-
serve in Figure 3.5(c) that C7’s genomic privacy decreases smoothly with the observation
of his grandparents’ SNPs, and then of his siblings’. We also observe a slight decrease
of privacy once the parents’ SNPs (P5 and P6) are also revealed, but the observation of
parents (after the other children) does not have a significant effect on the adversary’s
error. It is important to note that the importance of a family member for the inference
power of the adversary also depends on the sequence at which his/her SNPs are revealed
in Figure 3.5. For example, in Figure 3.5(c), if the SNPs of the parents (P5 and P6) of
the target child (C7) were revealed before her siblings (C8-C11), then the observation of
her parents would reduce the genomic privacy of the target child more than her siblings
(but the final genomic privacy would not change).
Next, we include the LD relationships and observe the change in the inference power
of the adversary using the LD values. We construct G from 100 SNPs on chromosome 1.
Among these 100 SNPs, each SNP is in LD with 5 other SNPs on average. Furthermore,
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Figure 3.7: Evolution of the global privacy for the whole family by gradually revealing
10% of family’s SNPs.
the strength of the LD (r2 value in Section 3.2.1) uniformly varies between 0.5 and
1 (where r2 = 1 represents the strongest LD relationship, as discussed before). We
note that we only use 100 SNPs for this study as the LD values are not yet completely
defined over all SNPs, and the definition of such values is still an ongoing research. As
before, we define a target individual from the CEPH family, and sequentially reveal
other family members’ SNPs to observe the decrease in the genomic privacy of the target
individual. We observe that individuals sometimes reveal different parts of their genomes
(e.g., different sets of SNPs) on the Internet. Thus, we assume that for each family
member (except for the target individual), the adversary observes only 50 random SNPs
from G (instead of all the SNPs in G), and these sets of observed SNPs are different
for each family member. In Figure 3.6, we show the evolution of genomic privacy of
three target individuals when the adversary also uses the LD values. We observe that
LD decreases genomic privacy, especially when few individuals’ genomes are revealed. As
more family member’s genomes are observed, LD has less impact on the genomic privacy.
We also evaluate the inference power of the adversary to infer multiple SNPs among
all family members, given a subset of SNPs belonging to some family members, and
also considering the LD between SNPs. That is, we evaluate the inference power of the
adversary for different fractions of observed data for the family members. Using the same
set of 100 SNPs, we construct xo from (κ × 100 × n) SNPs, randomly selected from all
family members, where n is the number of family members in the family tree (n = 11 for
this scenario), and 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1. We assume that the SNPs that are not in xo are hidden
from the adversary (i.e., in xH), and we observe the inference power of the adversary
for all the SNPs in x, for different increasing values of κ. In Figure 3.7, we observe
an exponential decrease in the global genomic privacy (privacy of all family members),
showing that the observation of a small portion of the family’s SNPs can have a huge
impact on genomic privacy. The estimation error is decreased by around 3 by observing
only the first 10% of the SNPs.
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3.5 Cross-Website Attacks
In order to show that the proposed inference attack threatens not only the Lacks family,
but potentially all families, we collected publicly available data from a genome-sharing
website and familial relationships from OSNs, and evaluated the decrease in genomic and
health privacy of people due to the observation of their relatives’ genomic data.
3.5.1 OpenSNP and Facebook
We gathered individuals’ genomic data from OpenSNP [2], a website on which people can
publicly share sets of SNPs. Then, we identified the owners of some gathered genomic
profiles by using their names and sometimes profile pictures. Among these identified
individuals, we managed to find family relationships of 6 of them (who publicly reveal the
names of some of their relatives) on Facebook.9 We expect this number to increase in the
future, as more health-related OSNs (which let people share their genomic profiles, such
as 23andMe [8]) emerge. Furthermore, we anticipate that the current widely used health-
related OSNs (e.g., PatientsLikeMe [13]) will let users upload and share their genomic
data. We identified 29 target individuals from 6 different families, whose genomic data
can be inferred using the observed SNPs of the identified individuals.
We focus on 2 individuals I1 and I2 out of these 6 identified individuals and evaluate
the genomic and health privacy for their family members. We observed that both I1
and I2 publicly disclosed around 1 million of their SNPs. Furthermore, we identified the
names of (i) 1 mother, 2 sons, 2 daughters, 1 grandchild, 1 aunt, 2 nieces, and 1 nephew
of I1, and (ii) 1 sibling, 1 aunt, 1 uncle, and 6 cousins of I2 on Facebook. We compute the
genomic and health privacy of these target individuals using the (normalized) entropy in
(3.9) on the targeted SNPs, and normalize the result based on the number of targeted
SNPs for each individual. We do not use the expected estimation error in (3.8), as we
do not have the ground truth for the genomes of the target individuals. Thus, privacy is
quantified as the uncertainty of the adversary in this section.
To quantify the genomic privacy of the target individuals (i.e., family members of
I1 and I2), we first construct G from all SNPs on chromosome 1 (from the observed
genomes of I1 and I2). The set of observed SNPs includes the observed SNPs of I1
(respectively I2) for the inference of family members of I1 (respectively I2). The set
of targeted SNPs includes 77k SNPs for I1’s family and 79k for I2’s family for each
evaluation. In Figure 3.8, we show the decrease in the genomic privacy for different
family members of I1 (aunt, niece/nephew, grandchild, mother, child) and I2 (cousin,
aunt/uncle, sibling) as a result of our proposed inference attack, first without considering
the LD dependencies (similarly to previous section). We observe that, as expected, the
decrease in the genomic privacy of close family members is significantly higher than that
of more distant family members. However, as we have seen in Section 3.4 and we will show
in the next Subsection, the observation of one (or more) additional family member(s)
has often much more impact on the target’s privacy than the observation of only one
relative.
In Figure 3.9, we display the decrease of genomic privacy with respect to 100 SNPs of
chromosome 1.10 We first show the different privacy levels by using all 100 SNPs of the
9According to [79], around 12% of Facebook users publicly share at least one family member on their
profiles.
10We consider only 100 SNPs here for the same reason as in Section 3.4.
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Figure 3.8: Attacker’s uncertainty about all SNP values on chromosome 1 for two different
families gathered on Facebook, without using LD. A stands for aunt, N for niece/nephew,
GC for grandchild, M for mother, C for child, U for uncle. Same notations are used in
Figures 3.9 and 3.10.
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Figure 3.9: Attacker’s uncertainty about values of 100 SNPs on chromosome 1 for two
families gathered on Facebook, by observing (i) all 100 SNPs of the relative that reveals
his/her genome, and (ii) only 50 SNPs but using LD.
observed relative (i.e., I1 or I2), and then show the same by using only 50 SNPs of the
observed relative and LD values. We note that the use of LD decreases privacy slightly
more for the first familyt than for the second family. This is because we randomly picked
50 different SNPs for both families, and those picked in the second family had weaker
LD relationships with other SNPs. We finally observe that the difference between the
two observation cases (50 SNPs with LD and 100 SNPs without LD) is higher for close
relatives (mother, child, or sibling) than for others.
We also evaluate the health privacy of the family members of I1 and I2 considering
their predispositions to various diseases. We first noticed that almost all important SNPs
for privacy-sensitive diseases affected by genomic factors, like Alzheimer’s, ischemic heart
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Figure 3.10: Adversary’s uncertainty about Alzheimer’s disease predisposition for two
families gathered on Facebook.
disease, or macular degeneration, were revealed by I1 and I2. Due to lack of space,
we focus on Alzheimer’s as it is one of the most important diseases that are mainly
attributable to genetic factors. Having two ApoE4 alleles (in SNPs rs7412 and rs429358
located on chromosome 19) dramatically increases an individual’s probability of having
Alzheimer’s by the age of 80. Thus, the contents of these two SNPs carry privacy-sensitive
information for individuals. We use the metrics in (3.11) to quantify the health privacy
of family members for Alzheimer’s disease. We assign equal weights to both associated
SNPs (as their combination determines the predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease). In
Figure 3.10, we show the attacker’s uncertainty about the predisposition to Alzheimer’s
disease for the family members of I1 and I2. We notice a decrease of around 0.2 (from
0.5 to 0.3) in uncertainty between close relatives. Clearly, the knowledge of the SNPs of
more relatives would further worsen the situation.
3.5.2 OpenSNP and Genealogy Website
We gathered individuals’ genomic data from OpenSNP.org here too. Then, we matched
47 OpenSNP profiles (who provided their full names) with profiles on genealogy websites
(that included familial information), clearly showing us the scale of the threat. We
noticed that three of the individuals identified on OpenSNP were associated to the same
family (which is hereafter referred to as the target family). Furthermore, from the family
tree, we obtained the names of 3 target individuals (only considering ancestors up to the
grandparents of youngest identified individual revealing his SNPs) in the same family,
as shown in Figure 3.11(a). We emphasize again that these 3 target individuals did
not publicly share any genomic data and that they would possibly be against such a
disclosure. We compute the health privacy of these 3 targets about their predispositions
to Alzheimer’s disease by using the same SNPs as in Subsection 3.5.1.
In Figure 3.11(b), we show the attacker’s uncertainty about the predisposition to
Alzheimer’s disease for the target individuals. We notice a decrease of 40% for the
father, and of 60% for both the grandmother and the grandfather, compared to their
initial privacy (prior, without any information about the genomes of their relatives).
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Figure 3.11: Quantification of health privacy for one family (with three relatives revealing
their SNPs) found in a genealogy webiste. (a) The family tree of the target family,
where black means that the genomic data of the family member is publicly available
on OpenSNP, and grey means it is not. (b) Adversary’s uncertainty about Alzheimer’s
disease predisposition of family members whose genomes are not publicly available.
This demonstrates that the more genomic data is shared, the less privacy is provided to
the family members.
3.6 Related Work
Stajano et al. were among the first to raise the issue of kin privacy in genomics and
to suggest discussing questions such as; Should you be allowed to disclose your genome
if other relatives do not want to? [154]. Cassa et al. provide a framework for mea-
suring the risks to siblings of someone who reveals his SNPs [44]. They show that the
inference error is substantially reduced when the sibling’s SNPs are known, compared
to when only the population frequencies are used. We push this work further, by con-
sidering any kind of family members, and LD relationship between SNPs, by proposing
and evaluating different privacy metrics, and by presenting a real attack scenario using
publicly available data. Our generic framework considers any observation of a family’s
SNPs, and the adversary’s background knowledge. Re-identification attacks have also
been proposed in the literature. Homer et al. [86] prove that de-identification is an in-
effective way to protect the privacy of participants in genome-wide association studies,
which is also supported by other works [167, 72, 175]. More recently, Gymrek et al. show
how they identified DNAs of several individuals (and their families) who participated in
scientific studies [81]. Finally, Sweeney et al. de-anonymized participants of the Personal
Genome Project by linking their demographic information to public records such as voter
lists [158].
Several algorithms for inference on graphical models have been proposed in the con-
text of pedigree analysis. Exact inference techniques on Bayesian networks are used
in order to map disease genes and construct genetic maps [67, 124, 105]. Monte Carlo
methods (Gibbs sampling) were also proved to be efficient for genetic analyses in the
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case of complex pedigrees [100, 160, 148]. All these methods aim to infer specific geno-
types given phenotypes (like diseases). Another paper relies on Gibbs sampling in order
to infer haplotypes (used in association studies) from genotype data [111]. Genotype
imputation [125] is another technique used by geneticists to complete missing SNPs
based upon given genotyped data. A similar approach has recently been used to infer
high-density genotypes in pedigrees, by relying notably on low-resolution genotypes and
identity-by-descent regions of the genome [42]. None of these contributions addresses
privacy.
In contrast with these contributions, in this chapter, we propose a novel and effi-
cient inference attack in order to reconstruct genomic data of individuals given observed
genomic data of their family members and special characteristics of genomic data. Fur-
thermore, we quantify the genomic privacy of individuals as a result of this attack using
different metrics, and show the real threat by using the data collected from different
websites and OSNs.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have formalized the problem of quantifying kin genomic privacy. To
quantify privacy, we mimic the reconstruction attack of an adversary who tries to infer
hidden data based on the genomic data he gets access to and some public background
knowledge. We propose an efficient inference attack that relies upon probabilistic graph-
ical models and belief propagation. Our inference algorithm provides us with the exact
posterior marginal distributions of the random variables representing the genomic data
when linkage disequilibrium is not taken into account. When linkage disequilibrium is in-
cluded in the graphical model, the posterior distributions are only estimations but which
are, in practice, very close to the exact values. We introduce different genomic-privacy
metrics that express the (in)correctness and (un)certainty of the adversary’s estimation
of genomic data. In order to get more tangible metrics, we also suggest to quantify health
privacy, that is the privacy of individuals regarding the predisposition to certain diseases.
We evaluate our approach and metrics on real genomic data gathered from eleven close
relatives. Furthermore, we demonstrate the extent of the threat by matching users shar-
ing their genomic data online with OSNs profiles where these users also reveal (some of)
their relatives.
Our results notably show that, by disclosing only 10% of its genomic data, a family
loses more than 50% of its global genomic privacy. This is an effect of both genetic
dependencies between relatives and dependencies within each genome via linkage dise-
quilibrium. We also show, in our cross-website attack, that the privacy regarding predis-
position to Alzheimer’s disease can drop by 40% due to the disclosure of a first-degree
relative’s genomic data related to this disease. The privacy situation even worsens if
more than one relative reveals his genomic data.
Chapter 4
Non-cooperative Behavior in Genomic
Privacy
4.1 Introduction
The decreasing cost in genome sequencing has dramatically increased the availability
and use of genomic data in many domains such as healthcare, research, law enforce-
ment, and recreational genomics. This availability raises many questions regarding the
management (storage, sharing, etc.) and, ultimately, the privacy of genomic data. For
instance, thousands of individuals are already sharing their genomic data online, either
anonymously1 or with their real identity (e.g., on OpenSNP.org), showing the willingness
of some people to disclose their genomic data. In addition to this, all individuals whose
DNA has been sequenced have to carefully manage their genomic data. Some may de-
cide to store it on personal devices, others on external (potentially untrusted) servers. In
both cases, guaranteeing security and privacy has a non-negligible cost. Schematically,
in this work, we consider that an individual whose DNA has been sequenced must make
decisions on (i) whether to share his genomic data or not, and (ii) how much to invest
in securing the storage of this data. In this chapter, we analyze the strategic behaviors
of members of the same family in a genomic-privacy context by using a game-theoretic
approach. Game theory has been shown to be very useful for analyzing the behavior
of strategic agents in information security settings [26]. In particular, interdependent
security (IDS) games have been proposed for scenarios where agents make decisions that
affect not only their own security risks but also those of others [122]. As we have seen
in the previous chapter, the genomic data of close relatives is highly correlated, thus
leading to interdependent privacy (IDP) risks. Following the IDS works, we define two
IDP games between family members with different perceived benefits, costs and pri-
vacy levels: (i) the storage-security game where family members have to decide on the
security investment to protect their genomic data, and (ii) the disclosure game where
relatives have to choose whether to disclose or not their genomes. First, we study the
interplay between two family members, who are selfish or (partially) altruistic. With
1Anonymization has been proven to not be an effective technique for protecting identities of the data
owners in the genomic context [81, 158].
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the two-player setting, we derive a closed-form expression to quantify genomic privacy
of any individual given one of his relatives’ genome, and compute different closed-form
Nash equilibria for the two games we study. This closed-form expression enables us to
compute the genomic privacy of individuals three orders of magnitude faster than with
the belief propagation method (proposed in Chapter 3). Furthermore, we consider some
altruistic behavior within a family. Then, we extend the two-player game to consider n
family members who decide whether to secure or disclose their genomes. To efficiently
compute the Nash equilibrium of the n-player game, we make use of multi-agent influence
diagrams (MAIDs), an extension of Bayesian networks that enables us to include deci-
sion and utility variables. With this approach we can significantly reduce computational
complexity with respect to a classic extensive-form game. Note that, compared to IDS
games that rely upon theoretical models of interdependence, the indirect risks in the IDP
games come from the actual familial correlations evidenced by genetics. Furthermore,
we quantify genomic-privacy losses with real genomic data, which provides very tangible
results.
Our results show that, if the discrepancy between the players’ perceptions of the
genome-sharing benefits is too high, they follow opposite strategies, creating externalities.
These misaligned incentives lead to inefficient equilibria that result in a lower familial
utility than when incentives are aligned. Our analysis also shows that, surprisingly,
altruism does not always lead to a more efficient outcome in a genomic privacy game.
Yet, such suboptimal equilibrium can be avoided if the players coordinate.
4.2 Model
Users We consider a set of n users from a family whose genotypes are sequenced. We
assume that all users have the same number and set G of SNPs sequenced and stored
on their devices. Users have to make choices regarding the investment on securing their
genomic data and the sharing of this data (e.g., to help research). A user might prefer
storing his genomic data on a personal, and possibly mobile, device. For instance, as
suggested in [52], there are various advantages to keep a person’s genome on a smart-
phone. It is portable, highly personal, and nowadays has very good computational and
storage capabilities. Unfortunately, the number of pieces of malware in current smart-
phones has exploded over the last few years [155], and keeping a mobile device secure
yields non-negligible costs. Alternatively, a user could decide to outsource the storage
of his genomic data to an untrusted third party. Second, a user might want to publicly
share his SNPs, essentially because his perceived benefits outweigh the perceived cost
(loss) for his genomic privacy.2 We assume such users typically do not invest in securing
their genomes on their personal devices, as they are already publicly disclosed.
Adversary The adversary’s goal is to collect and infer genomic data. His motivations for
gathering individuals’ genotypes can be multiple. For instance, the adversary could sell
the collected genomic data to life or health insurances that would then use it to genetically
discriminate potential insurees. As usually assumed in IDS games, the adversary is
considered to be an exogenous, persistent threat [122]. Thus, we do not model him as
a strategic agent, but rather as a probability h(·) of a successful breach on the targeted
2See, e.g., [4] to understand users’ motivations for and fears about genome sharing.
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system. If a user decides to publicly disclose his SNPs online, the probability of a breach
is 1 as the adversary can easily access the data.
4.3 Genomic Privacy Games
The genomes of close family members are highly correlated. Thus, the individuals’ be-
haviors regarding their genomic data will not only affect their personal genomic privacy,
but also those of their relatives, thus leading to interdependent risks. Game theory en-
ables us to model the interplay between users with dependent payoffs, with potentially
conflicting interests, and it enables us to predict their behaviors. We define two inter-
dependent privacy games between family members: (i) the (storage-)security game Gs,
and the disclosure game Gd. Both Gs and Gd are defined as a triplet (P, S, U), where
P is the set of players, S is the set of strategies, and U is the set of payoff functions.
•Players: The set of players P = {P1, ..., Pn} corresponds to the set of n family members
having their genomes sequenced, in both games Gs and Gd.
• Strategies: In the game Gs, for each player Pi, the strategy si ∈ S represents the
security investment for the storage of his genomic data. As differences between discrete
and continuous models of investment appear only in some boundary cases [122, 77], we
consider here the discrete model, i.e. si ∈ {0, 1}. si = 1 means “to invest in securing his
own device”, and si = 0 means “to not invest”, with his data on his device or outsourced
to an untrusted third party (that could be itself attacked). The strategy profile is then
defined as s = [s1, · · · , sn]T . In the game Gd, the strategy is represented by the decision
di to publicly share Pi’s SNPs (e.g., on OpenSNP.org) or not. As the majority of genome-
sharing people currently choose to disclose nothing or their whole set of SNPs, we consider
here a discrete binary model, i.e. di ∈ {0, 1} (0 meaning “no disclosure” and 1 “full
disclosure”). Note that we study is studied in detail a finer granularity of disclosure in a
cooperative context in Chapter 5. A player will choose di = 1 if and only if he perceives
more utility by sharing than by protecting. The strategy profile is then represented by
d = [d1, · · · , dn]T .
• Payoff Functions: The utility of a player is, by definition, equal to the benefit minus
the cost. In our setting, the first term of the benefit, bgi , represents the fact that a user’s
genome is sequenced and available for various benefits (e.g., personalized medicine).
This generic benefit can be added to the benefit bdi that player Pi obtains by disclosing
his genomic data online in game Gd. The cost comprises the (unit) cost of a security
investment for protecting his genome, ci, and the potential loss li of genomic privacy.
3
The cost ci can represent the OS updates that can lead to a non-negligible cost (renewal
of the equipment) once a device becomes too old to support them.
In our genomic context, the privacy loss li can be precisely quantified by relying upon
the expected estimation error Eji defined in (3.8) in Chapter 3. Giving the same weight
to each SNP, we then get
Ei =
1
|G|
∑
k:gk∈G
∑
xˆki ∈{0,1,2}
P (Xki = xˆ
k
i |XO = xO)
∥∥xki − xˆki ∥∥1, (4.1)
where XO represents the SNPs observed by the adversary. This observation depends on
the strategies of the players in Gs and Gd. We will denote Ei,0 to be the genomic privacy
3Note that an expected monetary loss would be expressed as a non-decreasing function of li. This
is left for future work.
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when no SNP is observed, i.e. when P (Xji = xˆ
j
i |XO = xO) = P (Xji = xˆji ). This initial
(prior) privacy level is computed by using the minor allele frequencies (MAFs) pmaf given
by population statistics. In general, as xO depends on the strategy profile s (respectively
d), Ei will be a function of s (respectively d) in game Gs (respectively Gd). As assumed
in several IDS games (e.g., [121]), the probability of successful breach is set to zero when a
player invests in security, i.e. h(si = 1) = 0. Otherwise, h(si = 0) = pa with 0 < pa ≤ 1.
For the game Gd, h(di = 1) = 1 as discussed in Section 4.2, and h(di = 0) = 0.
4
In our genomic privacy game, contrarily to IDS games, the interdependence lies in the
genomic-privacy loss and not in the breach probability h(·). The genomic-privacy loss li
is defined as Ei,0 −Ei(·), where Ei(·) is a function of the strategy profile s = (si, s−i) or
d = (di,d−i). Note that the risk is non-additive: Either the adversary manages to know
the player’s genome directly (and the genomic privacy drops to zero), in which case the
knowledge of another genome does not bring any extra information, or the adversary
cannot get access to the player’s genome and then there is only an indirect privacy loss.
Defining h(s−i) as the probability of successful breaches into a subset of players’ devices
(other than Pi), the payoff function of a player Pi in Gs is
ui(si, s−i) = b
g
i − (sici + h(si)Ei,0 + (1− h(si))h(s−i) (Ei,0 − Ei(s−i))) , (4.2)
and his payoff in the game Gd is
ui(di,d−i) = b
g
i + dib
d
i − ((1− di)ci + diEi,0 + (1− di) (Ei,0 − Ei(d−i))) .5 (4.3)
• Social Welfare: We define the social welfare function as the sum of the payoffs of all
players: U(s) =
∑
Pi∈P ui(s) for Gs, and U(d) =
∑
Pi∈P ui(d) for Gd.
• Altruism: Finally, we consider that family members are usually not purely selfish
regarding their relatives, meaning that some altruistic factors can play a role in their
decisions. Following an idea introduced in [132] for social networks, we define a familial
factor α ∈ [0, 1] that conveys the fact that relatives tend to be altruistic among them-
selves. We raise this factor to the power k(Pi, Pj) ∈ N∗ that represents the degree of
kinship between players Pi and Pj .
6 α = 0 means that players are purely selfish, whereas
α = 1 implies that they are fully altruistic with their whole family. For instance, in Gs,
the altruistic player Pi will maximize the following utility (instead of (4.2)):
uai (si, s−i) = ui(si, s−i) +
∑
j:Pj∈P,j 6=i
αk(Pi,Pj)uj(si, s−i). (4.4)
4.4 Two-Player Games
In this section, we study the interplay between two relatives who are first purely selfish,
and then who are partially altruistic depending on their degree of kinship.
4We assume that a player who does not share his SNPs will always invest in security in Gd.
5In the following sections, we will use the more concise notation Ei|−i expressing the genomic privacy
of Pi given a subset (that depends on s−i or d−i) of other players’ SNPs.
6k = 1 for first-degree relatives such as parent, child, sibling, k = 2 for second-degree relatives such
as grandparent, grandchild, uncle, aunt, niece, and so on.
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Table 4.1: Normal form of the two-player game Gs.
P1\P2 s2 = 1 s2 = 0
s1 = 1 (b
g
1 − c1, bg2 − c2) (bg1 − c1 − pa(E1,0 − E1|2), bg2 − paE2,0)
s1 = 0
(bg1 − paE1,0,
bg2 − c2 − pa(E2,0 − E2|1)
(bg1 − paE1,0 − (1− pa)pa(E1,0 − E1|2),
bg2 − paE2,0 − (1− pa)pa(E2,0 − E2|1))
4.4.1 Selfish Players
We start our analysis with the game Gs whose strategic representation is shown in
Table 4.1. Assuming the cost of security investment to be the same for all players, i.e.,
c1 = c2 = c, we characterize all Nash equilibria.
Lemma 4.1. For any value c ∈ [0,∞[, there exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium
(NE) in Gs. More precisely, the NE are defined by the best responses (s
∗
1, s
∗
2):
(s∗1, s
∗
2) =

(1, 1) if c < min(t1, t2)
(1, 1),mNE if min(t1, t2) < c < max(t1, t2)
(1, 1), (0, 0) if max(t1, t2) < c < pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2)
(0, 0),mNE if pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2) < c < pa max(t
0
1, t
0
2)
(0, 0) if c > pa max(t
0
1, t
0
2)
(4.5)
if max(t1, t2) < pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2), where ti = paEi,0 − p2a(Ei,0 − Ei|j), t0i = Ei,0, and mNE
is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. If max(t1, t2) > pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2), the third case NE
in (4.5) become (0, 1) if t01 < t
0
2 and (1, 0) if t
0
1 > t
0
2, and max(t1, t2) and pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2)
are swapped in the inequality bounds on c.
The NE can be derived from the best responses of each player that are quite straight-
forward by taking a close look at Table 4.1. Figure 4.1 depicts how the NE evolves for
different values of c. In order to obtain closed-formed Nash equilibria, we must analyt-
ically express the genomic privacy levels Ei,0 and Ei|j . In Chapter 3, we have shown
that, in the general case, belief propagation on factor graphs can be used to compute
the posterior marginal probability P (Xki |XO) given some observed genomic data, and
thus to quantify genomic privacy. In the following, we show that, if only two members
are involved in the game, and no other familial genomic data is observed, we can de-
rive a closed-form expression for P (Xki |XO), thus for Ei,0 and Ei|j . As we assume that
all players have the same set of SNPs G sequenced and potentially exposed, and that
the adversary can access the whole sequence of SNPs or nothing (as he either success-
fully breaches the system or not), linkage disequilibrium (correlations) between the SNPs
30
Figure 4.1: Dependence of the NE of game Gs with respect to the investment cost c.
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Yi-1
Yi+1
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1-pp/2
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(1-p)/2p
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(b)
Figure 4.2: (a) Bayesian network representation of a three-generation family, and (b)
Markov chain representing the probabilities of moving from one SNP value (state) to
another from generation i to i+ 1 or i− 1. Probability p is the major allele frequency of
the given SNP.
does not help the adversary, and thus is not used in the computation of genomic privacy.
Thus, when we want to compute the privacy at SNP gk of player Pi, we consider only
the observation at the same SNP gk of player Pj . Each SNP can then be considered
independently of other SNPs. In the following two lemmas, we focus on a single SNP,
thus drop the subscript/superscript k. Assuming Yi is the random variable representing
a SNP of an individual at generation i in a familial branch (see Figure 4.2(a), and p is
the major allele frequency of the SNP, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. The sequence {Yn} is a discrete stochastic process. Moreover, it is a
first-order homogeneous Markov chain, i.e., the conditional probability of Yi+1 given
(direct) ancestors in one of the parents’ family branches is formally defined as P (Yi+1 =
yi+1|Yi = yi,Yi−1 = yi−1, . . . ) = P (Yi+1 = yi+1|Yi = yi). Its transition matrix P is
defined as follows:
P =
 p 1− p 0p/2 1/2 (1− p)/2
0 p 1− p
 ,
where pmn = P (Yi+1 = n|Yi = m), m and n belonging to the state space {0, 1, 2}.
Proof. Genotypes of individuals in a family can be modeled as a Bayesian network (BN),
such as in Figure 4.2(a), where each node in the BN represents the SNP of a relative [124].
The two biological parents are also the two parents of each node in the BN. Thus, by
definition, the SNP value given its two parents is conditionally independent of any of its
ancestors. In our setting, where we focus on the ancestors in the familial branch of one
parent, the same reasoning applies. This means that the SNP value Yi+1 is conditionally
independent of any ancestor in the subnetwork (whose leaf node is Yi) given Yi. Thus,
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P (Yi+1 = yi+1|Yi = yi,Yi−1 = yi−1, . . . ) = P (Yi+1 = yi+1|Yi = yi). Finally, the
transition probability P (Yi+1 = yi+1|Yi = yi) is equal to∑
zi∈{0,1,2}
P (Yi+1 = yi+1|Yi = yi,Zi = zi)P (Zi = zi), (4.6)
where P (Yi+1 = yi+1|Yi = yi,Zi = zi) is given by the Mendelian inheritance probabili-
ties, and P (Zi = zi) by the major allele frequency p (Zi is not observed). Equation (4.6)
directly leads to the transition matrix P .
Note that the reverse process, which is the conditional probability of Yi−1 given
direct descendants Yi, Yi+1, . . . , is also a first-order homogeneous Markov chain defined
by the same matrix P where pmn = P (Yi−1 = n|Yi = m). This means that going up
or down the familial tree leads to the same conditional distributions. The corresponding
Markov chain is shown in Figure 4.2(b).
Lemma 4.2 helps us determine the conditional probabilities of SNPs of direct an-
cestors or descendants given any relative’s observed SNP. For instance, the conditional
probability P (Yi+k|Yi) of a relative k-degree apart from another direct relative at gen-
eration i whose SNP is observed and equal to m is given by pii+k = piiP
k, where pii is a
row vector that is equal to 1 in the mth coordinate and 0 elsewhere. This is by definition
of the Markov chain. Note also that the stationary distribution defined as the vector
pi such that pi = piP , is equal to the vector of prior probabilities (P (Yi)), given by the
major allele probability p:
pi =
(
p2 2p(1− p) (1− p)2) . (4.7)
This follows intuition as pi is defined to be equal to any of the columns of P k when k
tends to infinity. When the observed relative’s generation j is really distant from the
targeted individual’s generation i in the family tree, the genomes of relatives have no
more influence on each other. The conditional probabilities are well-defined for direct
relatives. However, if the individual whose SNP is observed is not a relative in direct line
(e.g., an uncle or a niece), the transition matrix P cannot be applied alone, and has to be
combined with a matrix M whose elements mab represent the conditional probabilities
P (Yi1 = b|Yi2 = a) of i1 given his sibling i2. Defining Ymi−1 and Yfi−1 to be the mother
and father SNP variable respectively, mab is derived as follows.
P (Yi1 = b|Yi2 = a) =
∑
ymi−1∈{0,1,2}
yfi−1∈{0,1,2}
P (Yi1 = b,Y
m
i−1 = y
m
i−1,Y
f
i−1 = y
f
i−1|Yi2 = a) (4.8)
=
∑
ymi−1∈{0,1,2}
yfi−1∈{0,1,2}
P (Yi1 = b|Ymi−1 = ymi−1,Yfi−1 = yfi−1)× (4.9)
P (Ymi−1 = y
m
i−1|Yfi−1 = yfi−1,Yi2 = a)P (Yfi−1 = yfi−1|Yi2 = a),
(4.10)
where we used the chain rule to go from (4.8) to (4.10), and the fact that
P (Yi1 |Ymi−1,Yfi−1,Yi2) = P (Yi1 |Ymi−1,Yfi−1), since two siblings are conditionally in-
dependent given both their parents. P (Yi1 = b|Ymi−1,Yfi−1) is given by the Mendelian
56 CHAPTER 4. NON-COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN GENOMIC PRIVACY
inheritance probabilities, P (Yfi−1|Yi2 = a) is given by matrix P , and
P (Ymi−1|Yfi−1,Yi2 = a) =
P (Yi2 = a|Yfi−1,Ymi−1)P (Ymi−1)
P (Yi2 = a|Yfi−1)
, (4.11)
using the Bayes rule and the fact that P (Ymi−1|Yfi−1) = P (Ymi−1), as two parents are
independent if no child is observed. Again, one can compute every factor of (4.11) by
using the inheritance probabilities, matrix P , and the major allele frequency p. Matrix
M is defined as
M =
p2 + pq +
q2
4 pq +
q2
2
q2
4
p2
2 +
pq
4
p2
2 +
3
2pq +
q2
2
pq
4 +
q2
2
p2
4
p2
2 + pq
p2
4 + pq + q
2
 , (4.12)
where q = 1− p.
We define the 3×3 distance matrix D with elements dij = ‖i− j‖1 and the (column)
vector yi with m
th coordinate equal to 1 and others 0 if relative ri’s SNP has value m.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. The genomic privacy Ei of individual ri at any SNP is:
Ei,0 = piDyi if no relative reveals the SNP
Ei|j = pijP kDyi if ri and rj are direct relatives and rj’s SNP is revealed
Ei|j = pijPuMP vDyi if ri and rj are not direct relatives and rj’s SNP is revealed
where k is the degree of kinship between ri and rj, u is the degree of kinship between rj
and his (direct) ancestor whose sibling is the (direct) ancestor of ri, and v is the degree
of kinship between ri and his (direct) ancestor whose sibling is rj’s (direct) ancestor.
Proof. The genomic privacy of one SNP g of individual ri is given by∑
yˆi∈{0,1,2} P (Yi = yˆi|YO)||yi − yˆi||1.
(i) If no observations are made, then P (Yi = yˆi|YO) = P (Yi = yˆi), the prior
probability, which is given by the major allele frequency p. This is equal to pi given
in (4.7). The second element ||yi − yˆi||1 is simply expressed in matrix format by Dyi.
Hence, Ei,0 = piDyi.
(ii) If ri is a k
th-degree direct relative of rj , then the conditional probability dis-
tribution P (Yi = yi|Yj = yj) is given by pij+k = pijP k from Lemma 4.2, leading to
Ei|j = pijP kDyi.
(iii) In case ri and rj are not in direct line, we need to split the conditional probability
computation into two. First, we need to compute the conditional probability of the direct
ancestor aj of rj who is a sibling of the direct ancestor ai of ri. If aj and j are u
th-
degree relatives, piaj = pijP
u. Then, as aj and ai are siblings, we make use of matrix
M defined in (4.12) to compute the conditional probability of ai’s SNP given aj ’s SNP
value. Thus, piai = piajM = pijP
uM . Finally, if ai and i are v
th-degree relatives, we have
pii = piaiP
v = pijP
uMP v. Hence, we get Ei|j = pijPuMP vDyi.
To illustrate the third case of Lemma 4.3, let us take for example two close relatives,
uncle and nephew. If rj is the uncle of ri, then the genomic privacy of ri given rj at a
certain SNP is Ei|j = pijP 1MP 0Dyi = pijPMDyi whereas, if rj is the nephew of ri, the
genomic privacy of ri is Ei|j = pijMPDyi.
We can now quantify genomic privacy for a range of SNPs and get closed-form NE.
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Theorem 4.1. For any value c ∈ [0,∞[, the pure Nash equilibrium is:
(x∗1, x
∗
2) =

(1, 1) if c < max(t1, t2)
(1, 1), (0, 0) if max(t1, t2) < c < pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2)
(0, 0) if c > pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2)
(4.13)
if max(t1, t2) < pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2), where t
0
i =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lDyli, ti =
pa
|G|
(∑
l:gl∈G((1 −
pa)pi
l+papi
l
jP
k
l )Dy
l
i
)
if ri and rj are direct k
th-degree relatives, and ti =
pa
|G|
(∑
l:gl∈G((1−
pa)pi
l + papi
l
jP
u
l MP
v
l )Dy
l
i
)
if ri and rj are not direct relatives, u and v as defined in
Lemma 4.3. If max(t1, t2) > pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2), the second-case NE (1, 1), (0, 0) becomes
(0, 1) if t01 < t
0
2 and (1, 0) if t
0
1 > t
0
2, and max(t1, t2) and pa min(t
0
1, t
0
2) are swapped in
the inequality bounds.
Proof. By summing over all SNPs in G the genomic privacy expressions computed in
Lemma 4.3 and embedding them into the NE computed in Lemma 4.1 (keeping only
pure NE), after some reordering, we get the NE in (4.13), as well as the expressions ti’s
and t0i .
In order to make these NE more tangible, we quantify genomic privacy by relying
upon real genomic data. We make use of the CEPH/Utah Pedigree 1463 that contains
the partial DNA sequences of 4 grandparents, 2 parents, and 11 children [59]. Figure 4.3
represents this family with 3 children. We consider all the SNPs that are available on
chromosome 1, around 82,000. Note that, thanks to our closed-form expression of Ei|j ,
its computation on 82,000 SNPs takes less than one second. This is at least three order
of magnitude faster than the belief propagation algorithm run on the same set of SNPs
(which takes more than one hour). Figure 4.4 shows the thresholds separating the three
different cases of NE in Theorem 4.1 with respect to pa and c. (1, 1) stands below the
two (dotted) red and green curves, and (0, 0) stands above these two curves. Thus, we
note that for most values of c and pa, either both relatives secure their genomes (if c is
smaller than around half of pa), or both do not secure them (if c is greater than around
half of pa). This shows that players, if they have similar cost c, have aligned incentives,
leading to an efficient NE. However, there are some values of c and pa for which two pure
NE (1, 1) and (0, 0) co-exist. It is between the two curves, if the (dotted) red curve lies
above the green one. If the green curve lies above the dotted one,7 then we have either
(0, 1) if E1,0 < E2,0 or (1, 0) if E1,0 > E2,0. The discrepancy between the two curves
is the highest in Figure 4.4(c), as the difference between the initial privacy levels Ei,0’s
and posterior levels Ei|j is the most significant (see Table 4.2). On the contrary, in the
game between C7 and GP1, the posterior levels Ei|j are closer to the initial ones Ei,0
(because the two players are second-degree relatives), and the Ei,0’s differ between the
two players, leading to inefficient NE, like (0, 1), as described above.
Discussion: We conclude that, for most security cost values and probabilities of suc-
cessful breach, the players follow the same strategies, even though their genomic privacy
levels are slightly different. They both either secure their devices, or do not secure.
We now move to the disclosure game Gd. Table 4.3 shows the resulting payoffs for
two players P1 and P2. The following theorem determines its NE.
7This happens for pa < 0.29 in Figure 4.4(a) and pa < 0.78 in Figure 4.4(b).
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GP1 GP2 GP3 GP4
P5 P6
C7 C8 C9
Figure 4.3: Bayesian network representation of nine relatives of the CEPH/Utah pedigree
1463.
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Figure 4.4: Thresholds of Theorem 4.1 separating the three different pure NE cases of Gs.
We show three different scenarios with two players: (a) Grandparent GP1 and parent
P5, (b) GP1 and child C7, and (c) children C7 and C8.
Table 4.2: Genomic privacy levels of grandparent GP1, parent P5, children C7 and C8,
from the Utah family shown in Figure 4.3.
(P1, P2) E1,0 E1|2 E2,0 E2|1
(P5,GP1) 0.4741 0.3579 0.4402 0.3179
(C7,GP1) 0.4788 0.4296 0.4402 0.3878
(C7,C8) 0.4788 0.3310 0.4803 0.3321
Theorem 4.2. For any value bd1 ∈ [0,∞[, and bd2 ∈ [0,∞[, the pure Nash equilibrium of
game Gd is:
(d∗1, d
∗
2) =

(0, 0) if (bd1 < E1,0 − c1) ∧ (bd2 < E2|1 − c2) ∨ (bd1 < E1|2 − c1) ∧ (bd2 < E2,0 − c2)
(1, 1), (0, 0) if (E1|2 − c1 < bd1 < E1,0 − c1) ∧ (E2|1 − c2 < bd2 < E2,0 − c2)
(1, 1) if (bd1 > E1,0 − c1) ∧ (bd2 > E2|1 − c2) ∨ (bd1 > E1|2 − c1)
(0, 1) if (bd1 < E1|2 − c1) ∧ (bd2 > E2,0 − c2)
(1, 0) if (bd1 > E1,0 − c1) ∧ (bd2 < E2|1 − c2)
where Ei,0 =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lDyli, Ei|j =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lP kl Dy
l
i if i and j are direct k
th-
degree relatives and, if i and j are not direct relatives, Ei|j = 1|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lPul DMP
v
l y
l
i.
The NE can be derived from the best responses of each player that are quite straight-
forward by taking a close look at Table 4.3. Figure 4.5 illustrates the NE computed in
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Table 4.3: Normal form of the two-player game Gd.
P1\P2 d2 = 0 d2 = 1
d1 = 0 (b
g
1 − c1, bg2 − c2)
(bg1 − c1 − (E1,0 − E1|2),
bg2 + b
d
2 − E2,0)
d1 = 1
(bg1 + b
d
1 − E1,0,
bg2 − c2 − (E2,0 − E2|1)) (b
g
1 + b
d
1 − E1,0, bg2 + bd2 − E2,0)
31
Figure 4.5: Dependence of the NE with respect to the genome-sharing benefits bd1 and
bd2.
Theorem 4.2. These NE depend essentially on the value of bdi + ci with respect to Ei,0
and Ei|j . A player Pi will disclose his genome given the other player discloses it as long
as bdi + ci > Ei|j whereas, if the other player’s best response is to not share, Pi will share
only if bdi +ci > Ei,0. Table 4.2 shows concrete values of genomic privacy E1,0, E2,0, E1|2,
and E2|1, for first-degree direct relatives, second-degree direct relatives, and siblings.
Discussion: We conclude that, in Gd, if the discrepancy between the sharing benefits
that players perceive is high enough between the two players, the players follow opposite
strategies, one player putting the other’s privacy at risk by disclosing his genome.
4.4.2 Altruistic Players
In this Subsection, we analyze how the equilibria evolve when the players are not purely
selfish, but consider also their relatives’ payoffs when making their decisions. Intuitively,
by becoming more socially concerned, the players’ decisions and their resulting NE should
lead to higher social welfare. However, as we will see, social welfare does not always
increase with altruism, unless some coordination between players happen.
To evaluate how the NE is affected by altruistic behavior, we focus on the game Gd.
Player P1 considers the altruistic payoff u
a
1(d1, d2) = u1(d1, d2)+α
k(1,2)u2(d1, d2) instead
of merely u1(d1, d2). The same applies symmetrically for P2. We define the familial
Nash equilibrium (FNE) as a strategy profile where no player can reduce his altruistic
payoff ua by unilaterally changing his strategy given the other player’s strategy. Defining
bi = b
d
i + ci for the ease of presentation, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.3. For any value b1 ∈ [0,∞[, and b2 ∈ [0,∞[, the pure FNE is:
(d∗1, d
∗
2) =

(0, 0) if (b1 < E1,0 +α
k(E2,0−E2|1))∧ (b2 < E2|1)∨
(b1 < E1|2) ∧ (bd2 < E2,0 + αk(E1,0 − E1|2))
(1, 1), (0, 0) if (E1|2 < b1 < E1,0 + αk(E2,0 − E2|1) ∧
(E2|1 < b2 < E2,0 + αk(E1,0 − E1|2)
(1, 1) if (b1 > E1,0 +α
k(E2,0−E2|1))∧ (b2 > E2|1)∨
(b1 > E1|2) ∧ (b2 > E2,0 + αk(E1,0 − E1|2)
(1, 0) if (b1 > E1,0 + α
k(E2,0 − E2|1)) ∧ (b2 < E2|1)
(0, 1) if (b1 < E1|2) ∧ (b2 > E2,0 + αk(E1,0 − E1|2)
(4.14)
where Ei,0 =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lDyli, Ei|j =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lP kl Dy
l
i if Pi and Pj are
direct kth-degree relatives and, if Pi and Pj are not direct relatives, Ei|j =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lPul DMP
v
l y
l
i.
The FNE can be derived from the Table of payoffs updated to uai . These different NE
are depicted in Figure 4.6 by circled numbers separated by (thick) dotted lines. Note the
up-right shift of the borders of the (0, 0) FNE compared to the selfish NE (red dotted
lines). This tells us that, by considering the other’s player utility, the decision maker will
choose to disclose his genome for a higher value of bi than in the purely selfish scenario.
Discussion: We conclude that altruism, by internalizing externalities into players’ pay-
offs, tends to reduce the privacy loss caused by the other player at equilibrium.
We now describe the strategies that a social planner would choose on behalf of the
players in order to maximize social welfare, thus to attain the social optimum U∗.
Theorem 4.4. For any value b1 ∈ [0,∞[, and b2 ∈ [0,∞[, the social optimum U∗ is
reached with the following strategies:
(d∗1, d
∗
2) =

(0, 0) if (b1+b2 < E1,0+E2,0)∧(b1 < E1,0+E2,0−E2|1)∧(b2 < E1,0+E2,0−E1|2)
(1, 0) if (b1 > E1,0 + E2,0 − E2|1) ∧ (b2 < E2|1)
(0, 1) if (b2 > E1,0 + E2,0 − E1|2) ∧ (b1 < E1|2)
(1, 1) if (b1 + b2 > E1,0 + E2,0) ∧ (b2 > E2|1) ∧ (b1 > E1|2)
(4.15)
where Ei,0 =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lDyli, Ei|j =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lP kl Dy
l
i if Pi and Pj are
direct kth-degree relatives and, if Pi and Pj are not direct relatives, Ei|j =
1
|G|
∑
l:gl∈G pi
lPul DMP
v
l y
l
i.
This theorem is derived by simply summing the utilities of both players in Table 4.3
for all four strategy combinations and selecting the combination that leads to the max-
imum sum for any value of b1 and b2. The social optimum’s strategies are represented
schematically with respect to b1 and b2 by the texture of Figure 4.6. Given this social
optimum U∗(d), the Price of Anarchy (PoA), that measures how the game efficiency de-
creases due to selfishness, is defined as U∗(d)/minNE U(d) [116]. The Price of Stability
(PoS) also measures this inefficiency but considers the best NE instead of the worst one,
assuming that players coordinate, thus is defined as U∗(d)/maxNE U(d) [28].
Following the notion of Windfall of Friendship (WoF) proposed in [132], we define
the Windfall of Kinship (WoK) as the ratio between the social welfare of the worst FNE
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Figure 4.6: Familial NE and social optima with respect to b1 and b2. Circled numbers
represent the five different cases of Theorem 4.3, in order, separated by (thick) dotted
lines in the figure. The red (small) dotted lines represent the borders of Figure 4.5. The
four different texture patterns represent the strategies of the social optimum, depicted
in Theorem 4.4: white for (0, 0), vertical lines for (1, 0), horizontal lines for (0, 1), and
dots for (1, 1). The single asterisk is E1,0 + α
k(E2,0 − E2|1), and the double asterisk is
E1,0 + E2,0 − E2|1.
and the social welfare of the worst NE:
κ(α, k) =
minFNE U(d)
minNE U(d)
(4.16)
Given this definition, we can state the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. If b1, b2 are such that
b1 + b2 > E1,0 + E2,0
b1 < E1,0 + α
k(E2,0 − E2|1)
b2 < E2,0 + α
k(E1,0 − E1|2),
(4.17)
then κ(α, k) < 1 for any k ≥ 1 and 0 < α ≤ 1.
Proof. Let us focus on the cases where NE and FNE differ. This happens essentially in
the two strips between Ei,0 and Ei,0 + α
k(Ej,0 − Ej|i) for i = 1, j = 2 and the contrary
(see Figure 4.6). We know, from Theorem 4.4, that the social optimum in these strips is
reached at (0, 0) except if b1 + b2 > E1,0 + E2,0 where it is reached at (1, 1). Moreover,
we know that the FNE or worse FNE is (0, 0) in these strips according to Theorem 4.3.
However, the NE is (1, 1) if (bd1 > E1,0 − c1)∧ (bd2 > E2|1 − c2)∨ (bd1 > E1|2 − c1)∧ (bd2 >
E2,0 − c2) according to Theorem 4.2. Let us now compute the ratio between the social
welfare at (0, 0) (FNE) and the social welfare at (1, 1) (NE):
κ =
bg1 + b
g
2 − c1 − c2
bg1 + b
g
2 + b
d
1 + b
d
2 − E1,0 − E2,0
=
bg1 + b
g
2 − c1 − c2
bg1 + b
g
2 + b1 + b2 − c1 − c2 − E1,0 − E2,0
.
κ is strictly smaller than 1 if and only if b1 + b2 > E1,0 + E2,0. This gives us the
first condition of (4.17), the two others being given by the area we are focusing on. If
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Figure 4.7: Evaluation of the (in)efficiency of the NE and FNE with respect to b1 and b2.
(a) Minimum social welfare at NE, (b) Windfall/Price of Kinship, (c) Price of Anarchy,
(d) minimum social welfare at FNE, (e) Windfall of Coordinated Kinship, and (f) Price
of Stability for the game Gd with players GP1 and P5, α = 0.8, and b
g
1 = b
g
2 = 0.5.
b1 + b2 < E1,0 +E2,0, we know that the FNE or worse FNE cannot be improved as they
are (0, 0), which is the social optimum. Note that the region where κ < 1 is the small
triangle with dots texture in the FNE area defined by circle 2 in Figure 4.6.
This theorem tells us that, contrarily to intuition, altruism in a family does not
necessarily lead to higher social welfare, and induces a Price of Kinship rather than a
windfall if the bi’s are in the range defined in (4.17). In this range, the social optimum
is to disclose their genomes for both players, but there is the possibility to end up in a
“non-disclose” (0, 0) FNE due to the altruistic factor, leading to a worse outcome than
in the selfish NE. However, note that the WoK is always less than or equal to the PoA.
Indeed, as for any α ∈ [0, 1], k ≥ 1, minFNE U(d) ≤ U∗(d), it directly follows from
(4.16) that κ(α, k) ≤ PoA.
If we assume that some coordination can happen between the players, we can define
the Windfall of Coordinated Kinship (WoCK) as the ratio between the social welfare of
the best FNE and the social welfare of the best NE:
γ(α, k) =
maxFNE U(d)
maxNE U(d)
(4.18)
This new definition allows us to state the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6. For any b1 ∈ [0,∞[, b2 ∈ [0,∞[, k ≥ 1, and α ∈ [0, 1], it holds that:
1 ≤ γ(α, k) ≤ PoS ≤ PoA. (4.19)
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Proof. First, as minNE U(d) ≤ maxNE U(d), we get
U∗(d)
maxNE U(d)
≤ U
∗(d)
minNE U(d)
, (4.20)
thus PoS ≤ PoA. Moreover, as maxFNE U(d) ≤ U∗(d), we get
maxFNE U(d)
maxNE U(d)
≤ U
∗(d)
maxNE U(d)
, (4.21)
thus γ(α, k) ≤ PoS. We know from Theorem 4.5 that κ(α, k) < 1 in the triangle defined
by (4.17). The difference between κ and γ is that the latter uses the best FNE whereas
the former uses the worst FNE. In the area defined by (4.17), two FNE co-exist,(0, 0)
and (1, 1). The worst FNE is (0, 0) and the best is (1, 1), which corresponds to the social
optimum and the selfish NE in this area. Hence, maxFNE U(d)/maxNE U(d) = 1 in
this triangle. For the rest of the (b1, b2) values where FNE and NE differ, the FNE is
always equal to the social optimum U∗ defined in Theorem 4.4, thus the social welfare
of NE cannot be greater. It follows that γ(α, k) ≥ 1.
In order to evaluate how the NE, FNE, WoK, WoCK, PoA, and PoS evolve in practice,
we make use of the genomic data provided by the Utah family. We choose the two
relatives GP1 and P5, and compute their genomic privacy based on their actual SNPs,
as in Subsection 4.4.1. We set α = 0.8, bg1 = b
g
2 = 0.5 and compute results (NE, FNE,
...) for b1 and b2 varying between 0 and 1, with granularity 0.01. Figure 4.7 shows
the resulting graphs. First, we notice the up-right shift of (0, 0) between NE and FNE
that follows the borders shown in Figure 4.6. We also see that minimum social welfare
is minimal in the squares standing in the middle of both Figures 4.7(a) and (4.7(d)).
Looking at Figure 4.7(b), we clearly notice that the WoK is smaller than one for values
of b1 and b2 close to 0.5, confirming Theorem 4.5. However, as soon as coordination
happens between players, the ratio between the social welfare of FNE and the social
welfare of NE (WoCK) becomes always greater than or equal to one, as illustrated in
Figure 4.7(e). Finally, we note that PoA and PoS are always greater than or equal to
one, that PoS ≤ PoA, and that PoS ≥ WoCK, confirming Theorem 4.6.
Discussion: In conclusion, if players cannot coordinate, their altruistic conservatism (or
prudence), regarding the disclosure of their genomes can lead to a worse social outcome
than in the purely selfish setting, as shown in Theorem 4.5 and in Figure 4.7(b).
4.5 n-Player Game
In this section, we extend the genomic privacy game to consider n > 2 relatives. Con-
trarily to the two-player framework that allowed us to derive closed-form expressions,
and thus compute all pure Nash equilibria very efficiently, we now face a more challeng-
ing problem. First, in general, all players (family members) can influence other players’
payoffs, thus all other players’ strategies have to be taken into account when a family
member optimizes his own decision. Second, privacy levels Ei|−i cannot be expressed in
closed forms if more than one other family members disclose their genomes.
In order to represent this complex game in a compact way and reduce its complex-
ity, we rely upon multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs), introduced by Koller and
Milch [114]. A MAID is an extension of the Bayesian network framework that embeds,
64 CHAPTER 4. NON-COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN GENOMIC PRIVACY
YM YF
YCDC UC2
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Figure 4.8: Multi-agent influence diagram representing a trio (mother, father, child) with
one decision variable (square), one chance variable (circle) representing the SNP(s) of the
player, and two utility variables (diamonds) per player. Full lines represent probabilistic
or deterministic dependencies, whereas dotted ones represent the variables that an agent
observes when he makes his decision. This figure illustrates a game with sequential
moves, perfect information, and with purely selfish players.
in addition to random variables, decision and utility variables, and enables to consider
multiple strategic agents, thus permitting to represent games. We define a MAID Md
representing the n-player genomic-privacy game Gd. We show an example of Md for a
trio in Figure 4.8. Note that in MAIDs, all variables are depicted by capital letters. The
chance8 variable Yi is defined as P (Yi = yi) = 1 (other values having probability 0) if
di = 1, and P (Yi = yˆi|YO = yO) if di = 0. Note that, we represent the chance variable
Yi for a single SNP but there actually are |G| chance variables that directly depend
on di, and are independent of each other (thus they can be considered in “parallel” in
the MAID). A child’s SNP is probabilistically determined by his parents’ genomes, as
explained in Subsection 3.2.1. We also define two utility variables: ui1 = b
g
i + dib
d
i −Ei,0
that directly depends on di , and ui2 = Ei that directly depends on the chance variable
Yi. Note that Ei is zero if di = 1 (genomic privacy drops to zero) and Ei = Ei|−i if
di = 0. Then, Pi’s payoff ui is ui1 + ui2.
We assume that players move (decide) sequentially and under perfect information of
previous decisions made by other players. Variables observed when a decision is made
are depicted by dotted directed edges. For instance, in Figure 4.8, the following decision
ordering is shown: mother, father and then child. Under these assumptions, we can state
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4. If a player Pi ∈ P moves, i.e. chooses his decision rule, at node Di before
Pj makes his own decision at node Dj, then Di is not s-reachable from Dj.
The concept of s-reachability is defined in Definition 5.3 of [114]. In a nutshell, if Di is
s-reachable from Dj , then Di is relevant to Dj or, in other words, Dj strategically relies
on Di. The main idea of the proof is that, if a decision node Di is observed by Dj (dotted
edge in Figure 4.8), it means that the decision rule δ(dj) at Dj will be conditioned on the
instantiations of Di. The decision rule at Dj will be defined as δ(dj |di),∀di ∈ {0, 1}, thus
8In MAIDs, random variables are called chance variables.
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Figure 4.9: Outcome of the n-player game. Number of players disclosing their genomes
(first row) and social welfare (second row) at NE in the n-player game Gd with the family
members shown in Figure 4.3. We set b2 = 0.4 in (a) and (d), b2 = 0.6 in (b) and (e),
and b2 = 0.8 in (c) and (f).
this decision will not be affected by a change Di. However, because Dj is not observed
by Pi when he makes his decision, Dj will be relevant to Di, thus s-reachable from Di.
Under perfect information, we can define, for any sequence of strategic decision among
players, an acyclic relevance graph9 using Lemma 4.4. From this acyclic relevance graph,
we can construct a topological ordering of the decision nodes D1, ..., Dn such that if Di
is s-reachable from Dj , then i < j. In the example shown in Figure 4.8, the topological
ordering is DC , DF , DM . In the general case, the topological ordering is such that, if
Pi chooses his decision rule before Pj , then j < i. Hence, the topological ordering
corresponds to the reverse decision order.
Theorem 4.7. By iteratively deriving the optimal decision rule δ∗(di|paDi) for each
node Di in topological order, and every instantiation paDi of its parents in the MAID,
we obtain a strategy profile d∗ that is a Nash equilibrium of Md.
This theorem essentially follows from Algorithm 6.1 and Theorem 6.1 of [114]. Note
that, in our scenario, under perfect information assumption, we do not need to define an
arbitrary fully mixed strategy profile at the beginning of the algorithm. The algorithm
defined by Theorem 4.7 is similar to the one defined by backward induction in extensive-
form games. However, thanks to the MAID approach, we can run inference on Md in
order to compute the expected utilities given the decision rules of every player, and to
eventually find a NE in O(|G|2n) instead of O(|G|32n) in the extensive-form game.
We numerically compute the NE of the n-player game Gd by considering the Utah
family shown in Figure 4.3. We assume the sequence of decisions to be the following:
9See the definition of a relevance graph in Definition 5.4 of [114].
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GP1, GP2, GP3, GP4, P5, P6, C7, C8, and C9. We skip the details of the algorithm
and inference and provide here the main numerical results. We focus on 1,000 randomly
chosen SNPs of chromosome 1,10 and compute the NE and resulting social welfare of the
family for varying values of bi’s. We assume bi = b1 for all grandparents, bi = b2 for
all parents, and bi = b3 for all children. We make b1 and b3 vary between 0 and 1 with
granularity 0.1, and b2 be equal to 0.4 (first column of Figure 4.9), 0.6 (second column
of Figure 4.9) and 0.8 (third column of Figure 4.9). In the first row of Figure 4.9, we
see the number of players disclosing their genomes at NE. In Figure 4.9(a), because b2
is quite small (0.4), if b1 and b3 are also small (≤ 0.4), then nobody has the incentive
to share his genome. If b1 or b3 are high enough for the grandparents and the children
to share their genomes, it will automatically lead the parents to do the same, because
then the parents’ genomic privacy will be reduced by their relatives’ decision. We see
this in the left strip where b3 ≥ 0.5 and b1 ≤ 0.2: 5 relatives disclose their SNPs, the 3
children and the 2 parents. By increasing b1 to 0.3, then 2 of the 4 grandparents have
the incentive to share their SNPs, considering their privacy levels. We notice that when
b2 increases to 0.6 (Figure 4.9(b)) and 0.8 (Figure 4.9(c)), then even if b1 and b3 are very
small, the parents’ best responses are to disclose their SNPs. Then, if b1 increases to
0.3 while b3 ≤ 0.1 (bottom strip), then 2 grandparents have the incentive to share their
SNPs (4 players thus share them), and from b1 ≥ 0.4 all grandparents have the incentive
to disclose their genomes.
Discussion: We conclude that, in some cases, when the perceived benefits do not clearly
outweigh the genomic privacy losses, some people with same perceived benefits might end
up with different strategies at equilibrium.
Looking now at the social welfare values at NE, the most interesting finding is that
the social welfare decreases between Figure 4.9(d) and Figure 4.9(e) for values of b1 and
b3 smaller than 0.5, even though b2 increases from 0.4 to 0.6. This is due to the privacy
externalities that are created by the parents disclosing their SNPs whereas grandparents
and children have no incentives to do the same. Hence, misaligned incentives have
negative impact on the social welfare of a family. Our MAID Md model can be easily
adapted to take altruism into account.
We note that the proposed n-player game requires all family members to give their
decisions sequentially but at a given time instant, which might not be feasible in real life
considering infants, or even unborn family members.
4.6 Related Work
Interdependent risks in privacy have recently been demonstrated and explored in different
settings. Due to their intrinsic social nature, online social networks (OSNs) are especially
prone to indirect privacy risks. Mislove et al. evaluate the fraction of users in an OSN
that would be sufficient in order to infer attributes of the remaining users [135]. Henne et
al. study how OSN pictures uploaded by friends can reveal information about one’s own
location [85]. Dey et al. analyze the risk of age inference in OSNs, by notably relying on
information posted by users’ friends and friends-of-friends [54]. In the context of location
privacy, Vratonjic et al. show how mobile users connecting to location-based services from
the same IP address can indirectly compromise location privacy of others [166]. Olteanu
10As in Section 4.4, LD is not used as we assume the same set G of SNPs potentially shared by the
players and targeted by the adversary.
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et al. study how users reporting co-locations with other users (e.g., on online social
networks) can decrease others’ location privacy [138]. In order to precisely quantify the
effect of co-location information, they propose an optimal inference algorithm and two
polynomial-time approximate inference algorithms.
Acquisti et al. are among the first to propose an economic model to formalize in-
centives and interactions between rational agents in the context of privacy [20]. More
precisely, the authors rely on a game-theoretic approach in order to study the incentives
and behaviors of participants in anonymity networks. Freudiger et al. analyze the be-
havior of selfish mobile nodes that want to protect their location privacy by changing
pseudonym and at a minimum cost [69]. Contrarily to Freudiger et al. who assumed a
global attacker, Humbert et al. consider a local adversary with multiple eavesdropping
stations. They study the interaction between such an adversary and mobile users deploy-
ing mix zones to protect their location privacy [92]. Shokri et al. make use of Stackelberg
Bayesian games in order to model the user-adversary interplay in the context of local-
ization attacks [153]. Biczo´k and Chia tackle, by using a game-theoretic framework,
the issue of interdependent risks caused by agents with misaligned incentives regarding
their privacy in online social networks [38]. They show how negative externalities can
lead to inefficient equilibria. Their work builds upon the literature on IDS games, that
is surveyed in [122]. We follow a similar approach for genomic privacy and, in addi-
tion, precisely evaluate the possible direct and indirect privacy losses with a well-defined
framework and by using real data. The non-linear genetic dependencies between players
in genomic privacy are also a novel compared to previous work.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have studied the interplay between the members of a given family,
who have to decide about whether to share their genomes and how much to invest to
secure their storage. We model the interplay between the family members with differ-
ent incentives and privacy levels by using a game-theoretic approach and predict their
behaviors at equilibrium. First, we extensively study a two-player game between two
purely selfish or partially altruistic family members. In this context, we also derive a
closed-form expression to quantify genomic privacy of any individual given one his rela-
tives’ genome, which dramatically decrease the computational burden compared to the
belief propagation algorithm used in Chapter 3. Then, we extend this framework to an
n-player game using multi-agent influence diagrams, an extension of the Bayesian net-
work framework that enables us to include decision and utility variables. This approach
allows us to significantly reduce the computational complexity of computing the Nash
equilibria with respect to a classic extensive-form game.
In the two-player setting, our results show that the players follow similar security
strategies, that is either invest in security or not, if the cost of investment is the same
for both players, regardless of the cost’s actual value and of the probability of successful
breach from the adversary. In the case of the genome-sharing game, however, if the
benefits of disclosure perceived by the players are different enough, the players follow
opposite strategies, one player putting the other’s privacy at risk by sharing his genome.
We also show that, in general, altruism tends to reduce the privacy loss caused by the
other player at equilibrium. However, for some perceived sharing benefits, the altruistic
prudence can, surprisingly, lead to a worse social outcome than in the purely selfish
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scenario. Finally, in the n-player game, we notice that, when the perceived benefits
do not clearly outweigh the genomic-privacy losses, some players with similar sharing
benefits might end up with different strategies at equilibrium.
Chapter 5
Cooperative Genomic Privacy
Protection
5.1 Introduction
As we have seen in Chapter 3, genomic privacy was popularized by the story of Henrietta
Lacks whose cells were sequenced and whose DNA sequence was put online without the
consent of her descendants [10]. After complaints from the family, essentially due to pri-
vacy concerns, Henrietta’s genome was taken oﬄine, and in 2013, the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) came to an agreement with the Lacks family, which gave them some
control over her genome. Even though this agreement enables the genomic researchers
to use Henrietta’s genome again, it also draws attention to the lack of techniques for
balancing the benefits of genomic research with personal and kin genomic privacy risks.
Richard Sharp, the director of biomedical ethics at the Mayo Clinic, warned that the
agreement was only a “one-off solution” rather than a broad policy that addresses the
tension between research and relatives’ privacy, and he added that a “new policy” was
absolutely needed [14].
Anonymization was the first countermeasure proposed to protect genomic privacy,
but in many different studies it was proven to be inadequate [81, 158, 86]. Another
protection mechanism is to add noise to aggregate statistical results (to satisfy differential
privacy) [64, 102], but at the cost of reduced accuracy. The last option proposed in the
literature is to rely on cryptographic techniques [36, 33]. Even though these techniques
are proven to be effective for using genomic data in healthcare [33, 50], computational
complexity becomes very high when it comes to conducting statistical tests on large
numbers of encrypted genomes for genomic research [106].
In this chapter, we present a genomic-privacy preserving mechanism (GPPM) for
reconciling people’s willingness to share their genomes (e.g., to help research1) with
privacy. Our GPPM acts at the individual data level, not at the aggregate data (or
statistical) level like in [64, 102]. Focusing on the most relevant type of variants (the
SNPs), we study the trade-off between the usefulness of disclosed SNPs (utility) and
genomic privacy. We consider an individual who wants to share his genome, yet who
1http://opensnp.wordpress.com/2011/11/17/first-results-of-the-survey-on-sharing-genetic-
information/
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is concerned about the subsequent privacy risks for himself and his family. Thus, we
design a system that maximizes the disclosure utility but does not exceed a certain
level of privacy loss within a family, considering (i) kin genomic privacy, (ii) personal
privacy preferences (of the family members), (iii) privacy sensitivities of the SNPs, (iv)
correlations between SNPs, and (v) the research utility of the SNPs. Our GPPM can
automatically evaluate the privacy risks of all the family members and decide which
SNPs to disclose. To achieve this goal, it relies on probabilistic graphical models and
combinatorial optimization. Our results indicate that, given the current data model,
genomic privacy of an entire family can be protected while an appropriate subset of
genomic data can be made available. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We propose a GPPM for enabling genomic research while protecting personal and
kin genomic privacy.
• Given the genomic data model, our obfuscation mechanism maximizes the utility
and meets all the privacy constraints of a given family.
• Using combinatorial optimization, we first compute the optimal solution without
considering correlations between SNPs, and then we extend the algorithm to ad-
dress non-linear constraints induced by these correlations.
5.2 Genomic-Privacy Preserving Mechanism
In order to mitigate attribute-inference attacks and protect genomic and health pri-
vacy, the GPPM relies upon an obfuscation mechanism. In practice, obfuscation can
be implemented by adding noise to the SNP values, by injecting fake SNP values, by
reducing precision, or by simply hiding the SNP values. In this thesis, we choose SNP
hiding, essentially because the genomic research community would not receive other op-
tions positively. Indeed, genetic researchers are very reluctant about adding noise or
fake data, notably because of the huge investment they make to increase (sequencing)
accuracy. We assume one family member, at a given time, who wants to disclose his
SNPs and to guarantee a minimum privacy level for him and his family.
5.2.1 Settings
Like in the two previous chapters, we focus on one family whose members are defined
by the set R (|R| = n). We assume that there is only one donor rD who makes the
decision to share his genome at a given time. His relatives might have already publicly
shared some of their genomic data on the Internet. rD takes this into account when he
makes his own disclosure decision. We let G (|G| = m) be the set of SNPs. Its cardinality
m can go up to 50 million, as this is currently the approximate number of SNPs in the
human population [11]. In practice, however, people put online (e.g., on OpenSNP) up
to 1 million of the most significant SNPs. We let xD represent the SNPs of rD (x
i
D is
the value of SNP gi of the donor rD), that are all initially undisclosed (hidden). Finally,
we let yD represent the m-size binary decision vector of rD, where y
i
D = 1 means SNP gi
will be disclosed, and yiD = 0 means SNP gi will remain hidden. Note that the decision
to disclose a SNP could also be probabilistic, thus transforming yiD into a continuous
variable in [0, 1]. We leave the study of the continuous case for future work.
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We express the privacy constraints of a family member both in terms of genomic and
health privacy. Our framework can account for different privacy preferences for different
family members, SNPs, and diseases. For all rj ∈ R, gi ∈ G, we define the privacy
sensitivity as sij . We can set the s
i
j ’s to be equal by default. Then, an individual willing
to personalize his privacy preferences may further define his own privacy sensitivities
regarding specific SNPs based on his privacy concerns regarding, e.g., certain phenotypes.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the most well-known example of such a scenario is the case
of James Watson, co-discoverer of DNA, who made his whole DNA sequence publicly
available, with the exception of one gene known as Apolipoprotein E (ApoE), one of the
strongest predictors for the development of Alzheimer’s disease.2 We let the sets P is ⊆ G
and P id include the privacy-sensitive SNPs and privacy-sensitive diseases of individual ri,
respectively. We represent the tolerance to the genomic-privacy loss of individual i as
Pri(i,P is), and the tolerance to the health-privacy loss of individual ri regarding disease
d ∈ P id as Pri(i, d). These tolerance values represent the maximum privacy loss (after the
disclosure of rD’s SNPs) that an individual would bear. By considering the privacy losses
instead of the absolute privacy levels, we ensure that the donor will more likely reveal a
SNP whose value is already well inferred by the attacker before donor’s disclosure (e.g., by
using SNPs previously shared by the donor’s relatives). Note that these tolerance values
can always be updated for any new family member willing to disclose his genome. Finally,
the utility function is a non-decreasing function of the norm of yD, as the knowledge of
more SNPs can only help genomic research. In a first step towards enhanced genomic
privacy, we assume linear contribution of SNPs on utility. Formally, we define ui to be
the utility provided by SNP gi. Note that, in practice, the utility of the SNPs can be
determined by the research authorities and can vary based on the study.
5.2.2 Linear Optimization
Optimization Problem
The donor faces an optimization problem: How to maximize research utility while pro-
tecting his own and his relatives’ genomic and health privacy. First, the objective function
is formally defined as
∑
i:gi∈G uiy
i
D. Then, privacy constraints are defined, for each in-
dividual, as the sum of privacy losses induced by the donor’s disclosure over all SNPs.
This sum must be capped by the respective privacy loss tolerances of all family members.
Formally, for all individuals rj ∈ R and SNPs gi ∈ G, the privacy loss induced by the
disclosure of xiD is defined as (E
i
j(y
i
D = 0)−Eij(yiD = 1)). Note here that the privacy loss
at a given SNP gi for any relative is only affected by the donor’s decision y
i
D regarding
SNP gi but no other SNP gk 6= gi, meaning that LD correlations are not taken into ac-
count. We make this assumption here in order to define linear constraints. We show how
to extend the linear optimization problem to include LD correlations in Subsection 5.2.3.
Finally, note that if an individual rj , j 6= D has already revealed his SNP gi, the privacy
loss at this SNP for gi for rj is zero, because E
i
j(y
i
D = 0) = E
i
j(y
i
D = 1) = 0.
For all rj ∈ R, gi ∈ G, the privacy weight pij is defined as
pij = s
i
j × (Eij(yiD = 0)− Eij(yiD = 1)). (5.1)
2Later researchers have used correlations in the genome to unveil Watson’s predisposition to
Alzheimer’s [137]. In this work, we also consider such correlations.
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Clearly, pij at a given SNP gi can be different for each family member rj , depending on
how close he is from the donor in the family tree, on the actual values xij and x
i
D of his
and the donor’s SNPs, and on his sensitivity. Note that sij = 0 ∀j /∈ P is.
We can now define the linear optimization problem as
maximize
yD
∑
i:gi∈G
uiy
i
D
subject to
∑
i:gi∈P js
pijy
i
D ≤ Pri(j,P js),∀rj ∈ R
∑
k:gk∈Sd
pkj y
k
D ≤ Pri(j, d),∀d ∈ P jd,∀rj ∈ R
yiD ∈ {0, 1},∀gi ∈ G,
(5.2)
where Sd is the set of SNPs that are associated with disease d. Note that, for the last
inequality, we replace the sensitivity skj in p
k
j by the contribution ck of SNP k to disease
d described in (3.11), and we embed the normalization factor
∑
k ck of (3.11) in Pri(j, d).
Optimization Algorithm
Our optimization problem is very similar to the multidimensional knapsack problem [70].
We decide to follow the branch-and-bound method proposed by Shih [150], because it
finds the optimal solution, represents a good trade-off between time and storage space,
and allows for the extension of the algorithm to null and negative (privacy) weights.
A branch-and-bound algorithm is a systematic enumeration of all candidate solutions,
where large subsets of candidate solutions are pruned by using upper bounds on the
quantity being optimized. A branch-and-bound method generally relies on two main
rules: (i) the estimation of the upper bound at any node (state of assigned variables) in
the search tree, and (ii) a choice criterion for the selection of a branching variable at the
node selected for further partitioning.
In order to find (i), Shih suggests treating the C-constraint knapsack problem as C
single-constraint knapsack problems with the same objective function, and then comput-
ing the value associated to the optimal fractional solution (thus relaxing yiD ∈ {0, 1} into
yiD ∈ [0, 1]) of all of these C problems separately. The fractional optimal solution is easier
to solve than the integer solution, as it enables us to sort the items (SNPs), with respect
to their ratios between utility and privacy weights rij = ui/p
i
j , from the highest to the
lowest ratios, and then to select all the highest ones that can fit under the constraint,
with the last SNP being partially included (based on the remaining room). Note that,
in our setting, we can have different orderings of SNPs for different constraints, based on
the pij values of the family members. The computation of the fractional optimal solution
is repeated C times, for the C different optimization problems, leading to C optimal
values. Then, the upper bound at the given node is defined as the minimum among all
these C values.
The node selected for the next branching is defined as the one in the search frontier
whose upper bound is the highest among all nodes in the frontier, and where the solution
associated with this upper bound is infeasible (some variables being different than 0 and
1, or some constraints being not satisfied). The branching variable is the one whose ratio
is the smallest among all the non-zero free variables (variables not explicitly assigned to
0 or 1 at a node) in this infeasible solution. If the solution at this node is feasible (all
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decision variables assigned to 0 or 1 and all constraints satisfied), then it is optimal, and
the algorithm stops.
Let us mention that our optimization problem has two main differences with the mul-
tidimensional knapsack problem. First, the privacy metrics, hence weights, are expressed
in real values, between 0 and 2 for Eij , whereas the knapsack problem assumes integer
numbers only. In order to obtain integer values, we merely multiply all our privacy
weights pij ’s and tolerance values Pri(.) by 10
k, where k ∈ N+ depends on the precision
we want to attain, and then round the weights to the closest greater integer and the
tolerance values to the closest smaller integer. This ensures that all privacy constraints
in the space of real numbers are still satisfied. Second, the privacy weight pij can be
equal to zero (e.g., if xij has already been disclosed by rj) or even negative (when the
donor reveals a SNP whose value increases the privacy of his relative(s) at the same
SNP).3 Thus, the ratios rij might not be defined or be negative. In order to resolve this
issue, we give a higher ranking in the ordering of SNPs to ratios with null weights with
respect to those with positive weights, and we give an even higher ranking to those with
negative weights. We furthermore give higher ranking to negative weights with absolute
values higher than the others. To enforce this ranking in practice in Section 5.3, we set
rij = ui/0.1 for null p
i
j ’s, and r
i
j = ui|pij |/0.01 for negative pij ’s. Note that, due to the
requirement of integer values for weights, all other (positive) weights pij belong, after the
aforementioned multiplication by 10k and rounding, to N+.
The output of the above optimization algorithm is an optimal solution y∗D that rep-
resents the SNPs the donor could disclose and an optimal value u∗ representing the
maximum research utility. We represent the optimal candidate SNPs to be shared in the
m-size vector x˜D where x˜
i
D = x
i
D if y
i∗
D = 1 and x˜
i
D = ⊥ if yi∗D = 0. This is the output we
see in state 2 of Figure 5.1. We give x˜D as input to the non-linear algorithm described
in Subsection 5.2.3 to eventually reach state 3.
5.2.3 Non-Linear Extension
Non-Linear Optimization Problem
The LD correlations between the SNPs are not considered in the above optimization
problem in order for the constraints to remain linear. In this subsection, we propose an
extension of the branch-and-bound algorithm in order to deal with non-linear constraints.
Whereas in the case without LD, the privacy loss at a given SNP gi of individual rj
depended only on the donor’s decision yiD regarding SNP gi, we have now to consider
all the SNPs in LD with gi to evaluate the privacy loss at gi. Defining E˜
i
j to be the
privacy level of individual rj at SNP gi quantified by including LD correlations, the
privacy loss at SNP gi of individual rj induced by the disclosure of x˜D is equal to
(E˜ij(yD = 0)− E˜ij(y∗DD)). This leads to the following updated privacy weights
p˜ij = s
i
j × (E˜ij(yD = 0)− E˜ij(y∗D)). (5.3)
Note that now the argument of E˜ij is the entire vector yD and not only y
i
D, because
of LD. The optimization problem in (5.2) is reformulated as a non-linear optimization
3For example, assume a child to be homozygous-major at a given SNP and his father to be heterozy-
gous. Then, the estimation error for the child’s SNP, thus the child’s privacy at this SNP, increases when
the father’s SNP is observed by the attacker (compared to the case when it is unknown, when only the
MAF is used, and this MAF is close to 0).
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Figure 5.1: Main steps of the optimization algorithm. Without loss of generality, the
donor rD is assumed to be the n-th member of the family, thus D = n. First, the donor
selects a subset of candidate SNPs to be shared using the optimization algorithm of
Subsection 5.2.2, and then reveals less or more SNPs depending on the updated privacy
weights computed with LD by relying upon the fine-tuning step of Subsection 5.2.3.
problem:
maximize
yD
∑
i:gi∈G
uiy
i
D
subject to
∑
i:gi∈P js
p˜ij(yD) ≤ Pri(j,P js),∀rj ∈ R
∑
k:gk∈Sd
p˜kj (yD) ≤ Pri(j, d),∀d ∈ P jd,∀ri ∈ R
yiD ∈ {0, 1},∀gi ∈ G.
(5.4)
Instead of solving this very complex optimization problem, we rely on the optimal
solution y∗D computed in Subsection 5.2.2, embed it into (5.4), and check whether the
privacy constraints are still met with the updated privacy weights p˜ij ’s. Let us first study
the case when no SNP has been disclosed by any relative before the donor’s decision.4 If
XO = ∅, then ∑
i:gi∈P js
E˜ij(yD = 0) =
∑
i:gi∈P js
Eij(yD = 0) (5.5)
and, because of LD correlations,∑
i:gi∈P js
E˜ij(y
∗
D) ≤
∑
i:gi∈P js
Eij(y
∗
D). (5.6)
Embedding (5.5) and (5.6) in (5.1) and (5.3), we get∑
i:gi∈P js
p˜ij(y
∗
D) ≥
∑
i:gi∈P js
pijy
i
D, (5.7)
meaning that, for the same value of Pri(j,P js) in (5.2) and (5.4), the privacy constraint
of family member i in (5.4) will be violated with high likelihood once LD is taken into
4Without loss of generality, we focus on the genomic-privacy constraints in the following.
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account. If XO 6= ∅, then two scenarios can happen. If∑
i:gi∈P js
Eij(y
∗
D)− E˜ij(y∗D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Privacy difference using LD or not
after x˜D is revealed
≥
∑
i:gi∈P js
Eij(yD = 0)− E˜ij(yD = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Privacy difference using LD or not
before x˜D is revealed
,
then we get the same inequality (5.7), leading to the same consequences of constraint
violation. If , on the contrary,∑
i:gi∈P js
Eij(y
∗D)− E˜ij(y∗D) <
∑
i:gi∈P js
Eij(yD = 0)− E˜ij(yD = 0), (5.8)
then we get ∑
i:gi∈P js
p˜ij(y
∗
D) <
∑
i:gi∈P js
pijy
i
D, (5.9)
which might allow the donor to reveal more of his SNPs without violating any of his
relatives’ privacy constraints. At a first glance, Inequality (5.9) looks counterintuitive.
However, in order to understand it, let us look at Inequality (5.8), which states that
the difference in privacy levels if LD is used or not is smaller after the observation of a
subset of the donor’s SNPs x˜D. This means that, by revealing his own SNPs, the donor
reduces the importance of using LD correlations to correctly infer some of the SNPs of
his relatives. For instance, let us assume the donor to be the father of a child rj whose
mother has already revealed SNP gi, in LD with another SNP gk revealed by the child.
Furthermore, assume that the father, mother, and child are homozygous major at SNPs
gi and gk. Now, before the father reveals his SNP gi (with value x
i
D = 0), there is
some uncertainty about the child’s SNP gj (with value x
i
j = 0); but by observing SNP
gk of the child (with value x
k
j = 0), the attacker improves his estimation if he uses LD
correlation and thus reduces his estimation error, meaning E˜ij(yD = 0) < E
i
j(yD = 0).
However, once the father decides to reveal his homozygous major SNP gi (y
i∗
D = 1), the
attacker is certain that the child’s SNP gj is homozygous major (because both mother
and father SNPs are homozygous major and revealed), regardless if LD is used or not, i.e.
Eij(y
∗
D) = E˜
i
j(y
∗
D) = 0. Thus, we have E
i
j(y
∗
D) − E˜ij(y∗D) < Eij(yD = 0) − E˜ij(yD = 0),
leading by extension to Inequality (5.8).
Fine-Tuning Algorithm
Let us first describe how we proceed if one or multiple constraints are violated once LD
correlations are considered in the privacy quantification. In this case, we first select the
privacy constraint that is not met anymore with the highest difference between Pri(j,Pjs)
(or Pri(j, d)) and the newly computed privacy losses. Focusing on the set of genomic-
privacy constraints, we thus select the constraint of the family member k, where
k = arg max
j:rj∈R
{
∑
i:gi∈P js
p˜ij(y
∗
D)− Pri(j,P js)}. (5.10)
We want then to hide some SNPs gi in x˜D (i.e. where y
∗i
D = 1) in order that the
constraint of relative rk is satisfied again. For all the SNPs whose value is revealed in
x˜D, we compute a global privacy weight δ
i
k for SNP gi of rk that includes the privacy loss
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induced by SNP gi on the SNPs gl ∈ L in LD with gi. We compute this global privacy
weight at SNP gi for individual rk as
δik = p˜
i
k +
∑
l:gl∈L
p˜lk
= sik(E˜
i
k(yD = 0)− E˜ik(y∗D)) +
∑
l:gl∈L
slk(E˜
l
k(yD = 0)− E˜lk(y∗D)).
(5.11)
Then, we compute the ratios of each SNP gi (revealed in x˜D) for individual rk as r¯
i
k =
δik/ui. The SNPs with the highest ratios represent those where LD correlations cause
the highest decrease in the genomic privacy of family member rk and/or provide low
utility to the optimal solution y∗D computed in Subsection 5.2.2. Thus, these should be
removed first from the set of SNPs to be shared in order to meet the privacy constraint
of individual rk again, and to cause the smallest decrease in utility.
To see whether the privacy constraint is met for the family member rk, we iteratively
remove such SNPs (starting with the one with the highest ratio) in x˜D and, after each
removal, we input the new solution to the quantification box. We repeat this until all
the privacy constraints are satisfied for all family members in R. Finally, the SNPs left
in x˜D after the final iteration are publicly shared. This case is illustrated in state 3 of
Figure 5.1.
In the case where including LD correlations in the privacy quantification actually
decreases privacy losses, the privacy constraints are still met and can even enable for
potential new SNPs to be included in x˜D. In this case, we select the genomic-privacy
constraint where the remaining room between the genomic-privacy constraint and the
newly computed privacy loss is the smallest, i.e. we select the constraint of the family
member rk, where
k = arg min
j:rj∈R
{Pri(j,P js)−
∑
i:gi∈P js
p˜ij(y
∗
D)}. (5.12)
For all SNPs not revealed in x˜D (i.e., where y
i∗
D = 0), we compute the privacy decrease
led by LD for rk compared to the privacy level computed without LD. We compute this
privacy difference at a SNP gi for individual rk as
∆ik = E
i
k(y
i∗
D = 0)− E˜ik(y∗D), (5.13)
where Eik(y
i∗
D = 0) is the privacy value at SNP gi for individual rk after the linear
optimization (without considering LD), and E˜ik(y
∗
D) is the privacy quantified using LD.
Then, we compute the ratios of each SNP gi (not revealed yet) for individual rk as
r¯ik = (ui∆
i
k)/s
i
k. The SNPs with highest ratios represent those where LD correlations
cause the most significant decrease in the genomic privacy of family member rk, and/or
provide high utility. Thus, these SNPs are the first ones that should be revealed and
included in x˜D, in order to have the smallest difference in privacy loss, thus still meeting
rk’s privacy constraint and providing maximal utility increase.
We iteratively include new SNPs in x˜D and input the new solution to the quan-
tification box to check whether all the privacy constraints are still met for all family
members. We repeat this step until one privacy constraint is violated again, and we
publicly share the last vector x˜D to have satisfied all constraints. In the next section,
we briefly show experimentally how close this fine-tuning algorithm is to the maximum
found with exhaustive search.
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5.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our optimization algorithm for protecting
individual and kin privacy. We study the balance between maximum achievable utility
and the privacy of each individual in a family. The results show the total utility we can
obtain for different genomic-privacy guarantees.
We make use of the CEPH/Utah Pedigree 1463 [59]. It includes the partial DNA
sequences of 17 family members: 4 grandparents, 2 parents, and 11 children. In order
to remain at a representative scale, we keep only 5 randomly chosen children out of
11, as in Chapter 3. Figure 5.2(a) presents the pedigree structure. We focus on 50
SNPs of chromosome 1 and assume one genomic-privacy constraint, including all the 50
SNPs for each family member. Thus, we have a total of 11 privacy constraints, which
represents more constraints than other generic experiments in the optimization literature
that included up to 5 or 7 constraints [70]. Considering LD strengths between r2 = 0.5
(medium LD) and r2 = 1 (strongest LD), each SNP is in LD with around 4.5 other
SNPs, on average. We set a precision of 0.01 in our privacy weights and tolerance values,
thus multiplying these real-valued elements by 102, and rounding them, as explained
in Subsection 5.2.2. Parent P5 is assumed to be the donor in all scenarios presented
in this section. In our evaluations, for the sake of simplicity, we assume each SNP
is equally useful for the genomic research, i.e., ui = 1 for all SNPs. We also assume
the privacy sensitivities are equal, for all SNPs and individuals, i.e., sij = s. Equal
values of sensitivities for all SNPs would typically be the default setting if, for example,
family members do not want to bother setting their privacy sensitivities themselves.
Other distributions over the utility or sensitivity values should not alter the algorithm’s
performances significantly.
5.3.1 No Previous Disclosure by the Family
As of today most people have not publicly revealed their genome, we first analyze the case
where no family member has shared any of his SNPs before the donor makes his decision.
In other words, we assume that, initially, XO = ∅. We analyze the tension between utility
and privacy for different values of parent P5’s privacy constraint. Figure 5.2(b) shows the
increase in the utility caused by the higher privacy loss tolerance of P5. Because a low
tolerance to privacy loss is assumed for all the other relatives in the family in this case,
the utility (computed without LD) cannot go beyond 19, even if P5’s constraint increases
beyond 4. We also notice that, once the LD is included in the privacy quantification,
the utility decreases, reaching a maximum value of 13 instead of 19. This is because LD
increases the privacy loss incurred when P5 reveals his SNPs, thus reducing the total
number of SNPs parent P5 can reveal without violating the family’s privacy constraints.
5.3.2 Previous Disclosure by Part of the Family
We want to mimic the situation where some of the family members have already revealed
some of their SNPs. We simulate this by randomly selecting (with probability 0.5) some
of the family members (except P5, who is the donor) who reveal a subset of their SNPs.
Then, for the members who are selected to reveal their SNPs, we select, uniformly at
random, some of their 50 SNPs to reveal. In the scenario we focus on, this leads to the
following SNPs being revealed before the donor’s decision: 8 (different) SNPs revealed
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Figure 5.2: Evaluation of the proposed solution on a real Utah pedigree. (a) Genealogical
tree, (b) Utility versus privacy under low tolerance to privacy loss for all relatives except
parent P5, and varying values of privacy constraints Pri(5,P5s ) for parent P5 (x-axis).
Here, XO = ∅, meaning that no relative has revealed any SNP before P5. Low tolerance
is defined as 1/4 of the total privacy loss that a relative would incur if all 50 SNPs of P5
were revealed. Results are shown up to Pri(5,P5s ) = 4.4 even if P5’s privacy constraint
can go beyond because, from Pri(5,P5s ) = 4, the utility stops increasing (capped by other
relatives’ low tolerance).
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Figure 5.3: Utility versus privacy under (a) medium, (b) high tolerance to privacy loss
for all relatives except parent P5, and varying values of privacy constraints for parent P5
(x-axis). Medium, respectively high, tolerance is defined as around half, respectively 3/4,
of the total privacy loss that a relative would incur if all 50 SNPs of P5 were revealed.
The x-axis represents the privacy loss constraint of P5, from no privacy loss (strongest
constraint) to 9.9 privacy loss (i.e., around 0.2 privacy loss per SNP, which is a weak
constraint).
by GP1 and GP2; 35 SNPs revealed by GP3; 42 revealed by GP4; 0 by P6; 0 SNP by
C7, C8, C9, C10; and 30 by C11.
We analyze the relation between utility and privacy for different genomic-privacy
constraint values, for each of the eleven individuals, Pri(i,P is). Figure 5.3(a) and 5.3(b)
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Figure 5.4: Genomic privacy of all family members given the genomic-privacy constraint
of P5, under the same setting as in Figure 5.3(a) i.e. under medium privacy loss con-
straints for P5 relatives: (a) privacy computed without LD, and (b) privacy computed
with LD, before the fine-tuning phase. We do not show the privacy levels of GP3, GP4
and P6 as these remain constant. Note the large discrepancy in absolute privacy values
and privacy losses between Figure 5.4(a) and 5.4(b). Also notice that GP1 privacy curve
is hidden by GP2 privacy curve in Figure 5.4(a) (they have same privacy levels w/o LD).
illustrate the utility gain with respect to different privacy loss tolerance levels for the
donor (P5). The two figures differ essentially in terms of the genomic-privacy constraints
of the rest of the family members. In Figure 5.3(a), the tolerance is medium; more
precisely, the privacy constraint for each individual in the pedigree (except P5) is set
to half of the maximum privacy loss that would be incurred by that individual if the
donor revealed all his SNPs. In Figure 5.3(a), the tolerance is higher, set to 3/4 of the
maximum privacy loss.
We first focus on the utility computed using our branch-and-bound algorithm (case
w/o LD). In Figure 5.3(a), we observe that the utility does not increase beyond 38 when
we increase the genomic-privacy loss constraint of the donor more than 5.4. From this
point, the increased privacy tolerance of the donor does not enable him to reveal more
SNPs, because he is constrained by the rest of the family’s privacy requirements. In
Figure 5.3(b), we note that the utility keeps increasing with the privacy loss constraint
of P5 because his relatives are more tolerant regarding their own privacy losses.
Looking at the utility induced once we include the LD correlations in the privacy
quantification, we notice some increase in the utility. In other words, including LD
enables the donor to reveal more SNPs than without LD. Utility in both curves reaches
50 SNPs after a 4.5 privacy loss constraint for the donor. This can be explained by the
fact that, when LD is considered, we use Equation (5.3) (privacy loss with LD) instead
of Equation (5.1) (privacy loss without LD) to compute the privacy weights for each
SNP in each constraint. And the privacy loss in Equation (5.3) is actually smaller than
in Equation (5.1) in this scenario, essentially because LD already decreases significantly
the relatives’ privacy before the donor reveals any of his own SNPs. This is very visible
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in Figure 5.4(a) and 5.4(b). In Figure 5.4(a), we show the privacy levels for any family
member when LD is not included in the privacy quantification. Figure 5.4(b) shows the
privacy levels when LD correlations are also used in the privacy quantification.
First, we notice that in both figures, it is P5’s privacy level that decreases the most,
as he is the one who actually reveals new SNPs in the process. Other relatives’ privacy is
only damaged due to familial correlations. At the origin of the x-axis (i.e., on the y-axis),
we see the privacy levels before the donor makes a decision, i.e., before the optimization
algorithm. We notice that, here again, privacy without LD is much higher than privacy
once LD is used to infer the SNPs. This is because some relatives have already revealed
part of their genomic data. This is the reason, once P5 reveals his own SNPs, the privacy
loss is much smaller in Figure 5.4(b) than in Figure 5.4(a). As a consequence, the donor
(P5) can reveal more SNPs while still meeting his family’s privacy constraints, thus
leading to the utility increase displayed in Figure 5.3(a) and 5.3(b). We conclude that
the values of the privacy-loss constraints have to be carefully determined by the family
members or the genetic counsellors, based on family members’ privacy expectations and
on whether LD is included or not in the initial inference and privacy quantification. In
our case, in order to make use of the linear optimization framework, we defined the
privacy loss constraints based on the privacy levels computed without LD.
Finally, we compared the optimal solutions computed with exhaustive search over
a subset of 10 SNPs whose privacy weights were computed with LD, with the solutions
derived from our optimization algorithm presented in Figure 5.1. In the various scenarios
we tested, the exhaustive search method could never find higher utility values than our
fine-tuning algorithm. In all scenarios, our fine-tuning algorithm reached the maximum
utility. Thus, even though we do not have any formal demonstration that the fine-tuning
step is optimal, we are confident that in general it provides a very good approximation
of the optimum.
5.3.3 Computational Complexity
As expected, the highest computation time is on average induced by the branch-and-
bound algorithm (Subsection 5.2.2), due to the high complexity of the multidimensional
knapsack problem. The non-linear extension (Subsection 5.2.3) is by design very efficient,
as it relies on previous optimal computations and it updates a minimal set of decision
variables, trading-off exact optimality for computational efficiency. This last part only
requires quantifying privacy levels twice at the beginning (in the quantification box), to
get the E˜ij(yD = 0)’s and E˜
i
j(y
∗
D)’s, and then quantifying once per update on a decision
variable yi∗D .
5
The multidimensional knapsack problem is NP-complete and admits no fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme. From our experiments, we notice that the com-
plexity of the branch-and-bound algorithm highly differs for different settings, e.g., dif-
ferent privacy-loss tolerance values or privacy weights. With 50 SNPs, the vast majority
of the solutions were found in less than one second. However, the algorithm did not
scale well for more than 50 decision variables. The positive side is that this whole pro-
cess has to be undertaken only once by the donor and can be run oﬄine. Furthermore,
we considered one privacy constraint for each family member, thus eleven constraints
5Note that the computational complexity of one quantification step is O(nm) (shown in Subsec-
tion 3.3.3).
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in total. In practice, some relatives would certainly not care much about their genomic
privacy, hence some constraints could be relaxed, thus enabling us to consider more SNPs
in the optimization problem. Also, an advantage of the branch-and-bound algorithm is
that it can be parallelized and distributed using a computer cluster. The algorithm’s
running time then scales linearly with the number of machines and cores [41]. Another
way to reduce the complexity is to cluster subsets of SNPs together (based on the dis-
eases they are associated with, or based on the LD correlations between them), thus
trading-off the granularity of the obfuscation mechanism for computational efficiency.
Note that our optimization problem can easily be adapted to deal with clusters of SNPs:
We can simply define the privacy weight of one cluster as the sum of the privacy losses
over the SNPs in this cluster. Finally, instead of using an exact optimization method,
heuristic approaches [70] could be used to approximate the optimal solution and improve
computational efficiency.
5.4 Related Work
Building upon [86], Sankararaman et al. provide quantitative guidelines for researchers
willing to make a certain number of SNPs publicly available in GWAS, without revealing
the presence of a single individual within a study group [145]. Fienberg et al. [64] propose
using differential privacy to protect the identities of participants in scientific study. In
the same vein, Johnson and Shmatikov [102] propose privacy-preserving algorithms for
computing various statistics related to the SNPs, while guaranteeing differential privacy.
However, differential privacy reduces the accuracy of research results and is aimed to be
applied on aggregate results. In our work, we focus on protecting individual genomic
data.
Some works also focus on protecting the privacy of genomic data and on preserv-
ing utility in medical tests such as (i) searching of a particular pattern in the DNA se-
quence [163, 39], (ii) comparing the similarity of DNA sequences [101, 40, 36, 52, 53, 109],
and (iii) performing statistical analysis on several DNA sequences [106]. Furthermore,
Ayday et al. propose privacy-preserving schemes for medical tests and personalized
medicine methods that use patients’ genomic data [34]. For privacy-preserving clinical
genomics, a group of researchers proposes to outsource some costly computations to a
public cloud or semi-trusted service provider [168, 47]. Finally, Ayday et al. propose
techniques for privacy-preserving management of raw genomes [32]. All aforementioned
works make use of cryptographic protocols to protect the privacy of genomic data. In
this thesis, we propose a non-cryptographic approach for protecting genomic privacy,
which has the advantage to be computationally more efficient when making research on
genomic data.
Finally, Calmon and Fawaz propose an inference framework for evaluating privacy
risks under utility constraints in a generic setting [60]. Their goal is to minimize infor-
mation leakage subject to certain utility constraints. They show that their optimization
problem can be cast as a modified rate-distortion problem. They eventually compare
their framework with differential privacy.
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we convey the importance of building mechanisms for preserving genomic
privacy. Such privacy goes beyond the protection of genomic information of the individual
to the consideration of the interests of family members. These might be unwilling to
allow predictions of their own genomic data based on the leakage of information from
one or several individuals of the kin. The approach presented here searches for balance
between accuracy (utility) of genomic data and privacy by relying on graphical models
and combinatorial optimization. We take into account the fact that different parts of the
genome can have different utilities in medical research, and different levels of sensitivity
for individuals. Our genomic-privacy preserving mechanism makes use of obfuscation to
meet privacy requirements of family members and maximize utility. We also present an
extension of the optimization algorithm to cope with non-linear constraints induced by
linkage disequilibrium. We implement both linear and non-linear optimization algorithms
and evaluate their computational complexities.
Part III
Positive Interdependence and
Incentives
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Chapter 6
Optimizing Incentives for Cooperative
Privacy Protection
6.1 Introduction
Over the last two centuries, non-governmental currencies, known as scrip, have been
issued by private companies or local communities for many different purposes. For in-
stance, to pay employees in isolated mining or logging camps, company scrip was used in
lieu of regular money. More recently, community-issued scrip, such as the Detroit Com-
munity Scrip, has been issued in order to restore economic confidence, and help consumers
make ends meet [17]. In the last decade, scrip systems have been proposed in order to
thwart free riding in online environments (e.g., file sharing or resource sharing [95, 165]).
The free-rider problem is particularly serious in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks such as
BitTorrent, LimeWire or Gnutella, in which most users (85 percent) do not share any
files [88].
Although scrip systems can help ensure fairness and prevent free riding, such systems
are exposed to similar behaviors as in real-world economies that lead to the same mone-
tary issues. The Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-Op [157], a concrete scrip system created
by a group of parents working on Capitol Hill, faced a recession and a monetary crash due
to its monetary policy. Several researchers further studied the dynamics of scrip systems,
based on these issues [71, 107, 108]. Among other results, they show that agents following
threshold strategies lead to a nontrivial Nash equilibrium. They show the impact of the
amount of scrip in circulation on the efficiency of the system. In particular, they show
that efficiency (social welfare) increases with the average amount of scrip per agent, until
some point where the system experiences a monetary crash. At that point, no agent is
willing to work anymore and social welfare falls to zero. Finally, they consider different
“irrational” behaviors, such as altruists and hoarders, and identify the impact of sybils
and collusion on scrip systems.
The original scrip system assumes one transaction at a time, where one agent provides
a service to another and gets paid one dollar1 for it (one-to-one exchange) [71]. Previous
work has brought a number of relevant results. However, there is an urgent need to
1We refer to the unit of scrip as the dollar.
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extend the one-to-one scrip system to a system involving more than one dollar and two
agents at a time in order to tackle new challenges led by modern IT systems, such as
fostering cooperation in privacy-enhancing applications.
Privacy-enhancing technologies, such as anonymity networks [56, 51, 68, 143], provide
valuable privacy benefits for Internet users. Among other benefits, anonymity networks
can prevent price discrimination in e-commerce by concealing IP addresses. They are
also used by journalists or human rights activists to circumvent censorship in dictatorial
countries. For instance, there was a dramatic increase of Tunisian Tor [16] users during
the Jasmine Revolution in January 2011 [15].
Many privacy-preserving mechanisms require cooperation among multiple users in
order to achieve a good level of privacy. However, cooperation is not free, and its inherent
cost often prevents users from collaborating. For example, in anonymity systems, running
a relay node costs a non-negligible amount of bandwidth and processing power. Back
in 2003, Acquisti et al. already highlighted the need of incentives to offer and use
anonymity services [20]. Whereas the use of anonymity networks has increased since
then, the number of relays is still much lower than the number of clients, and the client-
to-relay ratio keeps growing. In 2009, there were 1,500 Tor relays for approximately
100,000 simultaneously active Tor clients [128], in June 2011, 2,500 relays for 300,000 to
400,000 clients, and today, in December 2014, there are 10,500 relays (including bridges)
for 2.25 million Tor clients [15].
Among other incentives for acting as a relay in anonymity networks, several schemes
propose to make use of micropayments to reward users relaying others’ anonymous traf-
fic [27, 48, 65] . These previous works have mainly contributed to the design of anony-
mous and secure micropayments. However, they did not evaluate the monetary issues
that could appear in such systems. Assuming an anonymous circuit requires the coop-
eration of n relays, each client has to own (at least) n dollars in order to reward each of
these n relays. In order to earn enough scrip to afford such a relaying service, each client
will then have to serve — relay anonymous traffic — for other users in the anonymity
network.
This leads us to define and study the one-to-n scrip system: one agent requests n
other agents to fulfill a service and pays each of them one dollar. This scheme also better
complies with current file sharing systems, such as BitTorrent, where an agent downloads
multiple equal-size chunks from different neighboring peers of the torrent. In order to
download an entire file and get any utility from it, an agent needs n peers who volunteer
to upload their chunks. Thus, he must reward n agents with n dollars.
In this chapter, we develop and study a new analytical model for scrip systems en-
abling a much wider range of applications. First, we precisely characterize the distribu-
tion of scrip in the one-to-n scrip system at equilibrium as a function of n and of the
fraction of agents of each type. Second, we prove that, under certain assumptions, there
exists a nontrivial Nash equilibrium where all agents play threshold strategies. We study
the effect of n on the agents’ strategies and the consequent equilibrium and prove that
agents’ thresholds increase with n. Third, we evaluate the efficiency (social welfare) of
the one-to-n scrip system and notice that it tends to decrease when n increases. We
show that a system designer can increase the scrip supply in order to offset the loss of
efficiency caused by a larger n. This works well up to a point beyond which the system
experiences a monetary crash. We show that this critical upper bound increases with
n. Finally, we present how our one-to-n scrip system can help to improve fairness and
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Table 6.1: List of symbols.
Symbol Definition
N Number of agents within the system
T Set of agents’ types
f Distribution of types
ft Fraction of agents of type t
W Total amount of scrip in the system
m Average amount of scrip per agent
n Number of volunteers per request
bt Utility an agent gains for having a request satisfied
ct Cost of an agent when satisfying one request
δt Rate at which an agent discounts his utility
αt Request rate
βt Probability that an agent is able to satisfy a request
γt Likelihood to be chosen when an agent volunteers
kt Agent’s threshold
k Vector of size |T | encompassing all kt’s
skt Threshold strategy with threshold equal to kt
sk Strategy profile with agents’ thresholds defined by k
W State space describing the wealth of every agent
X Markov chain defined on W
A Set of agents who can afford a service
V Set of agents who volunteer
M ti Fraction of agents of type t with i dollars
pu Probability of earning one dollar
pd Probability of having a request satisfied
µ Fraction of agents at their threshold
efficiency in two privacy-enhancing applications. In particular, we evaluate the amount
of scrip that should be allocated into the Tor network to optimize its performance.
6.2 Model
In this work, we consider a scrip system with N agents who interact with each other.
We consider a population of agents with different preferences and characteristics. Each
agent has a type t ∈ T , where T is a finite set of types. The distribution of types is
described by f , where the element ft represents the fraction of agents with type t. The
type t of an agent is described by the tuple t = (bt, ct, δt, αt, βt, γt), whose variables are
defined in the rest of this section and in Table 6.1.
At each time slot, one agent is selected proportionally to his request rate αt to ask for
a service. If this agent has at least $n, he can afford a service and request other agents
to fulfill this service. In order to have his request fully satisfied, n agents must be able
and willing to collaborate. If there are less than n agents able and willing to volunteer,
the request cannot be fulfilled, even partially, and the requester gains no utility. The
service has to be satisfied in an “atomic” way. An agent is able to satisfy a service with
probability βt, and willing to volunteer depending on his strategy. Moreover, an agent
volunteering to provide service is chosen to fulfill another agent’s request with likelihood
γt.
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When a service is performed, meaning that n agents fulfill the request of another
agent, the requester (of type t1) obtains some benefit bt1(n) that is, in most cases, non-
decreasing with n (see Section 6.5 for further details on the privacy gain). Each volunteer
of type t2 bears a utility cost ct2 representing, for instance, the usage of bandwidth and
processing power in anonymity networks. Thus, when n agents of same type t2 collaborate
with another agent (of type t1) and satisfy his request, the whole cost is equal to nct2 ,
and the system’s utility gain is bt1−nct2 . We assume that bt1−nct2 > 0, such that social
welfare increases when a service is satisfied. The system would otherwise not be viable.
Regarding the monetary reward, an agent providing a service is paid some fixed
amount of scrip that we assume is equivalent to $1. Consequently, a service requester
must spend $n to obtain a service. If the chosen agent does not have enough scrip, no
transaction can take place in that time slot and social welfare stagnates. We model the
system as an infinite extensive-form game where the total utility of an agent over time
is the discounted sum of utilities at each time slot. The total discounted utility of agent
i (of type t) is then Ui =
∑∞
τ=0 δ
τ
t ui(τ), where δt represents the rate at which an agent
of type t discounts utility.
As in the one-to-one scrip system, we assume that prices do not change over time,
which allows the agents to know the future monetary cost of their service requests. As
the first step towards an extended scrip system, we will consider a payoff-heterogenous
population, i.e. bt, ct or δt might vary but αt = α, βt = β and γt = γ, for all t. Differences
in these parameters should not fundamentally change the game-theoretic results. The
one-to-n scrip system can be fully described by (T , f , N , m, n), where m is the average
amount of scrip.
6.3 Analytical Results
In this section, we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium when agents make use of
threshold strategies. We also show the effect of n on the system, its equilibrium and the
agents’ strategies. We begin this section by describing the distribution of scrip, which will
help us analyze the strategic behaviors of agents, as well as the resulting social welfare
in Section 6.4.
6.3.1 Distribution of Scrip
Before analyzing the best strategies and the resulting equilibrium, it is crucial to examine
what happens in the system if every agent adopts a predefined category of strategies,
called threshold strategies. Such a class of strategies is easy to explain. If an agent has
too little scrip, he will be willing to work in order to afford service requests later in time,
until he reaches a point at which he will feel “wealthy” enough. This threshold represents
how much scrip an agent wants to save up for future requests. Let sk be the strategy
where an agent volunteers when he has strictly less than k dollars and defects otherwise.
With this definition, s0 represents the strategy where an agent never volunteers, and s∞
the strategy where he always volunteers. As threshold strategies depend on the agents’
types, we write kt to represent the threshold adopted by agents of type t. Vector k
encompasses all the kt’s, for all types t, and sk is the corresponding strategy profile.
In our analysis, we assume that W = mN <
∑
t ftktN , meaning that the total
amount of scrip is not too high in order that the system analysis remains interesting. If
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W ≥∑t ftktN , the system would converge to a state where each agent has reached his
threshold, and thus does not want to volunteer anymore. We also assume that m ≥ n.
Otherwise, the system would converge to a state where no agent can afford a service,
i.e. where all agents own less than n dollars. These two requirements seem reasonable
because a system designer should ensure that (i) there are enough scrip in the system
such that exchanges can happen, and (ii) there is not too much scrip in order to prevent
procrastination and to encourage cooperation among agents.
Let X be a Markov chain over the state space W that describes the amount of scrip
each agent owns. Each state of the Markov chain can be described by a vector x, where
xi represents the amount of scrip agent i owns in state Wx. These states must satisfy
some constraints: (i)
∑N
i=1 x(i) = W , and (ii) 0 ≤ x(j) ≤ kt, for all agents j with type
t.2 Thus, even if the Markov chain has a significant number of states (when N is large),
their number is finite. If the Markov chain is in a state Wx, and agent j has a request
satisfied by n agents i1, i2, ..., in, the Markov chain moves to another state, Wy, where
y(j) = x(j)− n
y(i`) = x(i`) + 1, for ` = 1, ..., n,
y(.) = x(.), for all other agents.
(6.1)
We can already notice that, contrarily to the original scrip system, the aforementioned
Markov chain is neither reversible nor symmetric, notably because no single transaction
can restore the chain back to its previous state. Nevertheless, if there are at least n+ 2
agents within the scrip system, there exists a limit distribution, as stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 6.1. If there are at least n+ 2 agents in the system, then X is finite, aperiodic
and irreducible and has a limit distribution.
Proof. X is aperiodic. Assume that there are (at least) n + 2 agents i1, i2, ..., in+2.
Suppose X is in a state Wx where at least one agent has $n or more and the others
have less than their threshold amount of scrip. There must exist such a state by our
assumption that m is interesting (i.e. neither too small nor too high). There exists a
cycle of length n+ 1 from state Wx to itself: i2, i3, ..., in+1 volunteer for i1, then i1, i3,
..., in+1 volunteer for i2, and so on until i1, i2, ..., in volunteer for in+1. There is also a
cycle of length n+ 2: i2, i3, ..., in+1 volunteer for i1, then i1, i3, i4, ..., in, in+2 volunteer
for i2, then i1, i2, i4, ..., in−1, in+1, in+2 volunteer for i3, and so on until i2, i3, ..., in+1
for in+2.
X is irreducible. Indeed, a Markov chain is said to be irreducible if all states commu-
nicate, or, in other words, if it is possible to reach any state from any other state. For
any pair of states i and j of the Markov chain X , we can show that the probability of
going from i to j in a finite number of steps is strictly greater than 0, proving that any
state is reachable from any other one.
Finally, as the number of states W is finite, X is also finite, and thus a limit distri-
bution exists, and it is independent of the state in which the system starts [144].
2For simplicity, we assume that no one’s amount of scrip exceeds their threshold.
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We can express the transition probabilities for all pairs of states i and j, i 6= j that
are directly reachable from each other3 as
Pij =
1
|A| ·
1(|V|−I
n
) , (6.2)
where A is the set of agents who can afford a service, i.e. who have at least $n, in state
i, and V is the set of volunteers, i.e. agents who have not reached their threshold amount
of scrip, in state i too, and I is 1 if the agent requesting the service has an amount
of scrip that is under his threshold, and 0 otherwise (because an agent cannot satisfy
his own request). The transition probabilities depend on the values |A| and |V| that
vary among the different states. Thus, the limit distribution is not uniform, even when
n = 1. Instead of computing this limit distribution, we will focus on the corresponding
distribution of scrip, because we are not interested in who has how much scrip, rather in
the fraction of people that have a given amount of scrip.
For each state W of the Markov chain X , there is a distribution of scrip M that
describes the fraction of agents for each possible amount of scrip. More precisely, M ti
represents the fraction of agents of type t who own $i.4 For instance, if there is only one
type of agent and we are in a state W where money is uniformly distributed (x(j) = m
∀j), then M tm = 1, and all other M ti are equal to zero. The distribution of scrip must
satisfy two constraints:
∑
t
kt∑
i=0
iM ti = m (6.3)
kt∑
i=0
M ti = ft (6.4)
First, the average amount of money is equal to m, and second, the fraction of agents
playing skt is equal to ft (fraction of agents of type t). One can show that, if N is large,
there exists a particular distribution M∗ such that, with high probability, the Markov
chain X will almost always be in a state Wx such that the related distribution of scrip
Mx is close to M∗. This kind of convergence around the most likely distribution is known
as a concentration phenomenon in statistical mechanics [99]. According to Lemma 6.1,
we can state that M∗ exists. Before characterizing M∗, let us define two matrices B and
C of size (n+ 1)× (n+ 1):
B =

1 0 · · · 0 −θn
0
In
...
0
C =

1 + θn 0 · · · 0 −θn
0
In
...
0

where In is the identity matrix of size n, θn = 1λn , λ chosen to ensure that (6.3) is satisfied
with the distribution M∗ defined in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Given a payoff-heterogenous population, the distribution of scrip in a
one-to-n scrip system will converge to
(M∗)ti =
ftpi
t
i∑kt
j=0 pi
t
j
(6.5)
3Pij = 0 if i and j do not directly communicate with each other.
4Mi represents the fraction of agents who own $i, regardless of their type.
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where the piti ’s are defined in the following way:
eti = B
n−1−iCkt−2n+1vpitkt , if i ∈ [0, n− 2];
eti = C
kt−n−ivpitkt , if i ∈ [n− 1, kt − n− 1];
piti = θn(1 + θn)
kt−i−1pitkt , if i ∈ [kt − n, kt − 1].
eti and v are vectors of size (n+ 1) defined as:
eti =
 pi
t
i
...
piti+n
 v =

θn(1 + θn)
n−1
...
θn(1 + θn)
θn
1

Proof. Let us focus on one type t and then generalize for all types. Knowing that agents
of type t have kt + 1 possible states of wealth (i.e., their amount of scrip can go from 0
to kt), we can define a Markov chain Y over kt + 1 states that describes the amount of
scrip an agent of type t can own. When the Markov chain is in some state, it can either
move one state up, or move n states down, or stay in the same state. The probability of
moving one state up is
P (Yi+1|Yi) = n|V| (6.6)
and the probability of moving n states down is
P (Yi−n|Yi) = 1|A| (6.7)
where A is the set of agents who can afford a service and V is the set of volunteers.
There is one state from which the Markov chain cannot go up (the state where the
agent has kt + 1 dollars), and some states from which Y cannot go down (the states
where the agent has less than n dollars). From (6.6) and (6.7), we can express the
balance equations for all states:
1
|A|pii =
n
|V|pii−1, if i = kt;(
1
|A| +
n
|V|
)
pii =
n
|V|pii−1, if i ∈ [kt − n+ 1, kt − 1];(
1
|A| +
n
|V|
)
pii =
n
|V|pii−1 +
1
|A|pii+n, if i ∈ [n, kt − n];
n
|V|pii =
n
|V|pii−1 +
1
|A|pii+n, if i ∈ [1, n− 1];
n
|V|pii =
1
|A|pii+n, if i = 0.
By multiplying everything by |V|n and setting λ =
|A|
|V| (the ratio between |A| and |V| is
constrained by Equ. (6.3)), we get
1
λnpii = pii−1, if i = kt;(
1
λn + 1
)
pii = pii−1, if i ∈ [kt − n+ 1, kt − 1];(
1
λn + 1
)
pii = pii−1 + 1λnpii+n, if i ∈ [n, kt − n];
pii = pii−1 + 1λnpii+n, if i ∈ [1, n− 1];
pii =
1
λnpii+n, if i = 0.
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We then set θn =
1
λn and get the following recursions that fully describe the Markov
chain distribution:
pii = θnpii+1, if i = kt − 1;
pii = (1 + θn)pii+1, if i ∈ [kt − n, kt − 2];
pii = (1 + θn)pii+1 − θnpii+n+1, if i ∈ [n− 1, kt − n− 1];
pii = pii+1 − θnpii+n, if i ∈ [0, n− 2].
We can then express the last (n+ 1) pii’s (but pikt) with respect to pikt :
pii = θn(1 + θn)
kt−i−1pikt ∀i ∈ [kt − n, kt − 1]. (6.8)
From these n+ 1 values, we can build the vector v that will be used for the calculation
of all other probabilities:
v =

θn(1 + θn)
n−1
...
θn(1 + θn)
θn
1
 (6.9)
Then, we can write 
pikt−n
...
pikt−1
pikt
 = vpikt (6.10)
As ∀i ∈ [n − 1, kt − n − 1], pii = (1 + θn)pii+1 − θnpii+n+1, we can build a matrix C of
size (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) that will be used for computing these probabilities:
C =

1 + θn 0 · · · 0 −θn
0
In
...
0
 (6.11)
where In is the identity matrix of size n. We can then express, for instance, the (non-
normalized) probabilities from state kt − n− 1 to state kt − 1 in the following vectorial
form: pikt−n−1...
pikt−1
 = C
pikt−n...
pikt
 = Cvpikt (6.12)
By induction, we get the general form:pikt−n−j...
pikt−j
 = Cj
pikt−n...
pikt
 = Cjvpikt . (6.13)
Thus, we can compute pii, ∀i ∈ [n− 1, kt − n− 1]: pii...
pii+n
 = Ckt−n−ivpikt (6.14)
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Finally, as ∀i ∈ [0, n−2], pii = pii+1−θnpii+n+1, we build a matrix B of size (n+1)×(n+1)
that will help computing the remaining probabilities:
B =

1 0 · · · 0 −θn
0
In
...
0
 (6.15)
We can then express the non-normalized probabilities from state n− 2 to 2n− 2: pin−2...
pi2n−2
 = B
 pin−1...
pi2n−1
 = BCkt−2n+1vpikt (6.16)
By induction again, we get the general form: pin−1−j...
pi2n−1−j
 = Bj
 pin−1...
pi2n−1
 = BjCkt−2n+1vpikt . (6.17)
Hence, we can compute pii, ∀i ∈ [0, n− 2], pii...
pii+n
 = Bn−1−jCkt−2n+1vpikt (6.18)
By defining ei =
[
pii · · · pii+n
]T
, we get
ei = B
n−1−iCkt−2n+1vpikt , if i ∈ [0, n− 2];
ei = C
kt−n−ivpikt , if i ∈ [n− 1, kt − n− 1];
pii = θn(1 + θn)
kt−i−1pikt , if i ∈ [kt − n, kt − 1].
(6.19)
There just remains to normalize the pii’s to get the distribution of scrip:
(M∗)i =
pii∑kt
j=0 pij
. (6.20)
By multiplying by the fraction of agents of each type, we get the complete characterization
of the distribution of scrip:
(M∗)ti =
ftpi
t
i∑kt
j=0 pi
t
j
.
We have run simulations of the one-to-n scrip system in order to evaluate how close a
real-system limit distribution was to the theoretical limit distribution found in Theorem
6.1. Figure 6.1 illustrates the distribution of scrip in a one-to-n scrip system with 1000
agents with same type, m = 10, kt = 30, n = 5 and (bt, ct, δt, αt, βt, γt) = (1, 0.05,
0.95, 1, 1, 1). The dark bars show the theoretical distribution, whereas the light ones
show the averaged distribution of scrip after 10,000 steps in the simulated model. Both
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Figure 6.1: Distribution of scrip with n = 5 and kt = 30 for 1000 agents. Dark (black)
bars represent the theoretical distribution obtained in Theorem 6.1, whereas simulation
results (after 10, 000 iterations) are shown in light (blue).
distributions have very similar shapes. This allows us to believe that a real system would
converge to some point close to the theoretical limit distribution. Back to the example
depicted in Figure 6.1, we notice that both distributions increase until their peaks (at
n − 1 = 4), and then decrease until a very small peak (at kt − n = 25). We notice a
concentration of agents who have reached their threshold (at kt = 30). By doing more
simulations with various values of n, we have noticed the maximum of the curves always
stands at (n−1) if m remains smaller than half of kt. This clearly shows how n influences
the distribution of scrip.
6.3.2 Game Results: Strategies and Equilibria
In this section, we first analytically verify whether there exist an -best reply and a
consequent nontrivial -Nash equilibrium in the one-to-n scrip system. Then, we evaluate
the effect of n on the agents’ strategies and on the Nash equilibrium. In particular, we
show to what extent n influences the threshold vector k. These results will help us
measure the social welfare in the next section.
Note that δt has to be sufficiently large for all types t in order to reach a nontrivial
Nash equilibrium where all agents follow a threshold strategy. If the discount factor is
so small that it discounts too much future utility, all that matters is present utility and
there is no incentive to volunteer now for future benefit. In this case, the only Nash
equilibrium (trivial one) is to always defect for all agents. Thus, let us assume that
δt > δ
∗, ∀t. Moreover, all nontrivial Nash equilibria in threshold strategies will be of the
form sk with kt ≥ n, ∀t. Indeed, there is no incentive for a rational agent to volunteer
up to kt < n and then defect, because, in this case, the agent would never be able to
afford any service.
In order to analyze the game, we consider a single agent i of type t, from whom point
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of view the system can be modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP). If N is large
and n reasonably small with respect to N , what agent i does has essentially no effect on
the behavior of the system and no great impact on the scrip distribution. We will later
see that finding the best reply of agent i to the other agents’ strategies is equivalent to
finding an optimal policy for his MDP.
Assuming that the distribution of scrip is close to M∗ (defined in Theorem 6.1) and
all other agents have fixed their thresholds according to k, we can compute two crucial
probabilities for the optimal decision of agent i:
(i) pu, which is the probability of earning a dollar:
|A| − I
N
n
|V| =
1−∑
t
n−1∑
j=0
(M∗)tj
 n
1−∑t(M∗)tkt
(ii) pd, which is the probability of agent i having a request satisfied, or equivalently,
of spending n dollars:
1
N
Pr (|V| ≥ n) ∼= 1
N
pu is the product of two probabilities: (i) the probability that some agent other than
i who has n dollars is chosen to make a request, and (ii) the probability that i is the
agent chosen to satisfy it. Whereas the first probability decreases a little with n, the
second increases linearly with n, and thus pu increases almost linearly with n. pd is the
probability of agent i will have a request satisfied, which can be approximated to the
probability that agent i will be chosen to make a request.5 This probability only depends
on N . However, n will influence the repercussion of pd because if the agent is chosen to
make a request, he will then spend $n.
It follows from [142] that there exists an optimal policy for the MDP of agent i that is
a threshold policy. This threshold, kt, depends on pu, pd, bt, ct, δt, and n. We will prove
later the effect of n on kt. Note here that kt must be a multiple of n. Indeed, supposing
that an agent should decide between a threshold kt (multiple of n) and a threshold kt+1,
he would choose kt + 1 only if the extra dollar would give him the opportunity to make
one more request than with kt, and gain more benefit in the future. As the agent needs n
dollars to pay for a service, the extra dollar will be worth nothing, and eventually wasted.
The cost ct led by this extra dollar will not be compensated by a shorter expected time
to make a request, assuming that δt is large enough and ct is non-negligible.
Furthermore, if every other agent is playing a threshold strategy, for all m and  > 0,
there exists an optimal threshold policy that is an -best reply to the strategy profile
sk. This is valid only for δt > δ
∗, large N , and n reasonably small with respect to
N . Moreover, considering -best reply formalizes the fact that the optimal policy of the
MDP and the best reply are not exactly the same. Indeed, both pu and pd are related to
agent i’s MDP and they slightly differ from the corresponding probabilities of the game.
They are only close with high probability, and after some amount of time. For instance,
remember that we consider distribution M∗ in the MDP, whereas the actual distribution
in the game will be close but still different.
Before proving that a nontrivial -Nash equilibrium exists, we must show that the best
reply function is non-decreasing in k. Let BRtm(sk) be the best reply of an agent of type
5It is almost sure that n agents will be willing and able to volunteer under our initial assumption
that n is reasonably small with respect to N . See Formula (6.23) for more details.
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t given an average amount of money equal to m and the strategy profile sk. BR
t
m(sk)
is non-decreasing in k. First, it can be shown that if k′ ≥ k (i.e., k′t ≥ kt, ∀t), then∑n−1
j=0 (M
∗)t
′
j ≥
∑n−1
j=0 (M
∗)tj and (M
∗)t
′
k′t
≤ (M∗)tkt for all types t. This means that, by
increasing the threshold vector, more agents will not be able to afford a service, and fewer
agents will reach their threshold. Therefore, with k′, there will be fewer opportunities to
earn money and more agents willing to volunteer for those opportunities, meaning that
agents will earn money less often. Thus, agents will run out of money sooner. Hence,
the utility of earning more scrip will increase, and as a result so well the best reply. We
can now prove the existence of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.2. For δt > δ
∗, large N and n reasonably small with respect to N , there
exists a nontrivial -Nash equilibrium where all agents of type t play skt for some kt = ltn,
lt ∈ N.
Proof. As the best reply function BR is non-decreasing, Tarski’s fixed point theorem
ensures that there exist a least and a greatest fixed point [159] that are equilibria. The
least fixed point is the trivial equilibrium, and the greatest one can be reached by starting
with s∞ for all agents and using best-reply dynamics [107]. Moreover, if δt > δ∗, there
exists a strategy profile k such that BR(k) ≥ k. Monotonicity ensures that the greatest
fixed point k∗ is greater or equal to k, and thus gives a nontrivial equilibrium. Note that
n affects the nontrivial -Nash equilibrium. The higher n is, the further the MDP will
be from the actual game. However, we can finely tune  to cope with higher values of n.
Moreover, as stated before, the best reply, for all types of agent, is a multiple of n.
The natural question that arises from the above theorem is: To what extent does n
influence kt, for all types t? We already know that, ∀t, kt must be a multiple of n. In
fact, k increases with bt(n), thus with n as proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3. For given values of m, ct, αt, βt, γt, and δt > δ
∗ for all t, the threshold
vector k is increasing in n. More precisely, if bt = bt(n),
k ∼ Ω(bt(n)) (6.21)
Proof. Let us focus on the threshold kt = k of a particular agent and generalize it to the
threshold vector k. k is defined as the maximum value such that
ct ≤ E[δj(k,pu,pd)t ]bt (6.22)
holds, where j(k, pu, pd) is a random variable whose value is the first round in which an
agent starting with k dollars, using strategy sk, has less than n dollars. The expectation
is simply the discounted factor that will affect the agent’s benefit at round j. First, we
know that pu increases almost linearly with n. Moreover, pd is independent of n but the
effect of being chosen to make a request is linear to n, as the agent will spend n dollars in
that case. Thus, the effects of pu and pd on j(k, pu, pd) approximately compensate each
other. Assuming that bt generally increases with n, the right part of (6.22) will increase
with n if k remains unchanged. As ct is fixed, the increase in bt allows for the decrease
of E[δ
j(k,pu,pd)
t ] in front of bt and still satisfy the inequality. As j(k, pu, pd) increases in
k (the higher the threshold is, the more money we have and the later we go under $n)
and E[δjt ] decreases in j, E[δ
j(k,pu,pd)
t ] decreases in k. Moreover, as δt is close to one,
E[δ
j(k,pu,pd)
t ] decreases in o(j(k, pu, pd)), and so in o(k). Thus, k can be increased with
bt(n), more precisely in Ω(bt(n)).
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Our results in this subsection show the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium under
certain conditions, as well as some properties of this equilibrium. In the next section, we
focus on the social welfare and the optimal amount of scrip in the system.
6.4 Social Welfare
In this section, we investigate how much scrip should be allocated in the one-to-n scrip
system in order to optimize its performance, and thus social welfare.
A natural question arises when the system is at equilibrium: How good is it? Consider
a single transaction involving only agents of type t. If a request is satisfied, social welfare
increases by bt − nct > 0. If no request is satisfied then no utility is gained. For a
utility gain to happen, two events are required: (i) the agent chosen to make a request
must have $n, which occurs with probability 1 −∑n−1i=0 Mi, and (ii) there must be n
volunteers able and willing to satisfy the request. If µ is the fraction of agents at their
threshold (i.e., the agents who do not want to volunteer), the probability of having at
least n volunteers able to satisfy a request is
P (|V| ≥ n) = 1− P (|V| < n) = 1−
n−1∑
i=0
βit(1− βt)(1−µ)N−i
= 1− (1− βt)(1−µ)N ·
1−
(
βt
1−βt
)n
1− βt1−βt
. (6.23)
Expression
1−( βt1−βt )
n
1− βt1−βt
goes to 1 if βt is close to 0 or n = 1. This expression grows until
infinity if βt approaches 1. However, this factor is negligible with respect to (1−βt)(1−τ)N
if n is small with respect to N , which is always the case by assumption. As (1−βt)(1−τ)N
converges to 0 for large N or βt close to 1, the probability of finding n volunteers can be
approximated by 1.
The total expected social welfare over all time is then
(1−
n−1∑
i=0
Mi)
bt − nct
1− δt . (6.24)
First of all, social welfare is maximized by minimizing the fraction of agents with less than
n dollars. We can make
∑n−1
i=0 Mi decrease by adding more scrip in the system. Indeed,
if N is fixed, by increasing W , and thus m, the number of “poor” agents decreases.
Thus, social welfare increases in m. However, social welfare does not increase to infinity
with m and, beyond a certain average amount of money m∗, the only Nash equilibrium
reached by the one-to-n scrip system is the trivial one, where no agent volunteers. We
now evaluate the influence of n on the social welfare.
Theorem 6.4. For given values of bt, ct, δt, and m < m
∗, social welfare of a one-to-n
scrip system is decreasing in n.
Proof. In (1 −∑n−1i=0 (M∗)i)(bt − nct)/(1 − δt), two factors depend on n. First, (1 −∑n−1
i=0 (M
∗)i) decreases in n. Indeed, from Theorem 6.1, we can compute that, if n′ > n,∑n′−1
i=0 (M
∗)′i >
∑n−1
i=0 (M
∗)i. Actually this sum increases approximately linearly with
n. Second, (bt − nct) clearly decreases in n if bt remains constant. Consequently, the
whole expression decreases in n, and thus social welfare.
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Figure 6.2: Social welfare for various average amounts of scrip m and various n. When
m is too large with respect to n, social welfare falls to 0 (monetary crash).
Figure 6.2 shows social welfare with respect to n and m, with the same population
used in Figure 6.1. The only change is that now the benefit varies with n: bt(1) = 0.7,
bt(2) = 0.9 and bt(n) = 1, ∀n > 2. We notice that social welfare tends to decrease with
n. The only scenario where it increases slightly is when m = 4 and n moves from 1 to
2. In this case, the increase in benefit is greater than the loss in cost and the loss due to
agents that cannot afford a service. Note that social welfare falls to 0 when the average
amount of money is too high with respect to n (e.g., when m = 10 and n = 1 or 2).
The fact that social welfare generally decreases with n seems surprising at first sight.
Indeed, the more volunteers helping you, the higher the social welfare should be. Thus,
the result is counterintuitive. There are two possible explanations for that. First, we
must keep in mind that the n volunteers are not optional at all; without them no benefit
can be obtained. Moreover, the cost of volunteering ct does not decrease if more agents
volunteer. The cost for each agent remains the same, regardless of n, thus the total cost
for the system increases linearly with n. On the contrary, the benefit bt does not usually
increase so much with higher n. We can solve the first issue, or at least decrease its
negative impact, by increasing the amount of scrip in the system. Indeed, in Theorem
6.4, we assume a fixed average amount of scrip, whereas a system requiring a higher
number of volunteers per request will certainly need more scrip in circulation. This
intuition is formalized by the following corollary.
Corollary 6.1. Assuming all other parameters are fixed, for a certain n, social wel-
fare increases in m. It increases up to a certain average amount of scrip, m∗n, beyond
which there only exists the trivial Nash equilibrium (monetary crash). Furthermore, m∗n
increases in n.
Proof. The threshold vector k decreases when m increases, due to best-reply dynam-
ics. Moreover, from the definition of M∗ in Theorem 6.1, we can prove that
∑n−1
i=0 (M
∗)i
decreases if k decreases. Thus, 1−∑n−1i=0 (M∗)i and social welfare increase if m is increas-
ing. Furthermore, from Theorem 6.3, we know that the threshold vector at equilibrium
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k increases with n. Thus, the threshold vector k will still decrease when m is increased
but will reach zero (trivial equilibrium) beyond higher m with larger n. In other words,
the system will bear a higher average amount of money before crashing when n increases.
Hence, m∗n increases in n.
Figure 6.2 depicts the positive effect of higher m on the social welfare. It also shows
that scrip systems with higher n support higher average amount of scrip. For instance,
when m = 10, the system crashes with n = 1 or n = 2 but not with n ≥ 3. The ratio
m∗n/n must not go over a certain value that will be formally defined in future work. The
fact that m∗n is increasing in n can be well explained. When n increases, the agents feel
less wealthy if they keep the same threshold values. Indeed, knowing that they then need
more dollars to afford a single request, they will certainly be willing to save more dollars
for future requests. Thus, if n increases, the agents will stop volunteering later, and thus
the system will experience a monetary crash beyond a higher m∗n. Indeed, a monetary
crash appears when agents feel so rich that they are not willing to volunteer anymore.
Increasing n prevents such behavior.
6.5 Applications in Privacy Protection
In this section, we present two privacy-enhancing applications where a one-to-n scrip
system can help improve fairness and efficiency: (i) anonymity networks [56, 51, 68, 143],
and (ii) privacy-preserving data aggregation in participatory sensing [149]. Of course,
our one-to-n scrip system could also apply to other privacy-enhancing systems where
cooperation is needed, such as mix zones [37, 69] or collaborative sharing of informa-
tion [151, 146] in location privacy. We focus on the two aforementioned examples be-
cause (i) anonymity networks are currently used by hundred of thousands of people to
communicate and browse the Web anonymously, and (ii) participatory sensing could pro-
vide great benefits to society if there are enough mobile users participating in it, which
would be possible only if the privacy of participants is ensured. In both examples, the
more users involved in the privacy-preserving system, the higher privacy level the system
reaches. Thus, it is absolutely crucial to have as many users as possible. Moreover, it
is of the utmost importance that users help each other, i.e. volunteer for each other, in
order to preserve the participants’ privacy.
6.5.1 Anonymity Networks
Anonymity networks intend to prevent the Internet traffic of individuals from being
tracked by governments or websites. As Tor [56] is the most popular anonymity network,
we will focus on it for the rest of this section, even though the one-to-n scrip system can
be applied to any other anonymity system.
The Tor network is based on onion routing, a design that creates a private network
pathway by incrementally building a circuit of encrypted connections through relays
(onion routers) on the network. Data packets are repeatedly encrypted (using the relays’
public keys) and sent through multiple relays. Then, each relay removes a layer of
encryption using its private key (it peels one layer of the onion) to uncover the address of
the next relay on the path, and sends the packet to this relay where the same operation
is repeated. In this way, no relay ever knows the complete path that a packet has taken.
In order to prevent traffic linkability, users must renew their circuits over time. The
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Tor project website states that, currently, one circuit can be used for ten minutes [16].
The circuit’s path length, i.e. the number of relays in the circuit, is a key parameter
in Tor’s deployment. As suggested in [56], using one or two hops only would allow for
colluding relays to know too easily both the source and destination packets. Thus, the
authors recommend to always choose at least three relays per circuit. In the current
implementation, Tor selects exactly three relays for each circuit [16].
The lack of relays remains one of the main challenges in anonymity networks [57].
There are currently (December 2014) around 10,500 Tor relays (including bridges) for
2.25 million clients [15]. The corresponding client-to-relay ratio is not likely to decrease
if the Tor network does not provide incentives for users to relay others’ traffic. Acquisti
et al. were the first to formalize the economics of anonymity and propose incentives to
encourage users to serve for others [20]. The original Tor proposal already mentioned the
need of incentives for a long-term scalable development of such an anonymity system [56].
In the last few years, various incentive mechanisms have been proposed. The first cate-
gory of incentives is based on differentiated service for Tor users running a relay [136, 98].
The second category proposes to foster participation in traffic relaying by rewarding vol-
unteers with anonymous micropayments [48, 27, 98]. Our idea is that users should reward
their Tor relays with the micropayments earned when relaying others’ traffic, everybody
being involved in the relaying work such as in a P2P anonymity network [143, 68]. In
this way, the anonymity workload will be shared among all the users benefiting from the
system, thus ensuring fairness and preventing free-riding. Figueiredo et al. provided an
anonymous payment-based incentive for such networks [65]. Note that all of the afore-
mentioned micropayment-based incentive mechanisms proposed techniques to distribute
coins (scrip) in an anonymous way, in order that privacy gains provided by anonymity
networks are not jeopardized. Figure 6.3 depicts an example of this approach. It would
ideally reduce the client-to-relay ratio to 1:1, i.e. all Tor clients would eventually run a
relay.6 In order to analyze and evaluate optimal incentives to provide to the anonymity
network, we can rely on the one-to-n scrip system.
In current implementation of Tor, n is equal to 3 . This means that, in our scrip
model, a Tor user will have to pay $3 whenever he wants to create a new circuit in the
Tor network. It is difficult to evaluate whether the anonymity benefit would increase
with a larger n. We know that, with n = 1 or 2, the system would be too vulnerable to
insider attacks. However, would the level of privacy really increase with n greater than
3? We will consider bt constant for n ≥ 3. Different types of benefits can encompass the
fact that some users value anonymity more than others. The cost ct of traffic relaying
represents the bandwidth and power consumption used to forward Tor traffic. Different
costs can represent various bandwidth or power capabilities of the relays. Assuming that
all relays are of type t, the total cost of one request is equal to nct. We notice that
the cost induced by one anonymity service request is increasing linearly with n, whereas
the anonymity benefit remains more or less constant as soon as it reaches an acceptable
value for n. Hence, the system designer should keep n small to keep the relays’ costs
acceptable, and thus optimize social welfare. It is certainly a reason why Tor designers
have chosen to set n = 3.
Concerning the other scrip system parameters, αt, βt, γt, they can model different
6In order to not discriminate Tor clients that cannot run a relay due to censorship, such as in
China [18], we will make some exceptions and let such users benefit from Tor service for free. Indeed,
denying anonymity to clients in censored regions would go against Tor’s praiseworthy aim.
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Figure 6.3: Example of an anonymity network with 3 circuits (AGEJB, EIHAF and
CGHID) and 3 relays per circuit. Each user includes $3 for each circuit he wants to
build for anonymous communication. Then, each peer that accepts to relay traffic is
rewarded with $1 and can use it for his own relay requests.
behaviors and characteristics of the Tor users. First, αt represents the request rate.
Users surfing the Web more often in an anonymous way will request more service from
Tor relays, thus αt will increase. Second, a Tor agent might not be able to satisfy a
traffic relaying request, which is encompassed in the value βt. Finally, some Tor relays
can have higher bandwidth than others, thus a higher quality of service when relaying
traffic, or be well-known and more used than others. This could be represented by γt,
which is the likelihood that an agent is chosen when he volunteers.
We have run simulations of an anonymity network with N = 300, 000, n = 3 and
the same homogenous population used in Figure 6.1, i.e. bt = 1, ct = 0.05, δt = 0.95,
and αt = βt = γt = 1. Apart from N and n, the simulation parameters are not easy to
determine and we plan to further investigate these in future work. Under these settings,
the social welfare is maximized at m = 10 < m∗3. With this average amount of money,
there is only 2.5% of agents who cannot afford a service (i.e., with less than $3). We
conclude that a system designer should allocate m · N = 3 million dollars within an
anonymity networks of 300,000 users in order to optimize its efficiency.7
6.5.2 Privacy in Participatory Sensing
Participatory sensing is an example of novel mobile systems that leverage new capabilities
in computation, communication, storage and sensing of mobile devices [43]. In participa-
tory sensing, mobile users share sensing information, possibly including personal and/or
location data, with service providers. However, the emergence of such people-centric
systems leads to many issues, among which privacy is one of the most critical. Mobile
7Figure 6.2 provides more results on the social welfare for different values of n and m.
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users would certainly be willing to share sensing data, e.g. to help monitoring urban air
pollution [87], but not at any cost to their privacy.
Shi et al. have recently proposed a concrete privacy-preserving data aggregation
scheme for participatory sensing [149]. In this privacy-preserving mechanism, mobile
nodes rely on their nearby peers to “hide” their data from the aggregation server (or
service provider) that could be malicious (or at least curious), thus requiring cooperation
from mobile nodes in their vicinity. Figure 6.4 depicts an example of this privacy-
preserving scheme. First, each sensing node8 slices its data into n + 1 pieces, sends n
encrypted pieces to neighbor nodes and retains the last piece. Second, the mobile nodes
receiving pieces of data from other nodes aggregate all received pieces of data before
transmitting them towards the aggregation server. Assuming that a fraction R of mobile
nodes are malicious and can collude with the aggregation server, the normalized level of
privacy is proportional to
P = max{1−Rn −R|S|−1, 0} (6.25)
where |S| is the number of sensing nodes, which is equal to N if we assume that all
users participating in the privacy-preserving scheme are also sensing nodes. Thus, the
level of privacy increases with N , but also with n. However, this privacy-enhancing tech-
nique induces significant communication and computation overhead that also increases
with n. As battery consumption is, with privacy, one of the main concerns of mobile
users in participatory sensing, these communication and computation costs might pre-
vent participants from volunteering to cover other nodes’ data, thus threatening the
whole privacy-preserving system. In order to foster cooperation and prevent free-riding,
we propose to reward with scrip the mobile nodes that volunteer, and to rely on the
one-to-n scrip system to optimize the efficiency of the monetary incentive.
First, contrarily to Tor networks, the value n is not at all defined in the initial proposal
[149]. The system designer can tune this value to increase the privacy level provided by
the mechanism, at the cost of communication overhead. Therefore, we do not attach any
fixed value to n. Note that n should remain reasonably small with respect to the number
of mobile nodes in the system in order for our theoretical results to apply. This will
certainly be the case as the sensing nodes requesting help from others also suffer from
too high communication overhead when they send their slices to too many neighbors.
Thus, they will cap the number of “cover nodes” by themselves.
The benefit bt that a sensing node (of type t) gains when a request is satisfied is
related to the privacy utility it gains. As Equation (6.25) shows, bt is dependent on n.
Furthermore, as R is smaller or equal than one, bt(n) ∝ P increases with n. Moreover,
different types of benefits can encompass the fact that some agents are more privacy
cautious and sensitive than others. The cost of volunteering is equal to ct for all nodes of
type t. This cost represents the communication and computation overheads that lead to
higher battery consumption. The type of ct can represent the fact that some users are less
willing to consume their battery or merely that their battery has a shorter lifetime. In
conclusion, we clearly notice that the cost of one privacy-preserving request is increasing
linearly with n, whereas the privacy benefit is increasing with n, but less than linearly.
Hence, even if the requester gets higher payoff if he can send more data slices to more
neighbors, the overall utility of the system, social welfare, is decreased.
8A sensing node refers to any agent who uses his mobile device to sense his environment and submits
sensing data.
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Figure 6.4: Example of privacy-preserving data aggregation in participatory sensing.
Each mobile node sends data slices to neighbors in order to mix them. For encouraging
cooperation, each node includes a fixed amount of scrip in all data slices.
The sensing nodes can have different amount of sensing data to submit to the aggre-
gation server. This can be well described by the request rate αt. Indeed, if nodes are
collecting and submitting more data, they will request help of nearby peers more often.
Furthermore, an agent might be unable to satisfy a request. For instance, its device can
run out of battery or he can have a call at the same time. This can be encompassed in
βt. Finally, a node can be asked for covering others’ data slices more often than others.
For example, an agent can spend more time than another in a neighborhood with higher
density of mobile sensing nodes. This difference can be represented by the likelihood that
an agent is chosen when he volunteers, γt. As a concluding remark, we must mention
that the number of data slices n a sensing node can send is also dependent on the density
of the nodes in its vicinity. Thus, the optimal choice of n does not only depend on the
nodes’ privacy sensitivity, but also on the network density constraints.
We have also run experiments for participatory sensing systems, with various values
of N and n. For N = 1000 and n = 6 and the same type of agents than for the previous
application, social welfare is maximized with m = 16. This value is very close to m∗6
over which the system crashes. This average amount of scrip counterbalances the large
value of n very well. It leads to almost the same percentage of agents who cannot afford
a service (agents with less than $6) than in Tor example with n = 3 (around 2.5%).
Hence, in this scenario, a system designer should allocate m ·N = 16, 000 dollars within
the system to optimize its efficiency.
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6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed the first scrip system model that is able to tackle eco-
nomic systems where one agent needs multiple volunteers simultaneously in order to have
his request satisfied. For the novel one-to-n scrip system, we have proved that decisions
agents make, based on threshold strategies, lead to -Nash equilibrium. Assuming that
all agents of the system use threshold strategies, we have shown that the limit distribu-
tion towards which our scrip system will converge highly depends on n. Simulations of
the one-to-n scrip system confirm this convergence. We have studied the effect of n on
all results, notably on the agents’ strategies, on the social welfare and on the maximum
amount of scrip that the system can handle before crashing. We have proved that, at
equilibrium, the agents increase their thresholds if n increases. However, in this case,
social welfare decreases, which can be partially resolved by adding more scrip in the
system. This is possible because the maximum average amount of scrip that the system
can bear before it crashes increases with n. Finally, we have shown that our upgraded
scrip system can help improve fairness and efficiency in two privacy-enhancing applica-
tions where cooperative volunteers are required. We have notably evaluated the average
amount of scrip per agent that should be allocated into the Tor network to optimize its
performance and fairness.
In future work, it would be interesting to investigate agents’ possible strategies other
than thresholds. Furthermore, non-standard behaviors such as altruism or hoarding
could be studied. These behaviors should not necessarily be considered as irrational:
(i) altruists can benefit from providing help to others, and (ii) hoarders may get some
utility from owning more scrip. Finally, newcomers and their effect on the amount of
scrip in circulation could be evaluated. As a consequence, variable prices could also be
considered in the model.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have studied the impact on privacy of one of the fundamental character-
istics of humanity: interdependence between individuals. We evaluate how other people
can compromise our privacy, in both the social and biological dimensions of our identity.
We complete this thesis by studying scenarios where others can play a beneficial role in
privacy. This is typically the case in today’s most popular privacy-enhancing tool, Tor,
used by millions of people around the world.
In Part I, we have shown that an external adversary can efficiently find most users in
an OSN by exploiting information publicly disclosed by other OSN users. Our navigation
attack discovers two thirds of the targeted users in Facebook, and 59% of targeted users
in Google+, in a median number of crawled users smaller than 400, respectively 300. This
suggests that it is almost impossible for any participant in an online social network to
“hide in the crowd” by excluding his name from the central directory. One main reason
for failed cases is the privacy behaviors of the targets’ friends: the fewer friends who have
public attributes and public social links, the less likely the target is to be found. This
demonstrates the crucial role of social ties for privacy in OSNs. Another finding of our
research is that OSN-membership privacy cannot be ensured because of other people’s
weak privacy settings.
In Part II, we first formally quantify genomic privacy of individuals in a family by
relying upon Bayesian inference. In order to efficiently compute the posterior distribu-
tions resulting from the observation of some genomic data, we make use of probabilistic
graphical models and belief propagation. In order to express genomic privacy, we propose
different metrics widely used and recognized by the privacy research community that rep-
resent: (i) the (in)correctness of the adversary’s estimation, and (ii) the (un)certainty
in the adversary’s estimation. In order to obtain more tangible metrics, we go one step
further by quantifying health privacy of individuals. We evaluate our quantification
framework on real genomic data, and show the scale of the threat by matching genomic
profiles with OSN profiles publicly available online. Our results notably show that, by
disclosing only 10% of its genomic data, a family can lose more than 50% of its global ge-
nomic privacy. We evaluate the interplay between family members with non-cooperative
behaviors regarding the privacy of their genomic data. We derive closed-form expressions
to measure genomic privacy, as well as closed-form expressions of the Nash equilibria, in
the two-player context. We rely upon multi-agent influence diagrams in order to tackle
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the computational complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium in the more general n-player
setting. Our results notably show that misaligned perceived benefits in genome sharing
can create externalities that negatively affect genomic privacy. In the n-player scenario,
we notice that, when the perceived benefits do not clearly outweigh the genomic-privacy
losses, some players with similar sharing benefits might end up with different strategies
at equilibrium. Moreover, we have demonstrated that, although altruism tends to reduce
the indirect genomic-privacy losses at equilibrium, it can lead to a social outcome worse
than with a purely selfish behavior for specific values of sharing benefits. Finally, we have
proposed, in Chapter 5, an obfuscation mechanism for balancing the utility of genome
sharing with the privacy expectations of family members. Our privacy-preserving mech-
anism takes into account the fact that different parts of the genome can have different
utilities, and different levels of sensitivity for individuals.
In Part III, we have studied cooperative privacy-enhancing technologies where other
users are actually needed to provide any privacy provision, thus showing that interde-
pendence can also be beneficial for privacy. In particular, we have shown how monetary
incentives can be used and their amount optimized in order to foster cooperation between
users and to improve fairness and efficiency of the privacy-enhancing systems. We have
proved that decisions based on threshold strategies lead to a stable equilibrium. We have
also derived the maximum amount of money that the system can bear before crashing,
which happens to be the optimal amount of money for maximizing the efficiency of the
system. We have studied the impact of various parameters on our analytical results,
notably the effect of the number of cooperative agents needed in order to achieve privacy
for others. Finally, we have demonstrated the practical utility of our findings by deriving
the average amount of money that should be allocated into the Tor network in order to
optimize its performance and fairness.
In conclusion, we have clearly established the negative effect of interdependence on
privacy at both social and biological levels. This demonstrates that privacy is almost
impossible to achieve individually and independently of other people. We hope this thesis
will help raise awareness about interdependent privacy risks and encourage people to take
more into account other people’s privacy needs when making their own privacy decisions.
This is probably the only way privacy can be enhanced for the time being. We also
propose countermeasures and mechanisms for mitigating the negative impact of others’
behavior on privacy. We emphasize, however, that these privacy-preserving mechanisms
require some degree of cooperation between interdependent individuals. As cooperation
is a strong assumption in a society where self-interest has been raised to the status
of way of life, we should consider that online privacy is vanishing, and urgently begin
designing new mechanisms for the upcoming post-privacy era. Such mechanisms should,
in particular, prevent the misuse of personal data and enforce fair decision-making, in
order to eventually build a more equitable society.
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